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SUMMARY
Understanding the composition and distribution of the revenue of nonprofit
organizations (NPOs) is key to understanding NPOs themselves. Understanding revenue is
necessary for identifying the unique challenges of nonprofit management, contributing to
current debates over the proper role of NPOs in society, and even explaining the very
existence of NPOs. Even so, revenue in the nonprofit sector remains poorly understood.
This research uses revenue data for 87,127 charitable NPOs to draw three main
conclusions. First, revenue structures of NPOs vary widely among subsectors and across
organizational sizes, with many NPOs demonstrating revenue structures that might be
considered uncharacteristic of the nonprofit sector; average revenue is almost $8 million, and
fees for services generate a very high proportion of revenue—54 percent for the average
NPO. Second, despite the concerns of many nonprofit scholars, heavy dependence on either
government funding or charitable contributions is atypical of NPOs. And third, nonprofit
revenue is highly concentrated in relatively few NPOs; 20 percent of NPOs receive over 90
percent of all nonprofit revenue.
The description of revenue expands to examine the relationship between two of the
most important sources of revenue, charitable contributions and government subsidies.
Nonprofit scholars have long theorized that government funding diminishes charitable
giving, conventionally explained as donors’ negative reaction to government funding, which
they feel makes their contributions less necessary or duplicative of contributions already
made indirectly by paying taxes. The validity of this argument carries implications for policy
makers, public administrators, and nonprofit managers, yet previous research has failed to
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firmly establish the effect of subsidy on charity in the nonprofit sector. This research finds
that the effect of subsidy on charity varies substantially among the nonprofit subsectors, but,
contrary to widely accepted theory, these effects are more often positive than negative: More
than half of government funding of the nonprofit subsectors appears to spur an increase in
charitable giving, whereas only 6 percent of government funding is associated with decreased
giving. This research suggests that the effects of subsidy on charity are less likely due to the
decisions of donors than to the decisions of NPOs themselves.
These findings assuage some concerns about the future of the nonprofit sector but
substantiate others. As government increasingly relies on NPOs to deliver government-
funded services, it appears unlikely that NPOs will suffer decreases in charitable giving, and
government funding may even enable NPOs to increase revenue from charitable giving. But
marginal changes in charitable giving will not mitigate what many see as a distressing move
away from reliance on charity toward generating fees for services and generally becoming
more business-like. Whether these findings represent a nonprofit sector betraying its
charitable roots, diluting its power to effect social change by “corporatizing,” emphasizing
service delivery at the expense of advocacy, or becoming more efficient, financially stable,
and responsive to market demands remains a matter of debate, but debate better informed by
the understanding of nonprofit revenue provided by this research.
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CHAPTER 1
Importance of Understanding the Revenue of the Nonprofit Sector
The public face of nonprofit organizations may be meager thrift stores and dilapidated
homeless shelters, but such humble facades belie the vast resources devoted to the nonprofit
sector in the United States. According to the most recent estimates the 1.6 million
organizations comprising the nonprofit sector received over $664 billion in revenue and
accounted for more than 6 percent of the total national income in 1997 (Weitzman, Jalandoni,
Lampkin, and Pollak, 2002) and generated 9 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in 2000
(Hammack, 2001). The nonprofit sector commands enormous resources, and these resources
strongly shape the character of the organizations that comprise the nonprofit sector. Even so,
revenue in the nonprofit sector remains poorly understood.
This research addresses this gap in our knowledge of the nonprofit sector by
addressing two questions about revenue of nonprofit organizations (NPOs). First, what is the
composition and distribution of the revenue in the nonprofit sector? And second, what is the
relationship between government funding of NPOs and charitable giving to NPOs? This
chapter explains these two questions and their importance for understanding the nonprofit
sector, provides background information on the types of NPOs and the types of revenue, and
introduces the data used to explore the research questions.
Understanding NPOs’ revenue to understand NPOs
Understanding the composition and distribution of revenue in the nonprofit sector is
more than a dry accounting exercise; it is key to understanding the existence of NPOs, the
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unique challenges of nonprofit management, and current debates over the proper role of the
nonprofit sector in democratic society.
Revenue and the existence of NPOs
The ability to attract charitable contributions is a distinctive feature of NPOs and
forms the basis of many NPOs’ existence. Just like for-profit businesses, NPOs generate
revenue through the voluntary exchange of goods and services for consumers’ money.
Unlike for-profit businesses’ consumers, though, many of NPOs’ “consumers”—those
individuals, foundations, corporations, and governments that donate money to NPOs—
purchase goods and services that benefit other individuals, the public at large, or groups
sharing a common interest. Whether feeding orphans, rescuing beached whales, advocating
for school vouchers, or searching for extraterrestrial intelligence, many NPOs exist as a
vehicle for charitable donors to apply their pooled resources toward a common goal. For
these NPOs, donated revenue is the tangible expression of a collective goal and a means to
work toward it.
This central role of donated revenue in defining and sustaining organizational mission
is the basis of prominent theories for explaining the existence of NPOs. Public goods theory
argues that in a democracy, government action is driven by the preferences of the median
voter, which leaves many individuals and groups dissatisfied with government output. These
individuals and groups may form voluntary organizations, including formal NPOs, willingly
“taxing” themselves to provide collective goods that are not provided by government
(Weisbrod, 1975). Similarly, the “theory of the commons” (Lohmann, 1992) emphasizes that
NPOs exist as vehicles for individuals and groups to pool resources to produce “common
2
goods” to promote values other than private gain held to be important by those supporting
NPOs.
Other theories explaining the existence of NPOs underscore the roles of types of
revenue other than charitable contributions. Highlighting the role of fee-for-service revenue,
principal-agent theory and contract failure theory posit that some NPOs exist due to
consumers’ distrust of profit-maximizing organizations in exchanges in which the consumer
cannot easily judge the quality of the goods and services, such as parents’ difficulty in
assessing the quality of their children’s daycare, and are therefore more willing to pay NPOs
for such goods and services due to their trust in NPOs’ commitment to public service
(Holtman and Ullman, 1993; Young, 1998). NPOs that rely on revenue from membership
dues are, in part, the focus of consumer control theory, which explains the existence of some
NPOs, such as social clubs and farmers’ cooperatives, in terms of the desire of members to
have control over the organization rather than relinquishing monopolistic control to
unrepresentative, profit-motivated owners (Ben-Ner, 1986).
In all of these alternative (if perhaps complementary) explanations of NPOs’
existence, NPOs’ revenue profiles are closely tied to the nature of the NPOs themselves and
the rationale for their existence, indicating whose goals the NPO exists to pursue, whose
needs the NPO must meet, whose demands must be placated, to whom the NPO must
continue to demonstrate value and trustworthiness, and whose values must be promoted by
the NPO in order for the NPO to survive.
Revenue and unique nonprofit management challenges
The theories explaining the nonprofit sector also draw attention to a reality faced by
nonprofit managers—that different sources of revenue place different sets of external
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demands on the organization. The external demands associated with revenue sources present
two different challenges to nonprofit managers: competing demands and resource
dependence. For the NPO with multiple sources of revenue, the various demands associated
with those sources may contradict each other. Alumni of a liberal arts college may exert
pressure toward conserving their alma mater’s past, while current students—and their parents
—may exert pressure toward adopting a career-focused curriculum. Unlike in the for-profit
sector, where profit maximization pleases all shareholders, prioritizing among such
competing demands in the nonprofit sector is guided by the more amorphous dedication to
organizational mission and is one of the most challenging tasks of nonprofit managers and
boards (Miller, 2002).
A lack of diversity in revenue sources, though, creates its own management
challenges. A large body of literature has established the risks associated with overreliance on
a single source of revenue, with different types of revenue carrying different risks. Too much
dependence on government funding, for example, may subject an NPO to cash flow
interruptions, bureaucratization, or distraction from the organization’s primary mission
(Froelich, 1999). Faced with the risk of competing demands from multiple revenue sources
on one hand and the risk of dependence on too few revenue sources on the other, nonprofit
managers’ work is inevitably shaped by their organizations’ revenue portfolios, underscoring
the importance of understanding the composition and distribution of revenue in the nonprofit
sector to understanding the sector itself.
Revenue and the role of the nonprofit sector in society
The role of revenue in explaining the existence of the nonprofit sector and the
nonprofit management challenges posed by different revenue structures are widely agreed
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upon by nonprofit leaders and scholars. However, sharp disagreements exist over the
nonprofit sector’s changing role in society, and NPOs’ revenues play a central role in that
debate. Citing the sector’s decreasing reliance on charitable contributions and increasing
reliance on commercial revenue generation, critics charge that this “marketization”
(Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004; Salamon, 1999a) of NPOs weakens the sector’s role in
providing a venue for citizens to participate in policy advocacy and undermines the sector’s
contribution to civil society in general (Alexander, Nank, and Stivers, 1999; Carson, 2002;
Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004; Salamon, 1999a). Similarly, nonprofit leaders are split over
the implications of the concentration of revenue in a relative few NPOs. A popular listserv
for nonprofit sector researchers, for example, perennially debates whether the distribution of
nonprofit revenue among small and large NPOs is evidence for a sector dominated by a few,
efficient, large NPOs with many superfluous, redundant, small NPOs or a sector made
vibrant by countless small NPOs doing grassroots democracy and contributing untold service
to the common good in the shadows of large NPOs that have long forsaken their charitable
roots. Whether arguing for or against the marketization of NPOs or the proliferation of small
NPOs, an empirically derived understanding of the composition and distribution of nonprofit
revenue is essential to improving the discourse surrounding the role of NPOs in democratic
society.
The importance of understanding the relationship between subsidy and charity
An important first step toward understanding the nonprofit sector, then, is
understanding the strong influence of different types of nonprofit revenue on the character
and persistence of NPOs, on nonprofit management, and on the role of the nonprofit sector in
society. This understanding of nonprofit revenue can be extended by identifying
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relationships among the different types of revenue and the implications of these relationships
for NPOs. Of all the relationships among the various combinations of revenue sources, the
relationship between charitable contributions and government subsidy is the most widely
debated, yet remains unclear. Some argue that government subsidy of an NPO decreases, or
“crowds out,” the charitable giving of donors who receive less satisfaction from giving to an
NPO as its government funding increases or donors who feel satisfied that they have already
supported the NPO indirectly by paying taxes. Others argue that government funding of
NPOs acts as a signal to charitable donors (and potential donors), encouraging, or “crowding
in,” giving to organizations that have received the government’s “stamp of approval.” The
effect of government funding on private charity (the “subsidy-charity relationship”) has been
a focus of research among public policy, public administration, public economics, and
nonprofit scholars, whose work has yielded mixed conclusions, but most often has supported
the hypothesis that government funding to nonprofit organizations crowds out private
contributions.
A better understanding of the nature of the subsidy-charity relationship is worth
pursuing for its potential import for nonprofit management, public management, and public
policy. A better understanding of the subsidy-charity relationship will equip nonprofit
managers to maximize their resources and ability to fulfill their missions. Nonprofit scholars
recognize that various revenue sources have different advantages and disadvantages, that
revenue sources are interrelated, and that competent nonprofit administrators manage
resource portfolios so as to maximize revenue (Froelich, 1999; Benefield and Edwards, 1998;
Kingma, 1993). Given the heavy reliance of many NPOs on both government funding and
private charity, it behooves nonprofit managers to understand the subsidy-charity
relationship. Nonprofit managers would benefit from knowing the true cost of applying for
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government funds if part of that cost is hidden as future crowding out of private giving, and
they would benefit from knowing the true benefits of government funding if part of that
benefit is hidden as future crowding in of private giving.
Similarly, a better understanding of the subsidy-charity relationship could improve
public managers’ ability to meet their obligation to allocate funds—over $200 billion
annually—efficiently. Public managers are often responsible for developing contractual
arrangements with NPOs, determining NPOs’ eligibility for receiving government vouchers,
procuring services from NPOs, and awarding grants to NPOs (Salamon, 2002).
Understanding the subsidy-charity relationship may help public managers promote an optimal
level of private giving and NPO output.
Current policy trends also underscore the importance of better understanding the
potential impact of government subsidies on charitable giving. Contemporary governance
has come to be characterized by an increase in “third party” or “indirect” government that
relies on NPOs for delivering publicly funded services with, for instance, NPOs providing
over half of all government-funded social services (Salamon, 2002). With the 2003 CARE
Act, Congress encouraged more charitable giving by expanding eligibility for tax deductions
and other tax incentives, and legislators at the federal and state levels have encouraged faith-
based NPOs to compete for government funding with the recent proliferation of Charitable
Choice provisions. Clearly, the nonprofit sector has become a key player in social policy. As
this trend continues, policymakers would benefit from better understanding the effects of
government funding on nonprofits, including the effect on private giving to nonprofits.
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Types of nonprofit organizations and revenue
A prerequisite to understanding nonprofit revenue is to understand the different types
of NPOs and their different types of revenue. The organizations that comprise the nonprofit
sector in the United States are as diverse as the organizations of the private sector, making
generalizations about the entire sector of limited value. This analysis narrows the focus on
the nonprofit sector in two ways. First, it focuses on “operating public charities,” those
organizations that are on the front lines in providing benefits directly to the public. In 1998,
89 percent of all nonprofit organizations registered with the federal government were
operating public charities (calculated from Weitzman et al., 2002, p. 124, Table 6.1). This
focus excludes support organizations, which provide services to other organizations, such as
accounting, management consulting, fundraising, and grant-making. Support organizations
include United Way, community foundations, and private foundations. Also excluded from
this research are mutual benefit organizations, which provide benefits only to their members.
Such organizations include nonprofit insurance groups, unions and guilds, and fraternal
associations. By examining only operating public charities, this research focuses on those
public-serving, externally focused organizations at the heart of the nonprofit sector. Second,
results are reported not only for the nonprofit sector as a whole, but also for individual
subsectors (such as the human services subsector and the environment subsector) and for
NPOs grouped by organization size. As will become evident, disaggregating the nonprofit
sector proves valuable for identifying the widely varying revenue profiles and subsidy-charity
relationships for different types of NPOs.
Nonprofit revenue can be classified in several different ways. Nonprofit revenue may
be generated from contributions, program services, or from unrelated activities.
Contributions include monetary donations made to NPOs by private individuals,
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corporations, foundations, or governments for the purpose of supporting NPOs in fulfilling
their missions. Contributions may be given directly to NPOs or indirectly, such as
contributions channeled through the United Way, a community foundation, or a parent
organization. When revenues are classified as contributions, services are paid for by
someone other than the beneficiary. Program service revenues, in contrast, are received by
the NPO in exchange for providing the goods and services that form the basis of their
nonprofit status and tax exemption. Examples include university tuition, payments to
hospitals for medical care (including third party insurance payments), fees for counseling
services, museum ticket sales, membership dues that pay for member benefits, and fees for
services rendered to other organizations. Unrelated revenue is generated by activities
unrelated to the organization’s tax exemption, such as renting extra space to another
organization, selling excess office equipment, or trading securities.
Nonprofit revenue may also be classified as coming from either private or government
sources. Private revenue includes contributions from individuals, foundations, and
corporations, fees paid by individuals or private organizations for services, and membership
dues. Revenue from government sources includes all transfers of federal, state, and local
government funds directly to NPOs, including grants, payment for services provided under
government contracts, and fees for services provided to government agencies. Government
funds may also be paid to individuals who use those funds to obtain services from NPOs,
such as grants for college tuition and Medicare payments. These may be considered indirect
subsidies to NPOs, or they may be treated as program revenue.
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Introduction of dataset
Despite the centrality of understanding nonprofit revenue to understanding the
nonprofit sector, the only available detailed descriptions of nonprofit revenue are pieced
together from multiple sources and experts’ estimates. This study improves understanding of
the nonprofit sector by providing a more systematic description of revenue in the nonprofit
sector derived from a single, comprehensive data source. This research examines these
different types of revenue of NPOs and the relationship between revenue from government
sources and private charitable contributions by analyzing data reported by NPOs to the
Internal Revenue Service using IRS Form 990 in 1998, 1999, and 2000. The dataset was
constructed by combining six separate datasets, two for each year, obtained from the National
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), a part of the Urban Institute. These datasets have
only very recently become available and have not yet been used to describe revenue in the
nonprofit sector or to study the subsidy-charity relationship.
Most NPOs are required to submit Form 990 annually to the IRS to report financial
information required to document their continued eligibility for tax-exempt status. On Form
990, NPOs give detailed reports of revenue, expenses, assets, and liabilities. Although
questions have been raised about the reliability of Form 990 data, the IRS, nonprofit
accountants, and, most recently, NCCS, have made efforts to improve the quality of Form
990 data. These efforts seem to have paid off; a recent study reports a high correlation
between Form 990s and audited financial statements (Froelich and Pollak, 2000).1
To the Form 990 data, NCCS added classifications of the NPOs according to the
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE). The NTEE codes were used to exclude
1 The study found correlations between 1994 Form 990 entries and their corresponding audited financial
statements of .84 for total revenue, .81 for total contributions, .84 for total expenses, .73 for program service
revenue, and .89 for total assets.
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support and mutual benefit organizations from the sample and to group the remaining
operating public charities by subsector. It is possible to use the NTEE codes to group
operating public charities at several levels of aggregation, ranging from five major subsectors
(arts and culture, environment and animals, human services, education, and health) to 401
very specific classifications, such as homeless shelters, food pantries, bird sanctuaries, and
children’s museums. This research takes a middle-ground approach, using the 25 NTEE
categories listed and defined in Table 1.
The original dataset includes data for 105,863 operating public charities that filed
Form 990s in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Some of these cases, though, are omitted from analysis
due to two limitations of the NTEE and Form 990 data. First, 10,020 cases (10 percent) are
omitted because they are not yet assigned NTEE classifications, meaning that they could be
support organizations or mutual benefit organizations and thus out-of-scope for this research,
leaving 95,843 cases. Second, filing Form 990 is required only of NPOs with $25,000 or
more in annual revenue, but organizations with less than $100,000 in revenue and less than
$250,000 in total assets may elect to file the simpler Form 990EZ. Unfortunately, Form
990EZ does not include the level of detail required for this research. To avoid any bias that
may be introduced by differences between the organizations that file a Form 990EZ and those
that could file Form 990EZ but elect to file the full Form 990, the 6,477 NPOs (7 percent of
remaining cases) reporting both less than $100,000 in revenue and less than $250,000 in total
end-of-year assets are omitted from analysis. This introduces an important limitation to the
generalizability of the findings, which only extends to the population of nonprofits with
$100,000 in annual revenue and/or $250,000 in assets—presumably excluding many small
nonprofit organizations. This limitation, though, is unavoidable with currently available data;
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Table 1. NTEE subsector classifications and definitions
Subsector Definition
Animal-related Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to provide for the care,
protection and control of wildlife and domestic animals that are a part of the
living environment; to help people develop an understanding of their pets; and to
train animals for purposes of showing. Includes: Organizations that develop and
maintain fisheries resources and wildlife habitats to preserve and protect
endangered species and other wildlife; humane societies; veterinary services;
aquariums; and zoos.
Arts, culture, and
humanities
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to promote
appreciation for and enjoyment and understanding of the visual, performing,
folk, and media arts; the humanities (archeology, art history, modern and
classical languages, philosophy, ethics, theology, and comparative religion);
history and historical events; and/or communications (film, video, publishing,
journalism, radio, television). Includes: Museums and halls of fame; historic
preservation programs; organizations that provide services to artists, performers,
entertainers, writers, or humanities scholars; programs which promote artistic
expression of or within ethnic groups and cultures; art and performing art
schools, centers, and studios; historical societies; and genealogical or heredity-
based organizations (e.g., Sons of the Revolution, Daughters of the
Confederacy).
Civil rights, social
action, advocacy
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to protect and promote
the broad civil rights and civil liberties of individuals, to work for the realization
of specific social or political goals or to encourage the participation of people in
the public policy debate. Includes: Organizations that work to improve relations
between racial, ethnic, and cultural groups; advocacy and citizen action groups
that work to change public policy and opinion in a variety of areas; and
organizations that promote voter education and registration.
Community
improvement,
capacity building
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to strengthen, unify
and build community spirit and increase the capacity of various community
organizations to improve the quality of life for all. Includes: Organizations that
provide community and neighborhood development and improvement services;
urban and rural economic development programs; business services and services
to develop or improve commercial enterprises within communities; services that
enhance the performance of nonprofit organizations; volunteer recruitment,
training and placement services; and community service clubs (e.g., Kiwanis,
Lions, Altrusa, Pilot International and Junior League).
Crime and legal-
related
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to promote and
preserve conditions that enable community residents to live in a safe and
peaceful environment through enforcement of laws that protect life and property
and administration of justice according to the principles of law and equity.
Includes: Crime and delinquency prevention services (including regulation and
control of dangerous weapons; prevention and regulation of drunk driving);
police and other law enforcement agencies; detention and rehabilitation services
for offenders and ex-offenders; services to prevent or protect individuals from
neglect, abuse or exploitation; administration of justice services (including
courts and alternative dispute resolution services); and organizations that provide
legal assistance to individuals and organizations, including groups that conduct
public interest litigation.
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Table 1 (continued)
Subsector Definition
Diseases and
medical
disciplines
Private nonprofit voluntary health organizations such as the American Cancer
Society that are organized on a national, state or local basis and supported
primarily by voluntary contributions from the public at large, and are engaged in
a program of service, education and research that is related to a particular
disease, condition or disability, or group of diseases, conditions or disabilities.
Includes: Organizations active in the prevention or treatment of diseases and
disorders, or which represent medical practices, specialties and disciplines;
organizations that provide a variety of educational and other services in addition
to research.
Education Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to provide
opportunities for people to acquire the knowledge, skills, desirable qualities of
behavior and character, wisdom and general competence that will enable them to
fully participate in and enjoy the social, political, economic and intellectual life
of the community. Includes: Formally constituted educational institutions and
organizations that administer or support those institutions; libraries;
organizations that provide opportunities for continuing education outside the
framework of formal education (including English-as-a-second-language
programs and literacy and reading programs for children and adults); and
organizations that provide education-related services to students and schools,
e.g., educational testing services; scholarship programs; dropout prevention and
programs designed to increase parent participation in the schools. (Though part
of this subsector, colleges and universities are analyzed as a distinct subsector.)
Employment Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to help people to find,
secure and sustain suitable gainful employment. Includes: Organizations that
provide job training, retraining, and placement services; vocational guidance and
counseling; and vocational rehabilitation services (e.g., special employment
assistance for people who have disabilities).
Environment Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to preserve, protect
and improve the environment. Includes: Organizations that are involved in
pollution control and abatement; conservation and development of natural
resources; control or elimination of hazardous or toxic substances including
pesticides; solid waste management; urban beautification and open spaces
development; environmental education and outdoor survival; and botanical
gardens and horticultural societies.
Food, agriculture,
and nutrition
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to develop and
improve food resources and to ensure that the basic nutritional needs of the
community are met. Includes: Organizations that focus on preservation of
farmlands, soil and water conservation in agricultural settings, management of
livestock and other agricultural pursuits; food distribution and meal programs for
people who are elderly, disabled or indigent; home economics and home
extension services; and programs that conduct research regarding or promote
good nutrition.
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Table 1 (continued)
Subsector Definition
Health care Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to promote wellness,
provide for the prevention and treatment of illness or injury, and support the
medical rehabilitation of people with physical disabilities. Includes: Hospitals,
nursing or convalescent homes, and other primary medical care providers;
reproductive health, fertility, and family planning services; public health services
(e.g., communicable disease control and prevention, occupational health and
safety services); health support services (e.g., blood banks, organ banks,
emergency medical transport services); health care financing activities including
health and medical insurance providers; and organizations that study ethics or
promote the practice of ethical behavior in medical care. (Though part of this
subsector, hospitals are analyzed as a distinct subsector.)
Housing and
shelter
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to meet the basic
housing needs of individuals, families and communities. Includes: Housing
development and construction services; housing rehabilitation; home
improvement; shelters for people who are homeless; other non-recreational
temporary housing facilities; and services to assist individuals and families in
locating, acquiring or sustaining clean, safe and adequate housing on a rental or
ownership basis.
Human services Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to support the personal
and social development of individuals and families; provide care, protection and
supervision; and enhance the individual’s independence and ability to manage
his or her own resources. Includes: Organizations that provide a broad range of
social services to individuals or families, even though specific programs
operated within those agencies may be classified elsewhere (e.g., American Red
Cross, YMCAs, YWCAs, YMHAs, YWHAs); family service agencies; shelters
and aftercare programs for victims of domestic violence; organizations that
provide direct social services to children and adolescents (e.g., adoption and
foster care services, child day care); personal social services; travelers aid;
residential, custodial care facilities and services for individuals unable to live
independently due to physical and developmental disabilities, age or physical
infirmity; and programs that promote general independent functioning, living of
individuals (e.g., retarded citizens associations, guide dog services for people
with disabilities).
International,
foreign affairs,
national security
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to support activities
which are carried out beyond the borders of the United States and whose
beneficiaries are citizens of other countries. Also included are transnational
organizations whose activities serve and benefit both U.S. and foreign interests.
Includes: Organizations that promote international understanding and friendly
relations among nations; preserve world peace; protect national and cooperative
security interests; foster international human rights; promote international
economic, social and political development; foster exchanges of scholars,
scientists, artists, journalists and other professionals; and raise and distribute
funds for the benefit of overseas institutions
Medical research Private nonprofit research institutes and other organizations whose primary
purpose is to promote the advancement of knowledge about specific diseases,
disorders or medical disciplines. Includes: Organizations whose only function
is to conduct health-related research.
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Table 1 (continued)
Subsector Definition
Mental health and
crisis intervention
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to promote mental
health and provide for the treatment of people who are in emotional crisis, or
have mental illnesses, substance abuse problems or other addiction problems.
Includes: Psychiatric hospitals; community mental health centers; addiction and
substance abuse treatment services; crisis intervention services including suicide
hotlines, rape victim counseling, and other hotlines; and organizations that
conduct research related to the causes and cures or mental illness.
Public and
societal benefit
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to promote the
effective functioning of government, public administration and public officials.
Includes: Broadly focused leadership development programs; organizations that
conduct or promote research in multidisciplinary public policy; programs that
support or provide infrastructure services required for the effective functioning
of society, e.g., transportation systems and services, telephone and
telecommunications services, and financial and credit institutions; organizations
that promote patriotism including military and veterans’ organizations and their
auxiliaries; and consumer protection organizations.
Public safety,
disaster
preparedness,
relief
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to ensure the safety of
the community by sponsoring educational activities which make the public
aware of the measures they can take to eliminate safety hazards, by teaching
people the basics of first aid, by warning the public of impending disasters, by
rescuing people who are lost, stranded or the victim of an accident and by
providing relief for people who are disaster victims. Includes: Organizations
that seek to prevent, predict or mitigate the effects of disasters; prepare people to
cope with disasters; or provide broad-based relief services to disaster victims.
Also includes organizations that rescue accident victims; provide first aid
training and services; and/or offer safety education programs that focus on issues
like automotive safety and prevention of accidents caused by human frailty or
error.
Recreation and
sports
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to provide access to a
variety of leisure time pursuits that meet the recreational needs of individuals
who want to make constructive and satisfying use of their free time. Includes:
Camps and camping programs; physical fitness and other recreational facilities
such as parks, and playgrounds; organizations that provide for sports training
and competition; and sports, recreational and social clubs.
Religion-related Organizations whose primary purpose is worship, religious training or study,
governance or administration of organized religions, or the promotion of
religious activities. Includes: Churches, synagogues, mosques and other places
of worship; associations of churches; religious orders; church auxiliaries;
missions; and religious publishing activities and media. Excludes: Other
organizations operated under the auspices of specific religious groups such as
educational institutions, hospitals or social service agencies.
Science and
technology
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to promote or conduct
research and study in the physical and life sciences, engineering and technology.
Excludes: Organizations engaged in medical research; and research institutes
and services that operate in a single major group area, such as environmental
research institutes and education research institutes.
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Table 1 (continued)
Subsector Definition
Social science Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to promote the study
or teaching of, or conduct research in, one or more of the social sciences.
Includes: Organizations that conduct research in economics, psychology,
political science and demographics as well as interdisciplinary research
programs.
Youth
development
Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to build character and
develop leadership and social skills among children and youth. Includes: Youth
centers and clubs; scouting organizations; adult/child matching programs (e.g.,
Big Brothers, Big Sisters); business, agricultural, religious and other youth
leadership programs (e.g., Future Farmers of America, Catholic Youth
Organizations); and youth community service clubs (e.g., Key Club, Girls
League).
Source: National Center for Charitable Statistics, Urban Institute, 2003, National Taxonomy of Exempt
Entities—Core Codes Manual. Definitions are quoted directly from this publication.
in fact, the smallest NPOs, those with less than $25,000 annual revenue, are not required to
file a Form 990 at all.
Three accuracy checks led to the elimination of an additional 2,239 NPOs from the
sample (2 percent of the 95,843 cases known to be in-scope for the study). Net revenue was
calculated by summing reported values for individual revenue sources and compared to the
reported net values; 2,155 cases (2 percent) were not accurate within one dollar and are
omitted from the sample. Gross revenue was calculated similarly and compared to the
reported values, with 1,838 (2 percent) not accurate within one dollar and thus omitted. And,
since this research involves a detailed examination of revenue sources, including different
types of contributions, 122 cases (0.1 percent) reporting a total amount for contributions (line
1d) without subtotals for direct public support (line 1a), indirect public support (line 1b), and
government grants (line 1c) are omitted.2
2 1,876 cases either failed more than one accuracy check or failed one accuracy check in addition to failing to
meet the revenue and asset tests.
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Of the 95,843 cases known to be in scope for this study, 87,127 (91 percent) were
retained for analysis. Table 2 summarizes the proportions of cases included in the analysis
for each subsector. The percentage of cases retained for each subsector ranges from 82
Table 2. Cases retained for analysis, by subsector
# cases in
dataset known to
be in scope
# cases retained
for analysis
% cases retained
for analysis
All NPOs 95,843 87,127 90.9
By subsector
Animal-related 1,497 1,311 87.6
Arts, culture, and humanities 10,069 8,878 88.2
Civil rights, social action, advocacy 661 581 87.9
Colleges and universities 1,722 1,637 95.1
Community improvement, capacity building 4,542 3,981 87.7
Crime and legal-related 2,083 1,907 91.6
Diseases and medical disciplines 2,540 2,318 91.3
Education 9,965 8,892 89.2
Employment 2,112 2,005 94.9
Environment 1,871 1,649 88.1
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 1,095 989 90.3
Health care 6,707 6,349 94.7
Hospitals 3,915 3,774 96.4
Housing and shelter 7,105 6,815 95.9
Human services 19,968 18,655 93.4
International, foreign affairs, nat’l security 829 729 87.9
Medical research 538 486 90.3
Mental health and crisis intervention 3,941 3,676 93.3
Public and societal benefit 601 530 88.2
Public safety, disaster preparedness, relief 1,579 1,328 84.1
Recreation and sports 5,126 4,238 82.7
Religion-related 3,652 3,005 82.3
Science and technology 361 327 90.6
Social science 255 229 89.8
Youth development 3,109 2,838 91.3
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percent of NPOs in the religion-related subsector to 96 percent of hospitals and of NPOs in
the housing subsector.
Finally, filing Form 990 is optional for maintaining tax-exempt status for religious
congregations, denominations, and primary and secondary religious schools, but such
organizations may file voluntarily, and it is impossible to know how those religious
organizations that voluntarily file Form 990s differ from those that do not. Further, it is not
possible to identify in the dataset the religious organizations that file voluntarily; although
churches and denominations are classified explicitly as religious nonprofits, religious primary
and secondary schools are included in the education subsector classification.
Despite these limitations, Form 990 data are the best available data for exploring
questions about revenue in the nonprofit sector. Filing a Form 990 is a nearly universal
requirement for NPOs with greater than $100,000 in annual revenue and/or $250,000 in
assets. Such comprehensive coverage enables understanding revenue in the nonprofit sector
and its subsectors with a degree of confidence heretofore unattainable.
The remainder of this report is organized into three additional chapters and two
appendixes. Chapter 2 provides a thorough description of how revenue is distributed in and
among NPOs. Chapter 3 describes how government subsidy of NPOs affects charitable
giving to NPOs. Chapter 4 summarizes the key findings and implications of this research,
suggests avenues for future research, and places this research in the context of current “big
issues” in the nonprofit sector and nonprofit-government relations. Appendix A presents an
auxiliary study exploring the key assumptions of existing research of the subsidy-charity
relationship; its findings question the validity of these assumptions and are drawn on to
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design the study of the subsidy-charity relationship and to interpret these findings, as cited in
Chapter 3. Appendix B provides results of the regression analyses in greater detail than
provided in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 2
Description of Nonprofit Revenue
Before proceeding with the examination of the subsidy-charity relationship in Chapter
3, this chapter provides a detailed description of nonprofit revenue. Apart from laying the
foundation for understanding how subsidy affects charity, understanding nonprofit revenue is
a worthy goal in itself. In the nonprofit sector, revenue is more than just money; nonprofit
revenue can represent the expectations and values of donors, the obligations of NPOs to
government agencies, the reliance of government on NPOs for implementing public policies,
or the similarity of NPOs to for-profit counterparts. Indeed, the role of revenue is a common
thread running through the various theories that attempt to explain the very existence of
NPOs, describing revenue as being provided by individuals wishing to pursue collective
goals neglected by the government, individuals paying for services because they trust NPOs
more than for-profit businesses, or groups desiring to maintain control of their organization.
This chapter explores the composition and distribution of the revenue in the nonprofit
sector at two levels, organization and sector. At the organization level, this chapter describes
the revenue profiles of NPOs (that is, the amounts and proportions of NPOs’ revenue from
different sources), revealing considerable variation in revenue profiles among NPOs in
different subsectors and among smaller and larger NPOs, generally high reliance on revenue
from fees, surprisingly low reliance on charity, and high levels of dependence on a single
type of revenue in a minority, but a sizable minority, of NPOs. At the sector level, this
chapter describes the distribution of revenue and the different types of revenue among NPOs,
giving precision to the widely (and correctly) held impression that a relatively small portion
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of the nonprofit sector captures a very large share of total revenue, government subsidy, and
charitable contributions.
The remainder of this chapter introduces resource dependence theory and its
supporting empirical research to underscore the importance of describing NPOs’ revenue,
describes how the IRS Form 990 data were used to describe nonprofit revenue, and presents
and discusses the description of nonprofit revenue based on these data.
Previous research on the influence of revenue profiles on NPOs
Thorough descriptions of the distribution of revenue in the nonprofit sector do not
exist. Previous researchers have provided brief descriptions, such as O’Neill (2002), who
notes that in 1997, charitable NPOs with assets of $10 million or more “constituted less than
6 percent of all 501(c)(3) filers but accounted for 81 percent of the revenue . . . of those
filers” (p. 23), pointedly illustrating the strongly skewed distribution of revenue in the
nonprofit sector. Studies of the role of different types of revenue within individual NPOs,
though, are more common. While, as discussed in Chapter 1, diverse theories incorporate
revenue sources as a key factor in explaining the existence of NPOs, most research describing
the actual effects of different types of nonprofit revenue on NPOs is consonant with, and
frequently explicitly based on, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978),
which treats the revenue profiles of organizations as indicators of the extent to which they are
dependent on external actors. Organizations necessarily cede much control over internal
decision-making to external actors that provide their revenue; external actors may exert
power proportionate to the importance and scarcity of the resources they provide to constrain
organizational activities. Revenues from different sources carry different benefits and
liabilities, and organizations with multiple dependence relationships are subject to multiple,
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and sometimes conflicting, constraints, with some external actors wielding more influence
over organizational decision-making than others.
Previous research offers numerous examples. Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld (2001)
found that higher levels of dependence on charitable donations lead to increased use of
managerial tactics (such as streamlining internal processes, participating in more competitive
bidding, and generally becoming more “businesslike”) as well as political tactics (such as
strengthening commitment to mission and getting others to testify to stakeholders on behalf
of the organization). Powell and Friedkin (1986) found that increased competition for public
and foundation funds and increased dependence on corporate and individual support led a
public television station to show widely popular programming in lieu of politically
controversial and artistically experimental programming. Changes in relative resource
dependencies help explain organizational decisions about the composition of hospital boards
(Pfeffer, 1973), university budget allocations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974), and the priorities
of United Ways (Pfeffer and Leong, 1977).
Guided by resource dependence theory, Froelich (1999) summarizes the effects of
dependence on private contributions, government funds, and commercial activity on NPOs in
terms of revenue volatility, goal displacement (or “mission drift”), effects on organizational
processes, and effects on organizational structure. Dependence on private charitable
contributions tends to precipitate revenue volatility and goal displacement. Dependence on
commercial activities carries low risk of goal displacement but tends to induce process
effects, such as cost-benefit accounting, and structural effects, such as including more
business-oriented board members and adding more business-oriented staff and divisions.
(And critics of the “marketization” of NPOs add that dependence on commercial activities
detracts from the charitable ethos of NPOs and their ability to effectively advocate for social
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change.) Dependence on government funding is associated with goal displacement and
process and structural constraints, such as increased bureaucracy, personnel policy
requirements, and less discretion in client selection, but government funding may also
provide revenue stability. Smith (1994), though, cautions that while government funding
may be relatively stable over the long-term, it often comes with short-term cash flow
interruptions when release of funds is dependent on frequently stalled budget approvals.
Nonprofit scholars typically advise NPO managers to diversify their resource bases to
avoid the ill effects of dependence on any one revenue source (Gronbjerg, 1993; Powell and
Friedkin, 1986). Chang and Tuckman (1991) bring empirical support to this advice with
evidence that NPOs with more diversified revenue sources are less vulnerable to major
decreases in revenue. Kingma (1993) concurs that NPOs’ optimal revenue profile draws on
diverse sources, but finds that government funding lends the greatest amount of financial
stability in a sample of foster care NPOs.
Data
Resource dependence theory and its accompanying body of research have firmly
established the strong influence of nonprofit revenue on individual NPOs and the character of
the nonprofit sector as a whole, but this body of knowledge lacks the empirical support of a
thorough, nuanced description of nonprofit revenue derived from a single, consistent source
of data. This study supplies such a description of nonprofit revenue by exploring the IRS
Form 990 data of the 87,127 NPOs included in the dataset introduced in Chapter 1. The
detailed reporting required by Form 990 permits measuring contributions, program service
revenue, and revenue from unrelated activities and distinguishing between revenue from
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government sources and revenue from private sources. Table 3 summarizes the measures of
revenue used in this research and indicates how they are derived from Form 990.
Table 3. Variables used to describe nonprofit revenue
Variable name Source Description
revenue$1999 IRS Form 990,
line L
NPO’s gross revenue during FY1999
subsidy$1999 IRS Form 990,
sum of lines 1c
and 93g
Dollar amount of revenue received by a NPO from all
government sources during FY1999; sum of revenue from
government grants and government contracts
grants$1999 IRS Form 990,
line 1c
Dollar amount of revenue received by a NPO from government
grants during FY1999
contracts$1999 IRS Form 990,
line 93g
Dollar amount of revenue received by a NPO from government
contracts during FY1999
charity$1999 IRS Form 990,
sum of lines 1a
and 1b
Dollar amount of revenue received by a NPO from all charitable
contributions during FY1999; sum of revenue from direct
charitable contributions and indirect charitable contributions
direct$1999 IRS Form 990,
line 1a
Dollar amount of revenue received by a NPO from direct
charitable contributions during FY1999; direct contributions are
made directly to NPOs by private donors
indirect$1999 IRS Form 990,
line 1b
Dollar amount of revenue received by a NPO from indirect
charitable contributions during FY1999; indirect contributions
are made to NPOs through an intermediary organization
program$1999 IRS Form 990,
difference of
sum of lines 2,
3, and 93f and
line 93g
Dollar amount of revenue received during FY1999 by a NPO
from program service revenue, which are fees paid by the
consumers of the NPOs’ goods and services, including
membership dues, and reimbursements by third party payers
otherrev$1999 IRS Form 990,
sum of lines 4,
5, 6a, 8a, 9a,
10a, and 11
Dollar amount of NPO’s FY1999 revenue generated by
activities unrelated to the organization’s charitable purpose,
including special fundraising events, rents, sales, investments,
and revenue not otherwise classified
Revenue is divided into four categories: charitable support, government subsidy,
nongovernmental program service revenue, and other. Charitable support includes all forms
of private philanthropic contributions and is subdivided into direct charitable support, which
is given directly from private donors to the organization, and indirect charitable support,
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which is channeled through intermediary organizations. Government subsidy includes funds
from any government source and is subdivided into grants, which support the organization’s
activities that benefit the public, and contracts3 and fees for services provided to government
agencies. Program service revenue includes fees for services paid by the beneficiaries of the
services, including membership fees for which comparable benefits are received and
reimbursements for services paid by third parties.4 Finally, the “other” category includes
revenue generated by activities unrelated to the organization’s charitable purpose, including
special fundraising events, rents, sales, investments, and revenue not otherwise classified.5 In
addition to measuring revenue, total expenses (Form 990 line 17) are used as a measure of
organization size.
Throughout this chapter, descriptive statistics are based on the data for fiscal year
1999. Data from 1999 are used rather than 2000 to avoid the possibility of describing NPOs’
revenue during the year of their last return, which would likely be atypical for those
3 Note that IRS defines government contract revenue more narrowly than the common usage to mean revenue
for services provided under contract that benefit the government agency, not the general public. Examples
include contracted research, program monitoring, Employee Assistance Programs for government
employees, and government employee training.
4 Following Froelich (1999), Medicare payments, Medicaid payments, college tuition grants, and other forms
of “indirect” subsidy to NPOs are counted as program service revenue since they are intended to increase the
buying power of the beneficiaries, not to subsidize NPOs; such forms of indirect subsidy could be spent in
for-profit or governmental organizations as well. Further, only Medicare and Medicaid payments can be
isolated in the dataset. However, of the 3,915 nonprofit hospitals in the dataset, 3,649 reported no income
from Medicaid or Medicare, though virtually all hospitals, nonprofit or otherwise, receive Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursements. The line for reporting Medicaid and Medicare revenue was added to Form 990
for fiscal year 1997, an addition apparently overlooked by many hospital accountants. Even so, treating
Medicare/Medicaid payments as program service revenue makes treatment of indirect subsidy consistent
across all subsectors since indirect subsidy cannot be distinguished from private sources of program service
revenue in other subsectors.
5 Gross revenue, not net revenue (or “income”), is the focus of this research. “Gross revenue” refers to all
receipts of funds, regardless of any costs associated with obtaining the funds. “Net revenue,” on the other
hand, is the difference between revenue and expenses. In addition to examining gross revenue, it would also
be valuable to examine net revenue. With some revenue sources, determining net revenue is simple; for
example, net revenue from rental property is easily calculated as gross rents less rental expenses. With most
revenue sources, however, matching revenue and costs is more difficult; for example, fundraising expenses
may be applied against revenue from any combination of several sources—government grants, indirect
charitable contributions, indirect charitable contributions, or special fundraising events. It is similarly
indeterminable what portion of staff salaries should be used to derive the different categories of net revenue.
To keep different types of revenue as comparable as possible, only gross revenue is examined.
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organizations or cover only a partial year, and because the following chapter on the subsidy-
charity relationship will examine the effect of changes in subsidy from 1998 to 1999 on
changes in charity from 1999 to 2000, making 1999 the midpoint of this look at nonprofit
revenue over the three years.
Findings
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 4 (including statistics for
the regression sample for comparison). The average NPO in this sample received over $7.8
million revenue in 1999 (Table 4). This simple descriptive statistic warrants pause: $7.8
million is, simply, a lot of money, defying the popular image of the NPO on a shoestring
budget.
This simple average, though, oversimplifies the complex structure of nonprofit
revenue. Further analysis of the Form 990 data provides a richer understanding of nonprofit
revenue. The previous scholarship illuminating the role of nonprofit revenue provides a
useful filter for isolating three key patterns in this mass of data: 1) the revenue profiles of
NPOs vary significantly among the nonprofit subsectors and smaller and larger NPOs, with
many NPOs demonstrating revenue profiles that might be considered uncharacteristic of the
nonprofit sector, with a high proportion of revenue derived from fees for services; 2) heavy
reliance on either government funding or charitable contributions is atypical of NPOs
generally and most individual nonprofit subsectors; 3) nonprofit revenue is highly
concentrated in relatively few NPOs and in a very few subsectors. These patterns are
discussed in greater detail in the following three sections.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables used to describe nonprofit revenue, all NPOs (N
= 87,127) and the sample used for regression analysis consisting of NPOs that received
subsidy in 1998 and/or 1999 (N = 40,715)
Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Full sample
Regression sample
revenue$1999 7,875,341
9,204,875
60,727,067
73,308,473
567,036
722,154
25,028.00
25,320.00
4,024,409,647
4,024,409,647
subsidy$1999 838,195
1,322,903
7,849,322
8,232,522
0
184,535
0
0
537,854,479
537,854,479
grants$1999 497,615
1,064,857
5,098,808
7,418,226
0
121,577
0
0
537,854,479
537,854,479
contracts$1999 122,482
258,045
2,248,979
3,261,567
0
0
0
0
296,509,294
296,509,294
charity$1999 634,248
815,013
6,114,731
7,791,636
59,163
68,045
0
0
609,350,023
609,350,023
direct$1999 541,989
705,055
5,467,724
7,202,031
39,121
42,963
0
0
537,825,704
537,825,704
indirect$1999 92,259
109,959
2,351,369
2,283,870
0
0
0
0
411,785,635
264,597,107
program$1999 4,216,966
4,218,550
33,667,312
38,003,924
98,804
66,938
0
0
1,600,962,854
1,600,962,854
otherrev$1999 2,141,484
2,567,024
34,869,724
39,707,427
35,054
25,519
0
0
2,661,339,504
2,281,818,788
Diverse revenue profiles
Popular assumptions about the charitable nature of the nonprofit sector are challenged
by NPOs’ revenue profiles. For the sector as a whole, a shockingly low 8 percent of total
revenue comes from charitable giving (Table 5)—a severe departure from the popular image
of the nonprofit sector constantly pleading for funds from charitable donors. Almost as
surprising given the oft-discussed rise in government contracting with NPOs, only slightly
more—11 percent—of the sector’s total revenue comes from government sources. While the
ability to attract charitable giving and government’s preferential treatment of NPOs may be
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Table 5. Average revenue, share of total revenue, and sources of revenue, by subsector and
organization size, 1999 (N = 87,127)
Average
revenue
($)
Share
of total
sector
revenue
(%)a
Sources of revenue
Charity
(%)
Subsidy
(%)
Program
revenue
(%)
Other
(%)
All NPOs 7,875,341 100.0 8.1 10.6 54.1 27.2
By subsector
Animal-related 2,167,229 0.4 35.0 8.2 17.5 39.3
Arts, culture, and humanities 3,065,895 4.0 22.5 6.6 17.3 53.6
Civil rights, social action, advocacy 1,539,108 0.1 48.3 22.0 9.2 20.4
Colleges and universities 65,082,075 15.5 9.7 6.4 36.6 47.3
Community improvement, capacity building 2,042,786 1.2 14.0 30.4 25.0 30.5
Crime and legal-related 1,651,985 0.5 20.3 52.9 17.1 9.8
Diseases and medical disciplines 4,914,739 1.7 29.0 9.3 23.2 38.5
Education 3,778,407 4.9 11.8 9.3 34.3 44.5
Employment 3,055,260 0.9 8.0 36.0 39.5 16.4
Environment 3,188,357 0.8 32.5 6.7 12.1 48.7
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 2,451,443 0.4 62.9 18.5 11.2 7.4
Health care 7,977,161 7.4 4.7 13.5 70.2 11.5
Hospitals 81,444,947 44.8 0.8 0.8 83.8 14.6
Housing and shelter 1,076,002 1.1 10.3 24.2 48.1 17.4
Human services 3,126,844 8.5 12.0 34.2 36.7 17.2
International, foreign affairs, nat’l security 8,263,541 0.9 57.8 15.0 9.2 18.0
Medical research 14,904,486 1.1 7.6 6.2 8.1 78.1
Mental health and crisis intervention 3,082,375 1.7 6.1 42.0 42.5 9.3
Public and societal benefit 5,716,524 0.4 10.7 8.8 18.9 61.6
Public safety, disaster preparedness, relief 496,637 0.1 16.8 22.4 31.5 29.2
Recreation and sports 1,133,707 0.7 19.1 4.5 48.8 27.6
Religion-related 2,038,362 0.9 34.6 1.3 12.0 52.2
Science and technology 26,199,272 1.2 3.3 25.2 29.2 42.3
Social science 7,000,675 0.2 15.2 41.6 14.3 28.9
Youth development 1,940,815 0.8 26.8 5.3 16.6 51.2
By size
Smallest NPOs 220,382 0.9 27.5 8.7 13.4 50.4
2nd quintile 308,384 1.3 30.4 14.1 25.3 30.2
3rd quintile 591,156 2.4 28.4 18.7 29.4 23.5
4th quintile 1,525,364 6.2 22.8 21.8 31.4 23.9
Largest NPOs 21,961,125 89.2 10.9 17.0 38.5 33.6
a Calculated by assigning mean values to cases known to be in scope but omitted from analysis.
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distinguishing characteristics of the nonprofit sector, it is the sector’s similarity with the for-
profit sector that brings in the majority of its revenue: Over half—54 percent—of total
nonprofit revenue is generated by fees for services—the fees that NPOs, not unlike for-profit
businesses, charge the recipients of services.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, two nonprofit subsectors, hospitals and
colleges and universities, command well over half of nonprofit revenue, and the revenue
profile for the sector as a whole reflects hospitals’ and universities’ heavy reliance on
program revenue, which accounts for 84 and 37 percent of these subsectors’ revenue,
respectively (Table 5). Heavy reliance on program revenue, though, is not uncommon. Of
the remaining 22 subsectors, one—health care—generates 70 percent of revenue from
program fees, two—housing and recreation—generate almost half (48 percent) of their
revenue from fees, and eight others generate over one-quarter of their revenue from fees. In
some cases, it appears that those subsectors with the most potential to have a customer-like
relationship with service recipients, such as health care providers, universities, housing
providers, and recreation organizations, have higher proportions of their total revenue from
program fees, whereas those subsectors without easily defined customer groups, such as the
international, foreign affairs, and national security, civil rights and advocacy, and medical
research subsectors, are least reliant on program fees.
In some subsectors, the charity-dependent image of NPOs appears more accurate; 10
of the 25 subsectors are more heavily reliant on charity than on government funds or program
revenue. Only the international and food subsectors receive over half of their revenue from
charitable contributions, with the civil rights, social action, and advocacy subsector receiving
just under half (48 percent) of revenue from charity. The proportions for the next 7subsectors
range from 23 to 35 percent. Still, 7 of the 25 subsectors receive less than 10 percent of
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revenue from charitable donations, with charity accounting for as little as 1 percent of
revenue in the hospitals subsector and 3 percent in the science and technology subsector. All
subsectors receive most of their charitable support directly (as opposed to indirectly, through
a funding intermediary), with direct charitable support comprising from 57 percent of
charitable contributions to hospitals to 99 percent of contributions to the environment
subsector; 11 of the 25 subsectors receive over 90 percent of their charitable contributions
directly (Table 6).
Government revenue demonstrates similar variation, ranging from 1 percent of
revenue in hospitals and religion-related NPOs to 53 percent in the crime and legal-related
subsector, the only subsector receiving more than half its revenue from government sources
(Table 5). Three subsectors—crime and legal-related, social science, and community
improvement—are more reliant on government subsidy for revenue than any other source.
All of the subsectors receive most of their government subsidy in the form of government
grants (Table 6); grants comprise from 60 percent of total government subsidy in the science
and technology subsector to 98 percent in the social science subsector and 99 percent in the
medical research subsector. The science and technology subsector receives 40 percent of
government subsidy from fees for services provided to government agencies, the highest of
any subsector.
In addition to variation by subsector, the importance of the various revenue sources
varies substantially by organization size as well (Table 5). Not surprisingly, the revenue
profile for the largest 20 percent of NPOs most closely resembles the revenue profile for the
sector as a whole, with 39 percent of revenue in the largest quintile coming from program
revenue, 17 percent from government subsidy, 11 percent from charitable support, and 34
percent from other sources. Charitable support is proportionally much greater in the smaller
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Table 6. Sources of charity and subsidy, by subsector and organization size (N = 87,127)
Charity Subsidy
Direct
(%)
Indirect
(%)
Grants
(%)
Contracts
(%)
All NPOs 87.4 12.6 80.3 19.7
By subsector
Animal-related 96.3 3.7 87.4 12.6
Arts, culture, and humanities 95.6 4.4 97.1 2.9
Civil rights, social action, advocacy 96.6 3.4 93.4 6.6
Colleges and universities 97.3 2.7 90.8 9.2
Community improvement, capacity building 80.7 19.3 93.8 6.2
Crime and legal-related 85.8 14.2 85.1 14.9
Diseases and medical disciplines 80.1 19.9 81.2 18.8
Education 93.5 6.5 85.7 14.3
Employment 85.9 14.1 79.2 20.8
Environment 98.6 1.4 81.1 18.9
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 94.2 5.8 87.2 12.8
Health care 58.7 41.3 75.7 24.3
Hospitals 57.4 42.6 94.4 5.6
Housing and shelter 86.3 13.7 86.3 13.7
Human services 77.1 22.9 73.6 26.4
International, foreign affairs, nat’l security 76.9 23.1 97.6 2.4
Medical research 87.9 12.1 99.3 0.7
Mental health and crisis intervention 73.9 26.1 71.5 28.5
Public and societal benefit 82.4 17.6 91.7 8.3
Public safety, disaster preparedness, relief 90.6 9.4 82.5 17.6
Recreation and sports 86.3 13.7 74.4 25.6
Religion-related 94.0 6.0 79.2 20.84
Science and technology 92.9 7.1 59.8 40.2
Social science 97.4 2.6 98.2 1.8
Youth development 81.3 18.7 87.4 12.6
By size
Smallest NPOs 93.3 6.7 92.7 7.3
2nd quintile 90.8 9.2 88.0 12.0
3rd quintile 88.7 11.3 85.6 14.5
4th quintile 86.8 13.2 83.1 16.9
Largest NPOs 87.0 13.0 79.5 20.5
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NPOs; the NPOs in each of the four smaller quintiles receive over twice as much—23 to 30
percent—of their revenue from charitable contributions as a proportion of total revenue than
the largest NPOs. Inversely, the largest NPOs generate more revenue—39 percent—from
program service fees than smaller NPOs, which generate from 13 to 31 percent of revenue
from program service fees. There is no clear relationship between organization size and
percentage of revenue from government subsidy, except that the smallest fifth of NPOs are
least reliant on subsidy by far, receiving only 9 percent of revenue from government sources,
compared to 14 – 22 percent for the remaining size groups.
All five size quintiles receive most of their charitable contributions directly, but
intermediary funding organizations provide a larger proportion of larger NPOs’ revenue
(Table 6); the fourth and fifth quintiles each receive 13 percent of their charitable
contributions indirectly, while the first, second, and third receive 7, 9, and 11 percent,
respectively. In all five size groups, the largest proportion of government funding is through
government grants, from a high of 93 percent in the smallest quintile and descending as
NPOs get larger, with the second, third, fourth, and fifth quintiles receiving 88, 86, 83, and
80 percent of government subsidy in the form of grants. Inversely, “doing business” with the
government by providing services to government agencies appears to increase with size; fees
for services from government agencies account for only 7 percent of government funding
among the smallest NPOs, increasing steadily to 21 percent among the largest fifth of NPOs
—likely due to the greater management capacity of larger organizations to compete for and to
meet the administrative demands of government contracts.
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Dependence on charity and subsidy in a sizable minority of NPOs
The warnings of scholars against too much dependence on government subsidy and
charitable contributions appear to have been heeded or largely unnecessary. Dependence on
either of these sources for a large proportion of revenue does not appear widespread among
NPOs. Table 7 presents the percentages of NPOs receiving more than half and more than
three-fourths of revenue from subsidy and charity for the whole sector, by subsector, and by
organization size. About one-fifth of all NPOs receive over half of their revenue from
government sources, and about one-fifth of NPOs receive over half of their revenue from
charitable contributions. Twelve percent of NPOs are dependent on government funds for
more than 75 percent of their revenue, as are another 12 percent of NPOs on charitable
contributions. Since these groups are necessarily mutually exclusive, 24 percent of NPOs are
dependent on either charity or subsidy for at least 75 percent of their revenue.
Most dependence on government funds for revenue is, more specifically, dependence
on government grants: 16 percent of NPOs receive over half of their revenue through grants,
compared to 3 percent for government contracts. Likewise, the large majority of dependence
on charitable giving is dependence on direct charitable contributions: 18 percent of NPOs
receive over half of their revenue from direct charity, and 10 percent receive over three-
fourths of revenue from direct charity, compared to 1.5 and 0.5 percent of NPOs dependent
on indirect charity for half and three-fourths of their revenue.
Although in the sector as a whole, few NPOs appear at risk of suffering the ill effects
of too much dependence on government subsidy or charitable contributions, several
individual subsectors do appear at risk (Table 7). Dependence on government funding is
most prevalent in the crime and legal-related and mental health and crisis intervention
subsectors—just under 50 percent of the NPOs in each subsector receive at least half of their
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Table 7. Percentage of NPOs receiving more than half and more than three-fourths of
revenue from program revenue, subsidy, and charity, by subsector and organization size (N =
87,127)
Program
revenue
Subsidy Charity
Total Grants Contracts Total Direct Indirect
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
All NPOs 35.8
25.5
20.4
12.0
15.7
8.9
3.2
1.9
21.4
12.0
18.4
10.4
1.4
0.5
By subsector
Animal-related 12.3
4.7
6.5
2.4
4.7
1.6
1.7
0.7
36.5
16.6
35.1
15.5
0.3
0.2
Arts, culture, and
humanities
26.6
11.8
5.9
2.2
5.6
2.0
0.2
0.1
28.6
12.0
26.3
11.0
0.9
0.4
Civil rights, social action,
advocacy
8.9
5.3
19.1
12.2
17.9
11.5
0.6
0.3
57.5
41.1
53.6
37.9
1.0
0.7
Colleges and universities 54.1
28.4
2.7
1.6
2.5
1.4
0.2
0.2
13.7
7.3
12.0
6.3
1.0
0.6
Community improvement,
capacity building
21.2
14.9
27.6
16.9
25.2
15.0
2.0
1.3
23.6
13.4
20.6
11.9
1.0
0.7
Crime and legal-related 14.4
10.3
46.5
30.0
41.0
25.3
4.8
3.5
26.8
16.3
22.0
13.3
2.1
0.8
Diseases and medical
disciplines
22.3
15.7
19.5
11.9
15.9
9.1
2.3
1.4
27.4
14.3
21.7
11.0
2.0
0.7
Education 43.2
31.5
12.1
8.3
10.2
6.9
1.4
1.0
15.9
8.7
14.3
7.8
0.9
0.4
Employment 40.6
30.3
33.6
24.1
25.6
18.7
6.1
4.0
7.6
4.7
6.3
4.2
0.7
0.3
Environment 15.8
8.6
12.3
6.5
11.2
5.8
0.8
0.4
41.0
24.6
39.0
23.2
1.0
0.2
Food, agriculture, and
nutrition
21.7
12.2
16.7
10.2
14.9
8.9
1.5
1.1
38.8
27.6
33.3
23.5
2.5
1.2
Health care 53.5
41.0
12.9
6.8
9.5
4.6
1.7
1.0
13.7
7.5
11.2
6.0
1.4
0.6
Hospitals 71.2
63.2
1.2
0.8
1.2
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.0
Housing and shelter 50.0
40.6
23.9
9.1
17.7
6.8
5.6
1.7
8.9
4.3
7.8
3.7
0.6
0.2
Human services 34.8
25.2
33.4
21.3
24.7
15.2
6.1
3.9
16.1
8.9
12.5
7.2
1.5
0.5
International, foreign
affairs, national security
21.6
17.6
8.0
4.7
7.4
4.1
0.6
0.3
53.3
41.8
49.7
38.0
2.9
1.8
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Table 7 (continued)
Program
revenue
Subsidy Charity
Total Grants Contracts Total Direct Indirect
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
> ½
> ¾
Medical research 20.4
13.6
8.0
4.7
7.2
4.1
0.4
0.2
37.5
23.5
34.2
20.4
1.8
1.0
Mental health and crisis
intervention
30.0
21.4
47.3
18.8
35.0
18.4
9.9
5.9
9.5
4.5
7.1
3.3
1.4
0.3
Public and societal benefit 27.9
18.1
16.1
10.8
14.0
9.8
1.7
0.4
33.0
19.6
27.0
15.7
4.0
1.5
Public safety, disaster
preparedness, relief
17.8
12.0
24.7
13.2
20.0
10.2
4.1
2.7
17.7
9.5
14.3
7.5
1.7
0.9
Recreation and sports 51.4
33.4
2.5
1.1
2.2
0.8
0.3
0.2
16.1
8.4
14.2
7.3
1.0
0.4
Religion-related 16.2
9.9
2.2
1.0
1.6
0.8
0.5
0.2
63.7
49.9
60.9
47.4
1.8
1.0
Science and technology 34.8
22.6
20.5
14.1
15.6
11.0
4.0
3.1
18.4
10.4
16.2
9.8
1.5
0.3
Social science 31.4
20.5
13.6
7.9
11.0
6.6
2.6
1.3
33.1
23.1
31.0
21.0
1.8
0.9
Youth development 13.6
8.1
6.1
2.9
5.2
2.3
0.8
0.5
36.5
16.2
24.8
11.1
3.5
0.5
By size
Smallest NPOs 20.8
13.4
8.8
3.7
7.6
3.2
1.0
0.4
26.7
15.7
24.2
14.0
1.3
0.5
2nd quintile 32.9
22.7
16.2
7.5
13.6
7.2
2.1
1.1
29.2
17.2
25.5
15.0
1.8
0.6
3rd quintile 35.0
24.7
22.0
12.4
17.9
9.9
3.3
1.8
23.6
13.1
20.0
11.1
1.5
0.6
4th quintile 36.5
25.7
26.7
15.9
19.5
11.7
4.4
2.6
17.5
8.7
14.3
7.5
1.4
0.5
Largest NPOs 45.8
32.0
28.3
19.3
18.7
12.4
5.3
3.5
9.8
5.1
7.9
4.2
0.8
0.3
revenue from government sources. NPOs in three subsectors demonstrate even higher levels
of dependence on government funding—more than one-fifth of NPOs in the employment,
human services, and crime and legal-related subsectors receive more than three-fourths of
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their revenue from government sources. The inclusion of the human services subsector in
this list is notable as it receives more government support than any other subsector (Table 10,
discussed in the next section). Though government funding is considered a relatively stable
source of revenue (Froelich, 1999; Gronbjerg, 1991; Kingma, 1993), overreliance on it
carries the risks of goal displacement (as with over reliance on charitable giving) and the
imposition of process and structural restraints, such as “government-driven
professionalization, bureaucratization, and loss of administrative autonomy” (Froelich, 1999,
p. 256). And as noted before, the long-term stability of government funding may mask
recurring short-term instability as disbursement of funds is subject to the frequent delays of
government budget processes (Smith, 1994).
At the other extreme, only about 1 percent of hospitals and less than 3 percent of
colleges and universities and NPOs in the religion-related and recreation subsectors receive
half of their revenue from government sources (Table 7). (Recall, though, that hospitals and
colleges and universities benefit from indirect government subsidy in the form of
government-funded third party payments for services, that is, Medicaid/Medicare payments
and tuition grants.) In between, the proportion of NPOs receiving at least of half their
revenue from government sources in the remaining subsectors ranges from 6 to 34 percent.
In all of the subsectors, many more NPOs are dependent on revenue from government grants
than from government contracts.
The extent of dependence on charitable contributions for more than half of revenue
varies from less than 10 percent of NPOs in the hospitals, employment, and mental health
subsectors to more than 33 percent of NPOs in the animal-related, environment, food,
medical research, public and societal benefit, social science, and youth development
subsectors and more than 50 percent of NPOs in the civil rights, international, and religion-
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related subsectors. Between 40 and 50 percent of NPOs in the civil rights, international, and
religion-related subsectors receive more than three-fourths of their revenue from charitable
contributions, making them susceptible to the risks of revenue volatility, due to unpredictable
swings in the amount of revenue generated by charitable contributions, and goal
displacement, altering goals and priorities to garner contributions (Froelich, 1999; Gronbjerg,
1992, 1993). In all subsectors, the proportion of NPOs displaying high levels of dependence
on direct charity greatly exceeds the proportion displaying high levels of dependence on
indirect charity.
Organization size appears positively related to the proportion of NPOs highly
dependent on government subsidy and inversely related to the proportion of NPOs highly
dependent on charitable contributions (Table 7). Only 9 percent of the smallest 20 percent of
NPOs are dependent on government funds for half of their revenue, which increases to 16
percent for the next largest 20 percent of NPOs, to 22 percent for the median quintile, and 27
and 28 percent for the two largest quintiles. Nearly 20 percent of the largest NPOs are
dependent on government funds for three-fourths of their revenue. Inversely, 27 and 29
percent of NPOs in the two smallest quintiles are dependent on charitable contributions for
half of their revenue, decreasing to 24, 18, and 10 percent for the three larger quintiles.
These same patterns hold for government grants and contracts and for direct and indirect
charity.
Whether these findings represent “too much” dependence on charity or subsidy may
be a matter of opinion, but clearly, heavy reliance on either revenue source does not
characterize most NPOs. More typical than too much dependence on charity or subsidy,
though, is what critics of the “marketization” of the nonprofit sector might describe as too
much independence. In addition to dependence on subsidy and charity, Table 7 also presents
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the prevalence of dependence on program revenue for over half and over three-fourths of
total revenue. For every NPO dependent on either government subsidy or charitable giving
for more than three-fourths of its revenue, there is another NPO—26 percent of all NPOs—
that generates at least three-fourths of its revenue with fees for program services, and fees
account for at least half of revenue in 36 percent of NPOs. Such “resource independence” is
more common among larger NPOs, which might explain why these NPOs are large: Nearly
half (46 percent) of the largest NPOs generate at least half of their revenue with program
fees, compared to 21 percent of the smallest NPOs (reflecting, in part, the 71 percent of
hospitals and 54 percent of colleges and universities that generate at least of half of their
revenue from fees).
Highly concentrated distribution of revenue
The wide gap between the nonprofit sector’s average revenue of $7.9 million and its
median revenue of $567,000 betrays a heavily skewed distribution of nonprofit revenue
(Table 4). Most revenue, and specifically, revenue from both government subsidy and
charitable contributions, is highly concentrated in a relatively small proportion of NPOs
(Table 8). The skew of the distribution is striking: Twenty percent of NPOs command 93
percent of all revenue in the nonprofit sector. In dollar terms, the average revenue of the 20
percent of NPOs with the highest revenue is $37 million while the average revenue of the
remaining 80 percent of NPOs is less than $575,000.
For the 44 percent of NPOs that receive any government subsidy and the 80 percent of
NPOs that receive any charity, revenue from these sources demonstrate similarly skewed
distributions (Table 8). Of the NPOs that receive any government funding, the 20 percent
38
Table 8. Distributions of total revenue, subsidy, and charity (N = 87,127)
Share of sector revenue
from specified source
(%)
Average
amount
($)
NPOs receiving any revenue (100% of all NPOs) 100.0 7,875,341
1st quintile (the 20% receiving least revenue) 0.3 124,928
2nd quintile 0.7 272,034
3rd quintile 1.5 587,415
4th quintile 4.1 1,611,759
5th quintile (the 20% receiving most revenue) 93.4 36,781,365
NPOs receiving any subsidy (44% of all NPOs) 100.0 838,195
1st quintile (the 20% receiving least subsidy) 0.2 15,641
2nd quintile 0.9 71,497
3rd quintile 2.7 210,691
4th quintile 8.0 621,257
5th quintile (the 20% receiving most subsidy) 88.2 6,885,190
NPOs receiving any government grants (40% of all NPOs) 100.0 1,203,698
1st quintile (the 20%receiving least grant revenue) 0.2 13,443
2nd quintile 1.0 59,016
3rd quintile 2.9 173,485
4th quintile 8.4 503,319
5th quintile (the 20% receiving most grant revenue) 87.6 5,269,564
NPOs receiving any government contracts (7% of all NPOs) 100.0 1,789,869
1st quintile (the 20% receiving least contract revenue) 0.3 23,041
2nd quintile 1.2 107,121
3rd quintile 3.3 299,412
4th quintile 9.6 857,365
5th quintile (the 20% receiving most contract revenue) 85.6 7,665,407
NPOs receiving any charity revenue (80% of all NPOs) 100.0 832,847
1st quintile (the 20% receiving least charity revenue) 0.2 6,389
2nd quintile 0.9 38,136
3rd quintile 2.5 105,341
4th quintile 6.6 275,695
5th quintile (the 20% receiving most charity revenue) 89.8 3,738,782
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Table 8 (Continued)
Share of sector
revenue from
specified source
(%)
Average
amount
($)
NPOs receiving any direct charity revenue (77% of all NPOs) 100.0 744,265
1st quintile (the 20% receiving least direct charity revenue) 0.1 4,844
2nd quintile 0.8 29,713
3rd quintile 2.3 87,331
4th quintile 6.4 238,077
5th quintile (the 20% receiving most direct charity revenue) 90.3 3,361,318
NPOs receiving any indirect charity (23% of all NPOs) 100.0 443,654
1st quintile (the 20% receiving least indirect charity revenue) 0.2 4,690
2nd quintile 1.0 21,388
3rd quintile 2.4 53,111
4th quintile 5.7 125,999
5th quintile (the 20% receiving most indirect charity revenue) 90.7 2,013,306
with the most revenue from government sources receives 80 percent of all government
funding transferred to the nonprofit sector. The average amount of subsidy received by the
top 20 percent of NPOs is nearly $7 million compared to just under $16,000 for the bottom
20 percent. Total charitable contributions, direct charitable contributions, and indirect
charitable contributions are even more highly concentrated in a relatively few NPOs. Of the
80 percent of NPOs that report receiving any revenue from charitable contributions, the 20
percent of NPOs receiving the most revenue from charitable contributions receive 90 percent
of all charitable contributions made to the nonprofit sector, with revenue from charity
averaging almost $4 million; the 20 percent receiving the least revenue from charity receive
0.2 percent of all charity, averaging less than $7,000. The distributions are nearly identical
for direct and indirect charity.
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Just as total revenue, subsidy, and charity are distributed quite unevenly among
individual NPOs, they are also distributed quite unevenly among the nonprofit subsectors.
Just under half—45 percent—of all nonprofit revenue is generated by nonprofit hospitals
(Table 5). At a distant second, colleges and universities receive 16 percent of all nonprofit
revenue, with 40 percent of all nonprofit revenue split among the remaining 23 subsectors.
Only four of these subsectors receive over 2 percent of total nonprofit revenue: human
services (9 percent), health care (7 percent), education (5 percent), and arts and culture (4
percent).
Subsidy and charity are also concentrated in a few nonprofit subsectors, but the
distribution looks somewhat different than the distribution of total revenue. For instance,
while hospitals account for 45 percent of total nonprofit revenue (Table 5), they account for
only 8 percent of charitable revenue (Table 9). Sixty percent of all nonprofit revenue from
government sources is received by only three subsectors, human services (28 percent),
hospitals (20 percent), and colleges and universities (12 percent) (Table 10), and just over
half of all revenue from charity is received by only four subsectors, colleges and universities
(19 percent), human services, (13 percent), arts and culture (11 percent), and hospitals (8
percent) (Table 9).
Interestingly, direct charity and indirect charity are distributed quite differently among
the subsectors, suggesting different philanthropic priorities for funding intermediaries and
individual donors (or, perhaps, different fundraising strategies in different subsectors). Four
subsectors receive more than 10 percent of total indirect charity: health care (10 percent),
hospitals (23 percent), human services (20 percent), and international, foreign affairs, and
national security (11 percent) (Table 9). Two different subsectors are the leading recipients
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Table 9. Distribution of charity, by subsector and organization size (N = 87,127)
Receive
any
charity
(%)
Share of
charity
(%)
Receive
any
direct
charity
(%)
Share of
direct
charity
(%)
Receive
any
indirect
charity
(%)
Share of
indirect
charity
(%)
All NPOs 79.6 100.0 77.3 100.0 22.6 100.0
By subsector
Animal-related 95.0 1.8 94.7 2.0 10.6 0.4
Arts, culture, and humanities 93.9 11.1 92.9 12.4 12.1 3.4
Civil rights, social action, advocacy 94.5 0.8 92.8 0.9 27.0 0.2
Colleges and universities 88.5 18.6 87.1 21.2 12.4 3.8
Community improvement, capacity building 76.4 2.1 74.5 1.9 17.0 2.6
Crime and legal-related 84.3 1.2 81.2 1.2 33.8 1.2
Diseases and medical disciplines 87.6 6.0 86.1 5.6 36.1 8.2
Education 80.1 7.2 78.6 7.8 11.9 2.7
Employment 66.8 0.9 63.2 0.9 25.3 0.9
Environment 89.1 3.1 88.2 3.6 12.4 0.3
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 84.7 2.8 83.5 3.0 31.7 0.8
Health care 73.1 4.3 68.9 3.0 23.3 10.1
Hospitals 86.2 7.8 75.5 5.6 35.6 22.7
Housing and shelter 40.5 1.4 38.2 1.1 10.1 1.4
Human services 82.3 12.6 79.2 11.4 36.7 20.0
International, foreign affairs, nat’l security 84.5 6.3 83.1 5.7 11.9 10.7
Medical research 83.5 1.0 81.1 1.0 16.1 1.1
Mental health and crisis intervention 80.6 1.3 76.0 1.1 35.0 2.3
Public and societal benefit 76.6 0.6 74.5 0.6 17.0 0.7
Public safety, disaster preparedness, relief 87.1 0.2 85.9 0.2 14.8 0.1
Recreation and sports 75.5 1.7 74.2 1.7 10.7 1.4
Religion-related 90.3 3.8 89.1 4.2 9.4 1.4
Science and technology 70.3 0.5 67.6 0.6 11.0 0.3
Social science 82.5 0.4 81.2 0.5 8.7 0.1
Youth development 93.5 2.9 92.3 2.7 52.9 4.3
By size
Smallest NPOs 76.2 2.0 74.6 2.1 11.6 1.0
2nd quintile 79.8 3.1 77.8 3.2 18.3 2.2
3rd quintile 79.5 5.5 77.5 5.6 23.1 4.9
4th quintile 78.0 11.4 77.6 11.3 29.5 11.8
Largest NPOs 82.4 78.1 78.8 77.8 30.5 80.0
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Table 10. Distribution of government subsidy, by subsector and organization size (N = 87,127)
Receive
any
subsidy
(%)
Share of
subsidy
(%)
Receive
any
gov’t
grants
(%)
Share of
gov’t
grants
(%)
Receive
any
gov’t
contracts
(%)
Share of
gov’t
contracts
(%)
All NPOs 43.9 100.0 40.4 100.0 6.8 100.0
By subsector 0
Animal-related 33.9 0.3 24.6 0.1 11.1 0.3
Arts, culture, and humanities 49.3 2.5 48.7 3.0 1.3 0.5
Civil rights, social action, advocacy 36.5 0.3 35.5 0.4 2.4 0.1
Colleges and universities 53.8 11.8 52.1 12.0 3.7 7.8
Community improvement, capacity building 49.3 3.4 46.6 3.8 4.2 1.4
Crime and legal-related 66.6 2.3 61.5 2.2 8.0 2.3
Diseases and medical disciplines 39.0 1.5 35.6 1.6 5.4 1.5
Education 26.6 4.3 24.1 4.5 4.1 4.3
Employment 61.2 3.1 52.6 2.4 15.0 4.2
Environment 43.6 0.5 41.7 0.3 3.6 0.6
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 61.9 0.6 59.0 0.7 5.2 0.4
Health care 37.2 5.1 33.7 4.4 5.5 7.1
Hospitals 22.8 20.3 20.7 20.6 5.8 19.4
Housing and shelter 46.0 2.3 37.9 2.3 9.4 2.1
Human services 58.1 28.3 50.9 28.6 11.7 26.7
International, foreign affairs, nat’l security 21.9 1.2 21.0 2.0 1.2 0.2
Medical research 21.8 0.6 21.2 1.0 0.8 0.0
Mental health and crisis intervention 68.3 7.5 58.3 5.1 17.1 11.6
Public and societal benefit 32.3 0.4 31.5 0.6 7.5 0.2
Public safety, disaster preparedness, relief 66.6 0.2 61.5 0.3 7.5 0.2
Recreation and sports 15.9 0.4 15.0 0.4 1.3 0.5
Religion-related 7.3 0.1 6.3 0.1 1.0 0.1
Science and technology 41.6 4.0 35.5 1.5 9.5 8.1
Social science 35.8 0.9 31.4 1.5 4.8 0.1
Youth development 38.9 0.4 37.3 0.6 2.6 0.3
By size
Smallest NPOs 27.1 0.5 25.1 0.7 2.6 0.2
2nd quintile 40.3 1.0 36.7 1.5 4.9 0.8
3rd quintile 48.3 2.6 43.0 3.7 6.9 2.1
4th quintile 54.0 7.8 47.3 10.6 9.0 8.3
Largest NPOs 60.0 88.1 49.8 83.4 10.5 88.5
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of direct charity, though: colleges and universities (21 percent) and the arts and culture
subsector (12 percent). Given their prominence in the nonprofit sector, the large differences
in the shares of direct and indirect charitable revenue for hospitals and colleges and
universities are especially noteworthy: Hospitals receive 23 percent of all indirect charity but
only 6 percent of all direct charity; inversely, colleges and universities receive only 4 percent
of indirect charity but 21 percent of all direct charity.
In general, the most striking feature of the distribution of revenue is its heavy
concentration in a small proportion of NPOs. This finding lends support to alternative
explanations of the existence of the nonprofit sector. At first glance, the concentration of
revenue in a few NPOs (especially when coupled with the finding that larger NPOs are most
reliant on program revenue) appears to support the view that NPOs act like their for-profit
counterparts, demonstrating self-maximizing behavior and seeking, at best, efficiencies of
scale or, at worst, monopoly over a service area (Young, 1981), leading to domination by a
few large NPOs. However, proponents of explanations of the nonprofit sector that emphasize
the sector as a vehicle for collective voluntary action for those inevitably displeased with the
set of government services in a pluralistic society (Atkinson, 1997; Salomon, 1999b;
Weisbrod, 1975) may focus on the vast numbers of relatively small NPOs that exist in the
United States, including the 80 percent of this sample that control only 20 percent of total
nonprofit revenue, plus the countless others out of scope for this study. Only NPOs in the
mental health and crime and legal-related subsectors, which receive a large proportion of
revenue from government sources (Table 5) and are commonly very dependent on
government funds (Table 7), lend support to the contention that NPOs emerge to fill a market
niche created by the availability of government funding (Grobman, 2002), but this support is
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certainly weak as these two subsectors account for only 9 percent of government funding in
the nonprofit sector (Table 10).
The preceding description of the composition and distribution of nonprofit revenue
demonstrates the insufficiency of monolithic descriptions of the sector. The diversity of
revenue profiles reflects a diversity of roles for NPOs, a diversity of reasons for their
existence, and a diversity of management challenges facing their administrators. This
description also contradicts some widely held assumptions about the nonprofit sector. Far
from being charity-dependent and small, NPOs are more typically entrepreneurial and, on
average, very large. The next level of description of nonprofit revenue undertaken in this
study and reported in the next chapter focuses on the relationship between two of the revenue
sources just described—government funding and charitable contributions—and, like this
chapter, ultimately presents findings that challenge widely held assumptions about revenue in
the nonprofit sector.
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CHAPTER 3
Exploration of the Subsidy-Charity Relationship
During the 2004 spring pledge drive of Atlanta’s public radio station, one of the
announcers admonished in her famously soothing voice, “Some of you may not support
public radio because you believe that we get most of our money from the government. Not
soooo,” she crooned, “we only get a small percentage of our funding from the government.
Most of our support comes from listeners like you.” What compelled her to say this? Why
would she think it persuasive to tell listeners that the radio station receives little of its
revenue from government sources? Apparently, she believes what many economists have
long theorized, that private charitable donors eschew supporting NPOs that receive
government funds, and decided to go on the offensive, assuring potential donors that their
contributions are necessary and not duplicative of contributions already made indirectly by
paying taxes passed along to the station.
Whether the radio announcer’s fear is justified remains an unanswered question;
previous research on the relationship between government funding and charitable
contributions—the “subsidy-charity relationship”—has yielded conflicting results. By
employing improved methods, a superior dataset, and a more thorough look at variation in
the subsidy-charity relationship among different types of NPOs, this study provides surer
evidence of the nature of the subsidy-charity relationship and grounds for speculating as to
why it may occur.
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Theory and previous research
Insofar as it examines the risks associated with increased dependence on government
funding, study of the subsidy-charity relationship overlaps with the study of revenue from the
resource dependence perspective. Study of the subsidy-charity relationship, however, goes
further by examining the effect of one revenue source—government subsidy—on another—
charitable contributions, and it has its theoretical foundations (and thus its methodological
bent) in welfare economics rather than organizational theory.
Previous research on the subsidy-charity relationship has been conducted at 1) the
aggregate level, examining the effects of either total government transfers to the nonprofit
sector (or subsectors) or total government spending on total charitable giving (for example,
Schiff, 1985; Steinberg, 1985; Abrams and Schmitz, 1984a; Jones, 1983; Reece, 1979), and
2) at the organizational level, examining the effects of government funding on charitable
giving for specific charitable organizations (for example, Brooks, 1999; Payne, 1998;
Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler, 1995; Kingma, 1989). This chapter focuses on the latter case.
Both units of analysis merit attention, but the organizational unit of analysis may be of more
interest to public and nonprofit managers, who must take the total amount of government
spending and transfers to NPOs as given, but may frequently face decisions about allocating
and pursuing government funding for specific NPOs.
Various theories predict that in response to increases in government funding, private
giving may increase, decrease, or first increase and then decrease. Theorists explain these
potential responses in terms of changes in the utility private donors derive from giving to
NPOs caused by changes in the NPOs’ government funding levels. Most economists have
favored the crowding-out hypothesis, which predicts an inverse relationship between
government funding and private giving. This hypothesis posits that charitable donors derive
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utility from the services being provided by NPOs at a certain level. Since an NPO can use a
dollar of government subsidy to provide the same amount of service as with a dollar of
private charity, private donors can maintain the level of utility derived from the NPO’s
service provision by collectively decreasing their donations by one dollar for each dollar of
government funding (Roberts, 1984; Warr, 1982). Many theorists temper this hypothesis by
acknowledging that the displacement may be less than dollar-for-dollar since private donors
may derive some satisfaction from the act of giving itself in addition to the satisfaction they
derive from having the NPOs provide their services (Andreoni, 1990). Some also speculate
that donors derive less utility from donating the same amount if they perceive that the NPO
has become too like a government agency because of higher subsidy levels (Friedman and
Friedman, 1980) or if they perceive that their own influence over the organization is
diminished by the NPO’s increased dependence on government funds (Odendahl, 1990, cited
in Brooks, 2000a).
The crowding-out hypothesis, however, is not unopposed. Other theorists have
proposed that government funding may actually enhance utility derived from charitable
giving by acting as a signal of NPOs’ quality to private donors (and potential private donors),
stimulating an increase in private giving—a “crowding-in” effect (Schiff, 1990). To
illustrate, Brooks reports the tacit adoption of this theory by the National Endowment for the
Arts, whose promotional literature has claimed that “[e]ach NEA dollar is . . . a funding
catalyst attracting many more dollars from local and state agencies, corporations,
foundations, and individuals” (quoted in Brooks, 2000a, p. 211).
Drawing from both the crowding-out and -in hypotheses, Brooks (2000b)
hypothesizes a curvilinear relationship in which low levels of government funding stimulate
private giving, but increased government funding leads to crowding out. He suggests that
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when an NPO is receiving a small proportion of its revenue from government sources, it may
leverage these funds to stimulate private giving or private donors may see the NPO as having
been endorsed by the government. However, as government subsidy of the NPO increases,
private giving may decrease as donors begin to see their donations as unnecessary, the charity
as a quasi-public agency, or the NPO as financially vulnerable due to its dependence on
government funding.
Prior studies model individuals as rational actors who maximize the utility they derive
from both the act of giving to NPOs and from the NPOs’ actual service delivery, taking into
account NPOs’ government subsidies (see Brooks, 1999, and Payne, 1998, for recent
examples). A recent review of this literature (Brooks, 2000a) identified 22 empirical studies
of the subsidy-charity relationship. The studies yielded conflicting results, but the evidence
favors a partial crowding-out effect, with thirteen studies supporting the crowding-out
hypothesis, four supporting crowding-in, and five finding no statistically significant
relationship between government funding and private contributions. The partial crowding-
out effects ranged from 2 to 53 cents per dollar of government funding. In his own study,
Brooks (2000b) supports his hypothesis of a curvilinear subsidy-charity relationship, finding
that orchestras benefited from a crowding-in effect up to $8,200 in government support per
concert, above which a crowding-out effect dominated.
Previous studies of the subsidy-charity relationship, six of which were conducted at
the organizational level, do provide a strong foundation for this research, but they also
demonstrate important shortcomings. Some samples in previous studies were of a narrow
range of NPOs—worthwhile studies, but of limited generalizability. Connolly (1997) finds
moderate crowding in at research universities; Brooks (1999) finds government funding and
charitable giving to be independent for a sample of five symphony orchestras; Kingma (1989)
49
finds crowding out for public radio stations. As noted above, Brooks (2000b) offers
empirical evidence for his hypothesized curvilinear relationship between government funding
and private charity for symphony orchestras, but the data available for the study were only
partially disaggregated, with the symphony orchestras of the sample grouped by budget size.
The remaining two studies take the approach most similar to this research, using
organizational-level panel data across a broad range of nonprofit organizations. Payne’s
(1998) analysis, though, is limited due to the absence of data on the NPOs’ income from
services provided to government agencies, a limitation of available IRS data until 1993. The
data examined by Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995) suffer no such omissions, but they
examine nonprofits in the U.K., which likely exhibit a different subsidy-charity relationship
given their vastly different tax incentive structure, both for the nonprofit organizations and
individual donors. Payne’s analysis is also limited to subsectors related to social services.
Neither study allows for the possibility of a curvilinear subsidy-charity relationship—not
surprising since they preceded Brooks’ 2000 article, but a weakness nonetheless, considering
Brooks’ compelling theory and tentative evidence; nor do they allow for the possibility of
different subsidy-charity relationships depending on the specific types of subsidy and
charity.6
6 In addition to these criticisms of research conducted at the level of the organization, some scholars criticize
all study of the subsidy-charity relationship conducted at the aggregate level. Kingma (1989) and Schiff
(1990) interpret studies of the relationship between aggregate levels of government spending and aggregate
levels of charitable giving as tests of the extent to which government spending and charitable giving act as
substitutes or complements, not crowding out. Crowding out, they contend, must be studied at the
organizational level; donors may cease giving to one organization subsequent to increased government
funding and redirect their charitable contributions to other organizations. In this case, individual
organizations have experienced crowding out without an aggregate substitution effect. Studies conducted at
the aggregate level, then, may report a null effect, despite considerable crowding out at the organizational
level. (This is arguably a disagreement rooted in semantics; some authors use the term “crowding out”
intentionally to indicate a substitution effect [for example, Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler, 1995]). Schiff
(1990) criticizes some previous studies for inferring an effect of changes in aggregate governmental social
welfare spending on all charitable giving, regardless of sector, without a theoretical basis for inferring such a
relationship between social welfare spending and, say, charitable giving to the arts.
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The basic approach to examining the subsidy-charity relationship here follows the
strategy taken by several previous studies: A measure of private charity is regressed on a
measure of government subsidy from the previous time period. Despite its similarity with
previous studies, though, this study improves on previous research in at least four ways.
First, the data used for this study include a comprehensive measure of government subsidies
to NPOs, including funds from government contracts, an omission of previous research due
to the lack of availability of this data until 1993. Second, this study builds on the tentative
findings of previous research by exploring the mediating effects of organization size and
proportion of NPOs’ total revenue from government sources and by allowing for the
possibility of a nonlinear relationship between subsidy and charity. Third, this study
examines the subsidy-charity relationship for both the nonprofit sector as a whole and for
individual nonprofit subsectors; Schiff (1990) and Payne (1998) observe that studies of the
subsidy-charity relationship in the nonprofit sector as a whole may obscure differences
among subsectors. Fourth, this study recognizes that different kinds of government funding
may have different effects on charitable giving and that charitable giving may respond
differently to changes in government funding depending on whether it is given directly to
NPOs or indirectly through intermediary fundraising organizations.
Data and methods
The dataset described in Chapter 1, derived from 1998-2000 IRS Form 990 data and
the basis of the description of revenue presented in the previous chapter, is the primary data
source for this study as well. To examine the subsidy-charity relationship, additional
variables were calculated for the change in government subsidy from 1998 to 1999 and the
change in charitable giving from 1999 to 2000. These variables are listed and described in
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Table 11. The key independent variable is the first difference of revenue from government
sources (∆subsidy$1999-1998 ), lagged by one year since changes in government funding are not
expected to have simultaneous effects on private giving, but lagged effects (Brooks, 2000a
and 1999).7 These data are found in Form 990 lines 1c (government grants) and 93g (fees
and contracts from government agencies). The key dependent variable is the first difference
of revenue from charitable donations (∆charity$2000-1999), found in Form 990 lines 1a (direct
public support) and 1b (indirect public support). Since the crowding-in/-out hypotheses are
only relevant to NPOs that receive government funding, only the 47 percent of NPOs (N =
40,715) that received government funding during 1998 and/or 1999 are included in the
regression analyses.
Table 11. Variables included in regression analyses
Variable name Description
∆charity$2000-1999 Dollar change in revenue from charitable contributions from FY1999 to
FY2000
∆direct$2000-1999 Dollar change in revenue from direct charitable contributions from FY1999
to FY2000
∆indirect$2000-1999 Dollar change in revenue from indirect charitable contributions from FY1999
to FY2000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 Dollar change in revenue from government sources from FY1999 to FY2000
∆grants$1999-1998 Dollar change in revenue from government grants from FY1999 to FY2000
%∆charity2000-1999 Percent change in charitable contributions from FY1999 to FY2000: [100(charity$2000 – charity$1999)/charity$1999]
%∆direct2000-1999 Percent change in direct charitable contributions from FY1999 to FY2000:[100(direct$2000 – direct$1999)/direct$1999]
%∆indirect2000-1999 Percent change in indirect charitable contributions from FY1999 to FY2000:[100(indirect$2000 – indirect$1999)/indirect$1999]
7 It is also conceivable that changes in subsidy levels could have long-term effects over the course of multiple
years. This possibility has not been explored in previous research, nor is it in this research due to the
unavailability of the necessary data. Exploration of cumulative effects would be a valuable contribution of
future research as data become available.
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After presenting a simple cross-tabulation examining how many NPOs that
experienced increases and decreases in subsidy subsequently experienced increases and
decreases in charitable revenue, two regression models are tested for the sector as a whole,
for individual subsectors, and for NPOs of different sizes. The first model, below, is most
similar to the approach taken in previous research, driven by the hypothesis that charitable
donors decrease the dollar amounts of their contributions based on the actual dollar amount
of increase in subsidy levels (Roberts, 1984; Warr, 1982).
Model 1: ∆charity$2000-1999 = β0 + β1∆subsidy$1999-1998 + β2(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2
Model 1 tests whether changes in the dollars of government funding from 1998 to
1999 (∆subsidy$1999-1998) and its square (following Brooks, 2000b) predict changes in the
dollars of charitable giving to NPOs from 1999 to 2000 (∆charity$2000-1999).
Using a first-differencing approach provides the advantage of controlling for
unmeasured factors that remain constant for each NPO over time, so there is no concern that
omitted time-invariant variables would bias the coefficients on the subsidy variables. Still,
the model may appear rather “slim.” Since the goal of this study is to identify the
relationship between changes in subsidy and subsequent changes in charity, not to explain all
variation in revenue from charity, only omitted time-varying variables that would bias the
coefficients on the subsidy variables pose a threat to the validity of the model. While
additional variables that explain more variation in charity but do not bias the subsidy
coefficients would be beneficial to understanding variation in charity generally, they do not
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affect the subsidy-charity relationship of interest here. Further, the effect of changes in
subsidy on changes in charity may be mediated through omitted variables without detracting
from the validity of the model. For example, a recent cross-sectional study (Brooks, 2005)
reports that NPOs with more government funding may tend to expend less effort on
charitable fundraising. Including a measure of fundraising effort, then, may illuminate the
causal mechanisms by which the causal relationship between subsidy and charity arises, but
omitting it makes the estimation of the total effect of subsidy on charity relationship no less
accurate.8
A variation on the explanation of the crowding-out hypothesis assumes that charitable
donors respond to changes in the proportion of NPOs’ revenue from government sources, not
the actual dollar amount (Brooks, 2000b; Friedman and Friedman, 1980). To explore this
explanation, the second model, below, departs from previous research by treating both the
subsidy and charity measures in relative terms rather than in dollars.
Model 2: %∆charity2000-1999 = β0 + β1∆subsidy%1999-1998 + β2(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2
8 An omitted time-varying variable that could potentially bias the subsidy coefficients may be changes in state-
and local-level macroeconomic conditions, which could be correlated with both 1998 – 1999 changes in
subsidy and 1999 – 2000 changes in charitable giving. (Effects of macroeconomic changes at the national
level are accounted for in the constant term of the model, which captures secular trends for the sample as a
whole.) With typical two-year budgeting cycles, though, it is unlikely that subsidy levels would be
immediately responsive to macroeconomic changes, whereas charitable giving is clearly affected by
contemporaneous macroeconomic factors. So, while state- and local-level macroeconomic changes do affect
changes in charitable giving, these effects are likely independent of effects of changes in NPOs’ revenue
from government funding. To allow for different secular trends at the state level, an alternative model
including state dummy variables was tested, but the coefficients on the subsidy variables were virtually
unaffected; thus, the results using the model without the state dummy variables are presented in this study.
An additional control variable, the dollar amount of revenue from charity in 1999, was included in an
alternative model with negligible effects on the coefficients of interest. (See also footnote 11.)
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In this model, the percent change in charitable donations from 1999 to 2000
(%∆charity2000-1999) is regressed on the percentage point change from 1998 to 1999 in subsidy
as a percentage of total revenue (∆subsidy%1999-1998)9 and its square.10, 11
Model 2 captures one aspect of explanations of the subsidy-charity relationship that
focus on relative changes in subsidy and charity, but it does not distinguish between effects
that may be observed at different levels of government funding relative to total revenue that
result from changes in government subsidy, either in absolute dollar values or in relative
terms. This may be an important distinction if charitable donors respond to the perceived
“government-likeness” that comes with greater shares of revenue from government sources
(Friedman and Friedman, 1980). For example, charitable donors might decrease their giving
in response to a $100,000 increase in government funding if the additional subsidy resulted in
90 percent of the NPO’s revenue coming from government sources, but not if the additional
subsidy resulted in only 10 percent of the NPO’s revenue coming from government sources.
Likewise, charitable donors might decrease their giving in response to an increase in
government funding of 20 percentage points as a percentage of total revenue if the increase
resulted in the NPO receiving 90 percent of their revenue from government sources, but not
9 Note that while subsidy is treated as a proportion of total revenue, charity is treated as percent change
relative to the previous year’s amount of charity. Charity is not treated as a proportion of total revenue since
that would produce a negative coefficient on the subsidy variable as a measurement artifact. (See Table 2 for
calculations.)
10 Model 2 requires that NPOs reporting zero charity revenue in 1999 be omitted from analysis since the
calculation the dependent variable places 1999 charity revenue in the denominator. An alternative approach
was tested substituting one percent of total revenue for the zero values with similar (that is, statistically
insignificant) results.
11 Model 2 provides the opportunity to include three additional independent variables that are not plausible in
Model 1 but suggested as possible sources of bias by previous research demonstrating their effects on
changes in charitable giving to individual NPOs (Abrams and Schmitz , 1984a; Payne, 1998; Reece, 1979):
percent change in states’ gross state product, poverty rate, and average household income. These three
variables, constructed from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data for both 1998 – 1999 and 1999 – 2000,
were tested in the model. For the regressions that were statistically significant without these variables,
adding the variables did not change any of the subsidy coefficients more than 0.01, minimizing concern that
the omission of similar variables from Model 1 biases the subsidy coefficients (see also footnote 8).
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if the increase resulted in only 30 percent of the NPO’s revenue coming from government
sources.
Two options for exploring such possibilities were considered. First, it is possible to
include the percentage of nonprofit revenue from government sources in 1999 as an
additional independent variable and as an interaction term with the measures of subsidy
included as independent variables in Models 1 and 2. This approach was tested, but it did not
yield statistically significant results.12 A possible reason for the failure of this model to detect
any subsidy-charity relationship, though, may be that it assumes that the individuals and
organizations making decisions about their charitable contributions to NPOs can make fine
distinctions between different proportions of their beneficiary NPOs’ revenue that come from
government sources.
A separate study (Appendix A) demonstrates that individual charitable donors have,
at best, an imprecise impression of the proportion of revenue from government sources
received by their beneficiary NPOs. The study finds no correlation between donors’
estimates and the actual proportions, but it also finds that a sizable 28 percent estimated
within 10 percentage points of the actual percentage of their beneficiary NPOs’ revenue from
government sources, and an additional 15 percent estimated within 10 to 30 points of the
actual percentage.
Charitable donors’ imprecise knowledge of NPOs’ levels of government subsidy
suggests the second approach, which is to test Models 1 and 2 with the NPOs in the sample
assigned to four categories defined by broad ranges of the NPOs’ percentage of revenue from
government sources in 1999—that is, the percentage of revenue from government sources
12 That is Models 1 and 2 with the additional independent variable and interaction terms did not yield
statistically significantly improved (p < .05) model F-tests.
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that resulted from the change in subsidy levels from 1998 to 1999. The decision to use four
categories—zero to 25 percent, 25.1 to 50, 50.1 to 75, and 75.1 to 100—is somewhat
arbitrary but has the advantage of indicating whether the subsidy-charity relationship hinges
on whether NPOs receive over half of their revenue from government sources. This is the
approach taken in this study, constituting a third strategy for disaggregating the cases in
addition to the categories defined by subsector and organization size.
Models 1 and 2 are also examined in modified form using more narrowly defined
measures of subsidy and charity. Since government grants are more like charitable
contributions in that they pay for services provided to someone other than the payer and thus
may be more likely to displace charitable giving, the change in government grants from 1998
to 1999 (∆grants$1999-1998, ∆grants%1999-1998) is used as an alternative independent variable.13
And since decisions about charitable giving are made by the individual donor when given
directly to an NPO, whereas decisions are made by intermediary organizations about indirect
charitable giving, changes in direct charity (∆direct$2000-1999, %∆direct2000-1999) and indirect
charity (∆indirect$2000-1999, %∆indirect2000-1999) are used as alternative dependent variables.
Predicted crowding-in and crowding-out effects are estimated from the regression
results. Since the models only include the subsidy variable and its square, a statistically
significant (p < .05) F-test for the model as a whole also serves as a measure of the variables’
joint statistical significance. Statistically significant crowding-in/-out effects thus identified
are then assessed for their substantive significance based on the change in charity predicted
13 Revenue from government contracts, the other form of government subsidy described in Chapter 2, is not
used as an alternative subsidy measure for two reasons. First, very few NPOs (6 percent) report receiving
government contract revenue (see Chapter 3). Second, using contract revenue as an alternative subsidy
measure did not yield statistically significant (p < .05) model F-tests for the sector as a whole or for
individual subsectors.
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by a one dollar change in subsidy, evaluated at the median change in subsidy and the 25th and
75th percentiles of change in subsidy.14
OLS regression is used, which yields unbiased coefficients regardless of the normality
of independent and dependent variables in large samples. OLS, however, is susceptible to the
biasing effects of heteroskedasticity on variance estimates, which invalidate t-tests and F-
tests. Heteroskedasticity is very likely in these models; NPOs with very small changes in
charitable giving are likely to have changes in subsidy that vary over a narrower range than
NPOs that might have larger changes in charitable giving. In anticipation of this problem
with using OLS, robust standard errors are used to calculate heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests
and F-tests that are unaffected by heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2000).15
Findings
In both 1998 and 1999, about 46 percent of NPOs received some form of government
subsidy, and in both 1999 and 2000, about 80 percent received direct charitable contributions.
While the proportions of NPOs receiving government funds and charitable contributions
remained constant, the average amounts of subsidy and charity both increased, with an
14 The 25th and 75th percentiles demarcate the interquartile range, which is the range of the amount of change in
subsidy reported by 50 percent of the NPOs in the sample; 25 percent of NPOs report a change in subsidy
less than the value at the 25th percentile, another 25 percent of NPOs report a change in subsidy greater than
the value at the 75th percentile, and 50 percent of NPOs report a change in subsidy less than and 50 percent
report a change greater than the median.
15 Other options for dealing with heteroskedasticity were deemed inferior to using robust standard errors for
this study. Transforming the independent and/or dependent variables was not considered because of the
desirability in this study of preserving the direct interpretation of coefficients in terms of dollars. Using
robust standard errors was selected over weighting cases using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) because the
form of the heteroskedasticity did not conform to any typical patterns that could be easily modeled, nor could
the heteroskedasticity be confidently estimated under a Feasible GLS (FGLS) approach. Further,
heteroskedasticity-robust estimation can be applied uniformly to all of the regression models in this study,
whereas the specific form of GLS or FGLS would have to be modified for the different types of
heteroskedasticity observed for the various models. Finally, unlike FGLS, heteroskedasticity-robust
estimation does not carry the risk of biasing coefficient estimates if unnecessarily applied in the presence of
homoskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2000).
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increase in government subsidy from 1998 to 1999 of $122,277 and an average increase in
charitable contributions from 1999 to 2000 of $63,066 (Table 12, which also includes
descriptive statistics for the full sample for comparison).
Table 12. Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression analyses, all NPOs (N =
87,127) and the sample used for regression analysis consisting of NPOs that received
subsidy in 1998 and/or 1999 (N = 40,715)
Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Full sample
Regression sample
∆charity$2000-1999 63,066.32
88,192.68
2,788,320.40
3,220,793.54
0.00
0.00
-261,177,355.00
-261,177,355.00
235,115,000.00
202,516,000.00
∆direct$2000-1999 58,999.52
80,485.03
2,562,785.94
2,830,768.46
0.00
0.00
-202,994,589.00
-202,994,589.00
235,115,000.00
202,516,000.00
∆indirect$2000-1999 4,066.56
7,706.85
1,162,873.53
1,575,841.34
0.00
0.00
-261,177,355.00
-261,177,355.00
83,778,687.00
78,569,385.00
∆subsidy$1999-1998 122,277.36
161,507.44
3,486,005.01
4,794,588.20
0.00
7,360.00
-252,954,040.00
-252,954,040.00
373,571,967.00
373,571,967.00
∆grants$1999-1998 40,428.32
89,294.32
1,449,563.06
1,805,924.94
0.00
2,500.00
-70,000,000.00
-70,000,000.00
220,554,000.00
220,554,000.00
∆contracts$1999-1998 5,654.656
13,352.71
783,998.96
1,186,483.06
0.00
0.00
-53,207,019.00
53,207,019.00
128,051,878.00
128,051,878.00
%∆charity2000-1999 288.85
305.37
15,973.98
18,817.13
3.75
4.83
-100.00
-100.00
3,311,349.33
3,311,349.33
%∆direct2000-1999 256.50
199.96
9,752.99
3,340.64
3.49
4.53
-100.00
-100.00
2,093,793.33
2,093,793.33
%∆indirect2000-1999 138.64
144.47
6,000.10
5,825.33
0.63
1.22
-100.00
-100.00
489,013.14
489,013.14
∆subsidy%1999-1998 0.00
-0.05
14.00
19.05
0.00
0.00
-100.00
-100.00
100.00
100.00
∆grants%1999-1998 0.00
0.00
12.00
17.02
0.00
0.00
-100.00
-100.00
100.00
100.00
∆contracts%1999-1998 0.00
-0.03
9.41
12.33
0.00
0.00
-100.00
-100.00
100.00
100.00
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A broad assessment of the subsidy-charity relationship may be taken by determining
whether NPOs were more likely to experience an increase or decrease in charitable donations
in 2000 depending on whether they had experienced an increase or decrease in government
subsidy in 1999. Of NPOs that received any government subsidy in 1998 or 1999, 58 percent
experienced an increase and 38 percent experienced a decrease in charitable contributions
from 1999 to 2000. (Of the remaining 15 percent that experienced no change in charitable
giving from 1999 to 2000, almost all reported zero revenue from charitable giving in both
years.16)
If charitable giving were unrelated to the previous year’s change in government
subsidy, we would expect these proportions to be the same regardless of whether NPOs had
experienced an increase or decrease in subsidy levels in the previous year. This appears to be
the case; the percentages of NPOs experiencing decreases in charitable donations from 1999
to 2000 are within one percentage point of the values that would be expected regardless of
increases and decreases in government subsidy during the previous year, and the percentages
of NPOs experiencing increases in charitable donations from 1999 to 2000 are within about
two percentage points of the expected values (Table 13). The chi-squared statistic of 123.2
achieves statistical significance (p < .001), not surprisingly given the large sample size, but
the Gamma measure of the strength of the association is zero, indicating no effect of subsidy
on charity when measured simply as trichotomous increase/no change/decrease variables.
Similar results are obtained when using government grants as the independent variable and
direct and indirect charitable contributions as the dependent variable.
16 It may be confusing that unlike NPOs that did not receive government subsidy in 1998 or 1999, NPOs that
did not receive any charitable contributions in 1999 or 2000 are retained in the analysis; these cases are
important, though, because they could have experienced an increase in private charitable contributions from
1999 to 2000 following a change in government subsidy levels from 1998 to 1999, but did not. Excluding
these cases, then, could inflate crowding-in (and -out) estimates.
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Table 13. Percentage of NPOs experiencing changes in charitable giving following
changes in government subsidy (N = 40,715)
Change in subsidy 1998 – 1999
Decreased
(n = 12,422)
None
(n = 6,522)
Increased
(n = 21,771)
Total
Change in
charity
1999 – 2000
Decreased 37.1 38.1 37.7 37.5
None 17.0 12.8 13.0 14.5
Increased 46.0 49.1 49.3 48.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note. Sample of NPOs that received any government subsidy in 1998 or 1999.
χ
2
= 123.2 (p < .001); Gamma = 0.00
These findings support neither the crowding-out nor the crowding-in hypotheses, but
they do not take into account the magnitude of changes in charity and subsidy nor control for
other important factors, such as organization size or changes in the economy, tasks better
suited for multiple regression analysis. The results of the regression analyses are presented in
the following sections to answer three questions: 1) Does subsidy crowd out charitable
giving as predicted by the conventional crowding-out theory? 2) Does the subsidy-charity
relationship change depending on the magnitude of the change or the proportion of total
revenue from government sources? 3) Is there any support for alternative explanations to the
subsidy-charity relationship?
Does subsidy crowd out charitable giving as predicted by the conventional crowding-out
theory?
Recall that theorized answers to the question of why government funding affects
charitable giving conventionally have been derived from welfare economics, positing that
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those individuals and organizations making charitable contributions to NPOs take into
account changes in government funding when determining the amount of their contributions.
On the basis of this assumption, almost all theorists predict that government subsidy will
crowd out charitable giving as donors see less need for their charitable contributions or feel
that they have already contributed indirectly by paying taxes. What support for this theory do
these findings offer?
Overall, no support for conventional crowding-out theory
Overall, the findings do not support the conventional crowding-out theory; increases
in revenue from government sources do not generally portend decreases in revenue from
charitable giving. For the nonprofit sector as a whole, Model 1 predicts a 5-cent increase in
charitable giving for every dollar increase in revenue from government sources (full results of
the regression analyses are provided in Appendix B):
∆charity$2000-1999 = 75,851.99 + 0.05(∆subsidy$1999-1998) + 0.000000000172(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2
The model F-test is statistically significant (p < .001), indicating a statistically
significant relationship between changes in subsidy and changes in charity.17 In dollar terms,
17 Model 1 performed well in terms of standard diagnostic criteria. The results do not appear to be subject to
the biasing effects of outliers; 99.2 percent of the standardized residuals fall between +2 and -2 (whereas less
than 95 percent would suggest the presence of outliers). The results also do not appear to be unduly
influenced by any individual cases; only four cases (0.1 percent) have Cook’s Distance values greater than
one, which were found not to exert undue influence over the model parameters by repeating the regression
analysis without these four cases and generating nearly identical results (Field, 2000, citing Cook and
Weisberg, 1982). Visual examination of the distribution of the residuals from a standard OLS regression
easily identified heteroskedasticity as expected, justifying the use of robust standard errors for calculation of
t- and F-tests. Of the 210 Model 1 regressions, 114, or 54 percent, have statistically significant (p < .05) F-
tests, far greater than the 5 percent that would be expected by chance. External validity of all regression
analyses was assessed by calculating Stein’s Adjusted R2 (Field, 2000; Stevens, 1996). Stein’s Adjusted R2
is calculated by [1-(n-1)(n-k-1)-1(n-2)(n-k-2)-1(n+1)n-1(1-R2)], where n is the sample size and k is the number
of independent variables (Stevens, 1996, p. 99). Unlike Wherry’s Adjusted R2, calculated by most statistical
software, Stein’s formula is a measure of cross validity, providing the estimated amount of variation that
would be explained if the regression equation were applied to other samples drawn from the same
population. In contrast to other methods of cross validation, such as data splitting, Stein’s approach has the
benefit of using all available data to derive the regression equation while still allowing an estimate of
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for the NPO experiencing the median change in subsidy from 1998 to1999 of a $7,360
increase, the model predicts a $368 increase in revenue from charitable giving. The
coefficient on the quadratic term is statistically significant, but over the interquartile range of
subsidy change, the subsidy-charity relationship is essentially linear at 5 cents increase in
charity revenue per dollar increase in subsidy revenue.
Revenue from government grants, as opposed to total government subsidy, exhibit a
slightly weaker crowding-in effect on total charitable giving, with a dollar increase in
government grant revenue predicting a 3-cent increase in revenue from charitable giving:
∆charity$2000-1999 = 79,793.52 + 0.03(∆grants$1999-1998) + 0.000000000173(∆grants$1999-1998)2
For the individual nonprofit subsectors, the results do not uniformly predict crowding-
in effects, but neither do they support the conventional crowding-out theory. Eleven of the
subsectors do not demonstrate any statistically significant subsidy-charity relationship. Of
the remaining subsectors, nine demonstrate a crowding-in effect of total subsidy on total
charity, whereas only five demonstrate a crowding-out effect, and the eleven subsectors
demonstrating a crowding-in effect receive just over half—51 percent—of government funds
subsidizing the nonprofit sector, far greater than the 6 percent of subsidy received by the five
subsectors demonstrating a crowding-out effect (Figure 1). Of the subsectors demonstrating
a crowding-in relationship, the magnitude of the relationship varies considerably, from 2
cents increase in charity per dollar of subsidy in the human services subsector and 4 cents per
dollar in the education and housing and shelter subsectors to 34, 40, 58, 64, and 77 cents per
generalizability to other samples. If the regression equation derived from the sample were of low external
validity, Stein’s Adjusted R2 would be considerably less than the sample R2. In all of the statistically
significant regression models, Stein’s Adjusted R2 is most often equal and, at most, within two one-
thousandths of the model R2. Thus, the regression equations derived from this sample can be confidently
generalized to the population of NPOs from which the sample was drawn during the same time period. To
review, this population is comprised of operating public charities with greater than $100,000 in annual
revenue and/or $250,000 in assets (see Chapter 2).
63
-0.90 -0.70 -0.50 -0.30 -0.10 +0.10 +0.30 +0.50 +0.70 +0.90
Recreation/sports (N = 762)
Community improvement (N = 2,101)
Civil rights/advocacy (N = 221)
Int’l/foreign affairs/nat’l sec. (N = 179)
Human services (N = 11,333) Animal-related (N = 477)
Crowding out
Crowding in
Housing/shelter (N = 3,504)
Education (N = 2,525)
Arts/culture/humanities (N = 4,711)
Colleges/universities (N = 899)
Youth development (N = 1,192)
Environment (N = 802)
Medical research (N = 117)
Public safety (N = 931)
64
Figure 1. Predicted change in revenue from total charitable giving, 1999 – 2000, per
dollar increase in government subsidy, 1998 – 1999 ($)
Note. Heights of bars are proportional to percentages of all government subsidy received by the
corresponding subsectors (see Table 10 for precise values). No evidence of a subsidy-charity
relationship is found in 11 subsectors, determined by a statistically insignificant (p > .05) F-test for the
model; the 11 subsectors are health care, hospitals, mental health/crisis intervention, diseases/medical
disciplines, crime/legal-related, employment, food/agriculture/nutrition, science/technology, social
science, public and societal benefit, and religion-related.
dollar in the colleges and universities, youth development, environment, medical research,
and public safety subsectors, respectively (Table 14). The magnitude of the crowding-out
Table 14. Effect of changes in revenue from total subsidy on changes in revenue from total
charitable giving, by nonprofit subsectors (N = 40,715)a
Subsidy-
charity
relationship Subsector
Total charitable dollars crowded in/out per
dollar change in total subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Crowding in ALL NPOs +0.05 +0.05 +0.05
Arts/culture/humanities +0.15 +0.14 +0.14
Education +0.04 +0.04 +0.04
Colleges/universities +0.35 +0.34 +0.34
Environment +0.53 +0.58 +0.63
Medical research +0.68 +0.64 +0.61
Housing/shelter +0.04 +0.04 +0.04
Public safety/disaster
preparedness/relief
+0.71 +0.77 +0.82
Youth development +0.34 +0.40 +0.46
Human services +0.02 +0.02 +0.02
Crowding out Animal-related -0.01 -0.03 -0.05
Recreation/sports -0.83 -0.81 -0.80
International/foreign
affairs/national security
-0.16 -0.07 0.00
Civil rights/social
action/advocacy
-0.06 -0.08 -0.10
Community improvement/
capacity building
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18
Note. No evidence of a subsidy-charity relationship is found in 11 subsectors, determined by a statistically
insignificant (p > .05) model F-tests; the 11 subsectors are health care, hospitals, mental health/crisis
intervention, diseases/medical disciplines, crime/legal-related, employment, food/agriculture/nutrition,
science/technology, social science, public and societal benefit, and religion-related.
aFor this table and following similar tables, Ns for individual subsectors are reported in Table B1.
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effects varies similarly from 3 cents of charitable giving crowded out per dollar increase in
subsidy in the animal-related subsector to 81 cents per dollar in the recreation and sports
subsector (Table 14). The effects of government grants on total charitable giving are very
similar to the effects of total government subsidy (Table 15), still supporting the prevalence
of crowding-in effects of government funding over crowding-out effects among the nonprofit
subsectors.
Segregating the subsidy-charity relationships for NPOs grouped by size provides no
evidence of crowding out of charity by subsidy and crowding in only among the largest
NPOs, close in magnitude to the 5 cents of charity crowded in by total government subsidy
and the 3 cents crowded in by government grants observed in the sector as whole (Table 16),
further underscoring the disproportionate influence of large NPOs in the sector as discussed
in Chapter 2 as well as the prevalence of a positive effect of subsidy on charity.
Thus far, these findings lend little support to the crowding-out hypothesis favored by
most previous researchers and theorists. Perhaps, though, Model 1 provides the wrong test of
the hypothesis—it could be that charitable donors respond to the proportional change in
NPOs’ revenue from subsidy, the variation of the hypothesis tested by Model 2. However,
Model 2 also fails to provide support for the crowding-out hypothesis—or for any other
subsidy-charity relationship, for that matter. Somewhat surprisingly given the significant
findings from Model 1, Model 2 yields statistically insignificant model F-tests, both in its
general form and when using the alternative measures of relative changes in subsidy and
charity.18 There does not appear to be a relationship between changes in revenue from
18 Nine (4 percent) of the 210 regression analyses conducted using Model 2 yielded statistically significant (p <
.05) F-tests, less than the 5 percent that would be expected by chance and thus regarded as due to chance
rather than representing actual effects of proportional changes in subsidy on charity.
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Table 15. Effect of changes in revenue from government grants on changes in revenue from
total charitable giving, by nonprofit subsectors (N = 36,982)
Subsidy-
charity
relationship Subsector
Total charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in government grants
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Crowding in ALL NPOs +0.03 +0.03 +0.03
Arts/culture/humanities +0.40 +0.39 +0.38
Education +0.07 +0.07 +0.07
Diseases/medical
disciplines
+0.62 +0.62 +0.62
Animal-related +0.02 + < 0.005 -0.02
Medical research +0.68 +0.64 +0.62
Housing/shelter +0.04 +0.04 +0.04
Public safety/disaster
preparedness/relief
+0.87 +0.92 +0.98
Youth development +0.23 +0.29 +0.35
Human services +0.05 +0.05 +0.05
Crowding out Environment -0.09 -0.04 +0.01
Recreation/sports -0.52 -0.55 -0.57
International/foreign
affairs/national security
-0.16 -0.07 + < 0.005
Civil rights/social
action/advocacy
-0.07 -0.09 -0.11
Community improvement/
capacity building
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18
Note. No evidence of a subsidy-charity relationship is found in 11 subsectors, determined by a statistically
insignificant (p > .05) model F-tests; the 11 subsectors are colleges/universities, health care, hospitals, mental
health/crisis intervention, crime/legal-related, employment, food/agriculture/nutrition, science/technology,
social science, public and societal benefit, and religion-related. Note that crowding in gives way to crowding
out in the animal-related subsector and vice-versa in the international subsector.
67
Table 16. Effect of changes in revenue from total subsidy and government grants on
changes in total charitable giving, by organization size
Type of
subsidy Size quintile
Total charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in total subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Total subsidy
(N = 40,715)
Smallest NPOs
2nd quintile
3rd quintile
4th quintile +0.04 +0.05 +0.06
Largest NPOs +0.04 +0.04 +0.04
Government
grants
(N = 36,982)
Smallest NPOs
2nd quintile
3rd quintile
4th quintile +0.05 +0.06 +0.07
Largest NPOs +0.02 +0.03 +0.03
Note. Blank cells indicate statistically insignificant (p > .05) model F-tests.
government sources as a percentage of NPOs’ total revenue and the proportional change in
NPOs’ revenue from charitable contributions.
Crowding out of indirect charity may support conventional theory
Partitioning the effects of subsidy on direct versus indirect charitable giving in dollar
terms (that is, using Model 1) reveals an exception to the tendency toward a crowding-in
effect of subsidy on charity in the nonprofit sector. (To recall, direct charity is given to NPOs
directly by donors whereas indirect charitable giving is channeled through intermediary
funding organizations, such as United Way affiliates and parent organizations.) Model 1
most often predicts crowding in of direct charity by total government subsidy (Table 17) and
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Table 17. Effect of changes in revenue from total subsidy on changes in revenue from direct
charitable giving, by nonprofit subsectors (N = 40,715)
Subsidy-
charity
relationship Subsector
Direct charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in total subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Crowding in ALL NPOs +0.08 +0.08 +0.08
Arts/culture/humanities +0.16 +0.15 +0.15
Education +0.02 +0.02 +0.02
Colleges/universities +0.33 +0.33 +0.33
Environment +0.53 +0.58 +0.63
Animal-related +0.16 +0.13 +0.10
Medical research +0.49 +0.46 +0.45
Housing/shelter +0.05 +0.05 +0.04
Public safety/disaster
preparedness/relief
+0.72 +0.77 +0.82
Youth development +0.36 +0.42 +0.48
International/foreign
affairs/national security
+0.22 +0.26 +0.28
Civil rights/social
action/advocacy
+0.04 +0.02 -0.01
Crowding out Health care -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Recreation/sports -0.83 -0.81 -0.80
Note. No evidence of a subsidy-charity relationship is found in 12 subsectors, determined by a statistically
insignificant (p > .05) model F-tests; the 11 subsectors are hospitals, diseases/medical disciplines, mental
health/crisis intervention, crime/legal-related, employment, food/agriculture/nutrition, human services,
community improvement/capacity building, science/technology, social science, public and societal benefit, and
religion-related. Note the change in sign in the civil rights subsector.
by government grants (Table 18). However, the effects of changes in subsidy on indirect
charity tend toward crowding out. Model 1 predicts crowding out of 3 cents of indirect
charity for every dollar increase in revenue from subsidy and 9 cents for every dollar increase
in revenue from government grants specifically:
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Table 18. Effect of changes in revenue from government grants on changes in revenue from
direct charitable giving, by nonprofit subsectors (N = 36,982)
Subsidy-
charity
relationship Subsector
Direct charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in government grants
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Crowding in ALL NPOs +0.12 +0.12 +0.12
Arts/culture/humanities +0.41 +0.40 +0.39
Education +0.02 +0.02 +0.02
Animal-related +0.20 +0.16 +0.13
Medical research +0.49 +0.48 +0.44
Housing/shelter +0.05 +0.05 +0.05
Public safety/disaster
preparedness/relief
+0.87 +0.92 +0.98
Youth development +0.27 +0.33 +0.39
International/foreign
affairs/national security
+0.22 +0.26 +0.28
Civil rights/social
action/advocacy
+0.06 +0.03 + < 0.005
Crowding out Environment -0.09 -0.04 +0.01
Recreation/sports -0.52 -0.55 -0.57
Note. No evidence of a subsidy-charity relationship is found in 11 subsectors, determined by a statistically
insignificant (p > .05) model F-tests; the 11 subsectors are colleges/universities, health care, hospitals,
diseases/medical disciplines, mental health/crisis intervention, crime/legal-related, employment,
food/agriculture/nutrition, human services, community improvement/capacity building, science/technology,
social science, public and societal benefit, and religion-related.
∆indirect$2000-1999 = 7,743.61 – 0.03(∆subsidy$1999-1998) + 2.50E-10(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2
∆indirect$2000-1999 = 10,963.83 – 0.09(∆grants$1999-1998) + 5.33E-10(∆grants$1999-1998)2
At the subsector level, more subsectors exhibit crowding out of indirect charity by
subsidy than crowding in, but the subsectors that exhibit crowding out receive a much
smaller proportion of government funding of the nonprofit sector than those subsectors that
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Figure 2. Predicted change in revenue from indirect charitable giving, 1999 – 2000, per
dollar increase in government subsidy, 1998 – 1999 ($)
Note. Heights of bars are proportional to percentages of all government subsidy received by the
corresponding subsectors (see Table 10 for precise values). No evidence of a subsidy-charity
relationship is found in 17 subsectors, determined by a statistically insignificant (p > .05) F-test for the
model; the 17 subsectors are education, employment, environment, hospitals, mental health/crisis
intervention, health care, diseases/medical disciplines, food/agridculture/nutrition, housing/shelter,
public safety/disaster preparedness/relief, recreation/sports, youth development, science/technology,
social science, public and societal benefits, religion-related, and youth development.
exhibit crowding in (Figure 2). Only three subsectors demonstrate crowding in of indirect
charity by increases in revenue from government subsidy, with twice as many subsectors
demonstrating crowding out. These three subsectors, though, receive over 40 percent of all
government funding of NPOs, whereas the six subsectors that demonstrate crowding out
receive only 10 percent of government funding of NPOs. The crowding-out effect observed
for the sector as whole reflects the larger effect sizes among the subsectors demonstrating
crowding out, which includes 11 cents of indirect charity crowded out per dollar of subsidy in
the civil rights subsector, 17 cents per dollar in both the animal-related and community
improvement subsectors, and 38 cents per dollar in the international, foreign affairs, and
national security subsector, compared to a crowding-in effect of 18 cents per dollar in the
medical research subsector, which only receives less than one percent of all subsidy, and only
2 cents per dollar in both colleges and universities and the human services subsectors (Table
19). Five subsectors demonstrate a crowding-in effect of government grants on indirect
charity, and five demonstrate a crowding-out effect, but as with the effects of total subsidy,
the magnitudes are considerably larger for the crowding-out effects than for the crowding-in
effects (Table 20).
The weak tendency toward crowding-out of indirect charity may provide partial
support for the conventional explanation of crowding out. As alluded to previously, the
earlier study included in Appendix A found that individual charitable donors have very little
awareness of the proportion of their beneficiary NPOs’ revenue that comes from government
sources (let alone the actual dollar amounts or the changes in these amounts over time). The
intermediary fundraising and umbrella organizations that allocate indirect charitable
contributions to NPOs, though, may be in a position to have more knowledge or be more
motivated to obtain knowledge about changes in NPOs’ receipts from government sources.
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Table 19. Effect of changes in revenue from total subsidy on changes in revenue from
indirect charitable giving, by nonprofit subsectors (N = 40,715)
Subsidy-
charity
relationship Subsector
Indirect charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in total subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Crowding in Colleges/universities +0.02 +0.02 +0.02
Medical research +0.18 +0.18 +0.17
Human services +0.02 +0.02 +0.02
Crowding out ALL NPOs -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Arts/culture/humanities -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Animal-related -0.17 -0.16 -0.15
International/foreign
affairs/national security
-0.38 -0.33 -0.28
Civil rights/social
action/advocacy
-0.11 -0.10 -0.09
Community
improvement/capacity
building
-0.17 -0.17 -0.17
Crime/legal-related -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Note. No evidence of a subsidy-charity relationship is found in 17 subsectors, determined by a statistically
insignificant (p > .05) model F-tests; the 17 subsectors are education, employment, environment, hospitals,
mental health/crisis intervention, health care, diseases/medical disciplines, food/agriculture/nutrition,
housing/shelter, public safety/disaster preparedness/relief, recreation/sports, youth development,
science/technology, social science, public and societal benefit, religion-related, and youth development.
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Table 20. Effect of changes in revenue from government grants on changes in indirect
charitable giving, by nonprofit subsectors (N = 36,982)
Subsidy-
charity
relationship Subsector
Indirect charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in total subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Crowding in Education +0.05 +0.05 +0.05
Mental health/crisis
intervention
+0.01 +0.01 +0.01
Medical research +0.18 +0.18 +0.17
Employment +0.01 +0.01 + < 0.005
Human services +0.04 +0.03 +0.03
Crowding out ALL NPOs -0.09 -0.08 -0.09
Arts/culture/humanities -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Animal-related -0.18 -0.16 -0.15
International/foreign
affairs/national security
-0.38 -0.33 -0.28
Civil rights/social
action/advocacy
-0.13 -0.12 -0.11
Community
improvement/capacity
building
-0.17 -0.17 -0.17
Note. No evidence of a subsidy-charity relationship is found in 15 subsectors, determined by a statistically
insignificant (p > .05) model F-tests; the 15 subsectors are colleges/universities, environment, hospitals, health
care, diseases/medical disciplines, crime/legal-related, food/agriculture/nutrition, housing/shelter, public
safety/disaster preparedness/relief, recreation/sports, youth development, science/technology, social science,
public and societal benefit, and religion-related.
If this is the case, the observed crowding out of indirect charitable giving may reflect the
behavior theorized by the conventional explanation, with intermediary funding organizations
decreasing their support of NPOs in reaction to increased government funding (or, inversely,
increasing their support of NPOs that lose government funding). The conventional
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explanation of the subsidy-charity relationship, then, may apply when charitable donors are
aware of changes in NPOs’ revenue from government sources.
If the findings were limited to the crowding out of indirect charity, this would make a
reasonable case for the conventional crowding-out theory. However, the preponderance of
the findings predict a crowding in of direct charity and total charity by government subsidy,
and stronger effect sizes at that. Further, the lack of (almost) any statistically significant
findings from Model 2, which allows for donors’ response to the proportional change in
NPOs’ revenue from government sources, suggests that the conventional explanation fails
even when relaxed to require that donors know only the proportion of NPOs’ revenue from
government sources rather than the actual dollar amounts. Taken as a whole, these findings
undermine the plausibility of the conventional explanation of the subsidy-charity relationship.
Does the subsidy-charity relationship change depending on the magnitude of the change or
the proportion of total revenue from government sources?
Just as with the conventional crowding-out theory, the findings provide little support
of the curvilinear hypothesis—that small changes in revenue from subsidy may stimulate, or
crowd in, charitable giving while large changes may lead to crowding out of charitable giving
(Brooks, 2000b). This alternative hypothesis would be supported if the quadratic terms
revealed crowding-out effects that grow larger with larger changes in subsidy or crowding-in
effects that diminish with larger changes in subsidy. At the sector level, however, the
quadratic term is positive, indicating a crowding-in effect that strengthens with larger
changes in subsidy; while statistically significant, though, the effect is so small that the
predicted crowding-in effect is essentially linear throughout the range of the observed
changes in subsidy. Among the subsectors and NPOs grouped by size, the quadratic terms
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lack any overall pattern. Though examples can be found of the quadratic subsidy terms
predicting substantively significant changes in the rates of crowding in and out, it appears
that the effects strengthen as often as they weaken for any given combination of subsidy and
charity measures.
Though previously only tested by including the square of the subsidy independent
variable (Brooks, 2000b), this study takes an additional approach to testing the curvilinear
hypothesis by examining differences in the subsidy-charity relationship among NPOs
grouped by percentage of revenue from subsidy in 1999—that is, the percentage of revenue
that resulted from changes in revenue in 1998 to 1999. The findings are partially consistent
with the curvilinear hypothesis, with stronger crowding-in effects among NPOs for which the
change in subsidy resulted in subsidy comprising less than half of their revenue (Table 21).
The effect of government grants on direct charity conforms to the curvilinear hypothesis most
closely, with the crowding-in effect decreasing steadily from 24 cents per dollar among NPOs
with less than 25 percent of revenue from government sources in 1999 to 1 cent per dollar
among NPOs with greater than 75 percent of revenue from government sources (Table 22).
These results, however, do not wholly support the curvilinear hypothesis. The
subsidy-charity relationship does not give way to crowding out as predicted by the
hypothesis, even for those NPOs receiving over three-fourths of their revenue from
government sources, though it does dwindle to one or two cents per dollar for NPOs with the
highest proportions of revenue from subsidy. And the effect of subsidy on indirect charity
remains contrarian, tending toward crowding out among NPOs with the smallest proportions
of revenue from subsidy and giving way to weaker crowding in among NPOs with the largest
proportions of revenue from subsidy (Table 23).
76
Table 21. Effect of changes in revenue from total subsidy and government grants on
changes in total charitable giving, by percent of 1999 revenue from government sources
Type of
subsidy
% 1999 revenue from
government sources
Total charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Total subsidy 0 – 25.0 (n = 17,555) +0.08 +0.08 +0.08
25.1 – 50.0 (n = 6,438) +0.09 +0.10 +0.10
50.1 – 75.0 (n = 6,854) + <0.005 + <0.005 + <0.005
75.1 – 100 (n = 9,823) +0.02 +0.02 +0.02
Government
grants
0 – 25.0 (n = 16,391) +0.06 +0.07 +0.08
25.1 – 50.0 (n = 5,982) +0.04 +0.06 +0.08
50.1 – 75.0 (n = 6,106) +0.08 +0.08 +0.07
75.1 – 100 (n = 8,503) +0.03 +0.02 +0.02
Table 22. Effect of changes in revenue from total subsidy and government grants on
changes in direct charitable giving, by percent of 1999 revenue from government sources
Type of
subsidy
% 1999 revenue from
government sources
Direct charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Total subsidy 0 – 25.0 (n = 17,555) +0.18 +0.18 +0.18
25.1 – 50.0 (n = 6,438) +0.09 +0.09 +0.09
50.1 – 75.0 (n = 6,854) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
75.1 – 100 (n = 9,823) +0.01 +0.01 +0.01
Government
grants
0 – 25.0 (n = 16,391) +0.24 +0.24 +0.24
25.1 – 50.0 (n = 5,982) +0.06 +0.08 +0.09
50.1 – 75.0 (n = 6,106) +0.03 +0.03 +0.03
75.1 – 100 (n = 8,503) +0.01 +0.01 +0.01
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Table 23. Effect of changes in revenue from total subsidy and government grants on
changes in indirect charitable giving, by percent of 1999 revenue from government sources
Type of
subsidy
% 1999 revenue from
government sources
Indirect charitable dollars crowded in/out per dollar
change in subsidy
At 25th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
At median
change in
subsidy
At 75th
percentile of
change in
subsidy
Total subsidy 0 – 25.0 (n = 16,391) -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
25.1 – 50.0 (n = 5,982) + < 0.005 + < 0.005 + < 0.005
50.1 – 75.0 (n = 6,106) +0.02 +0.02 +0.01
75.1 – 100 (n = 8,503) +0.01 +0.01 +0.01
Government
grants
0 – 25.0 (n = 16,391) -0.18 -0.18 -0.17
25.1 – 50.0 (n = 5,982) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
50.1 – 75.0 (n = 6,106) +0.05 +0.05 +0.05
75.1 – 100 (n = 8,503) +0.01 +0.01 +0.01
Is there any support for alternative explanations to the subsidy-charity relationship?
While the findings support neither the conventional crowding-out theory nor the
curvilinear hypothesis, they may be consistent with at least four alternative explanations.
First, the preponderance of predicted crowding in of direct and total charitable giving may
support the minority of theorists who predict crowding in from a welfare economics
framework (e.g. Schiff, 1990), assuming that donors respond positively to government
funding, seeing it as a sign of NPOs’ quality or trustworthiness. Given the findings from the
auxiliary study (Appendix A), though, this explanation seems unlikely since it still requires
donors’ knowledge of changes in NPOs’ revenue from government sources.
Second, the finding that predicted crowding in appears to be attributable largely to
government grants suggests that the common requirement of matching funds may be
responsible for subsequent increases in private charitable giving—government grants often
78
come with the requirement that the NPO raise matching funds proportional to the amount of
the grant, such as 50 cents or a dollar for every grant dollar. As this practice proliferates, a
crowding-in effect may become automatic.
Third, the receipt of government funds may enable NPOs to allocate more resources
to generating revenue from charitable contributions. For example, the increased government
funding could be used to hire additional staff to administer program functions, leaving others
more time for fundraising; or, the increased government funding could fund programs that
make the NPO more visible to the public and thus more able to attract charitable
contributions.
Fourth, the finding that the predicted crowding-in effect is strongest in NPOs that
remain dependent on government for smaller portions of their total revenue suggests that
government funding may be effective as “seed” money, with small amounts (relative to total
revenue) spurring the NPOs’ effectiveness in generating charitable contributions.
Importantly, these last three alternative explanations of subsidy-charity relationships
suggested by the findings do not rely on donors’ responses to government funding, but rather
changes in organization processes and structures. This possibility was suggested in one of
the earliest monographs on the subsidy-charity relationship (Driessen, 1984), but never tested
empirically. The emphasis on organization processes and structures implies a need to go
beyond the theoretical framework provided by welfare economics to a theoretical framework
that more readily accommodates the role of organizations in shaping the subsidy-charity
relationship. This shift brings the study of the subsidy-charity relationship into the fold with
most other research of nonprofit revenue, and initial steps toward integrating these research
streams and deriving implications for public policy, public management, and nonprofit
management are pursued in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Nonprofit Revenue and the Nonprofit Sector’s “Big Questions”
The current literatures of public policy, public administration, and nonprofit
management share at least one major theme: The business of accomplishing public goals is
increasingly carried out by complex networks of governmental, nonprofit, and even for-profit
organizations rather than traditional hierarchical government bureaucracies—a trend that has
come to be known as the movement to a “new governance” paradigm (for example, Salamon,
2002; Peters, 2001; John, Kettl, Dyer, and Lovan, 1994). A key feature of new governance is
the shift of responsibility for the delivery of government-funded services from government
agencies to nonprofit organizations, described as the rise in “third-party government”
(Salmon, 2002, 1987, 1981). New governance proponents contend that third-party
government can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government-funded services by
harnessing the performance incentives of competitive markets and because NPOs can
augment government funds with revenue from private philanthropy (e.g., Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987).
There is little doubt that a new governance movement is afoot; at the federal level,
new governance themes have resounded in Reagan-Bush era privatization efforts, in Clinton-
Gore’s National Performance Review and Reinventing Government program, and in the
“competitive sourcing” component of the President’s Management Agenda and the
“compassionate conservatism” philosophy of the current administration (White House, 2002
and 2004). The validity of the claims of new governance proponents, though, is not yet
established. Evaluating the merit of pursuing public goals through government funding of
NPOs requires not only determining the effectiveness of these services, but also determining
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the costs to government, the costs to the NPO, and the costs to the community (Provan and
Milward, 2001). In part, then, this evaluation must identify the effects of government
funding on NPOs, including any effects of government funding on NPOs’ revenue from
private philanthropy.
The conventional approach to understanding the effects of government subsidy on
charitable giving to NPOs appears inadequate to explain this relationship. Neither its
assumptions nor its predictions have strong empirical support. Previously, theorists have
sought to explain this relationship as driven by the responses of charitable donors to NPOs’
receipt of government funding, almost unanimously predicting that charitable donors would
respond to government subsidy of NPOs by decreasing their charitable giving, feeling that
their donations were no longer needed, that they had already given indirectly by paying taxes,
or that they simply no longer wanted to give to an NPO that looked too much like a
government agency. The plausibility of this explanation, though, is seriously undermined by
charitable donors’ lack of knowledge (and lack of concern) about NPOs’ revenue from
government sources (Appendix A).
The conventional explanation of the subsidy-charity relationship is further
undermined by the finding that government subsidy to the nonprofit sector most often
predicts an increase in charitable giving—the opposite of previous theorists’ predictions. The
largest share of government subsidy distributed to the nonprofit sector goes to the human
services subsector, which receives 28 percent of total subsidy. Uniformly, government
subsidy in the human services subsector predicts an increase in charitable support: Total
subsidy has a predicted 2 cents per dollar crowding-in effect on total charity and a 2 cents
crowding-in effect on indirect charity; government grants to the subsector have a predicted 5
cents per dollar crowding-in effect on total charity and a 3 cents crowding-in effect on
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indirect charity. Behind hospitals, which demonstrate no subsidy-charity relationship,
colleges and universities receive the next largest share of government subsidy, garnering 12
percent of government subsidy of the nonprofit sector. As with the human services
subsector, government subsidy uniformly predicts an increase in charitable giving. The
magnitude of the crowding-in effects, though, are much larger: Total subsidy has a 35 cents
crowding-in effect on total charity and a 32 cents crowding-in effect on direct charity;
government grants have a 33 cents crowding-in effect on direct charity and a 32 cents
crowding-in effect on direct charity. And the remaining subsectors that demonstrate
crowding-in effects receive over ten percent of all government subsidy of the sector.
To be clear: More than half of all government subsidy of the nonprofit sector has a
crowding-in effect on charitable giving at the subsector level. As a partial evaluation of the
rise in third-party government, these findings are generally positive, supporting the claim that
paying NPOs to provide public services allows public funds to be augmented by private
philanthropy. Even more, government funding appears to often spur an increase in private
philanthropy.
However, having established the inadequacy of the existing theoretical base for
exploring this question, why government funding may spur private philanthropy remains
unclear. Understanding the causal mechanisms underlying the subsidy-charity relationship,
though, is important. The positive effects of government funding on private philanthropy are
not uniform; some types of NPOs tend to experience negative effects, which may be
mitigated with a better understanding of the subsidy-charity relationship. Having ruled out
causal explanations based on reactions of charitable donors, the actions of NPOs should be
studied as an alternative source of explanations of the subsidy-charity relationship, with
organization theory as an alternative to welfare economics as the theoretical framework for
82
inquiry into the subsidy-charity relationship. As discussed in Chapter 1, resource dependence
theory has guided and illuminated much study of nonprofit revenue generally, and it may be a
beneficial theoretical framework for a fresh look at the subsidy-charity relationship
specifically.
This approach can capitalize on an important duality in resource dependence theory:
The organizational environment affects organizational decision-making, processes, and
structure, but the environment does not act deterministically on the organization;
organizations, too, act to strategically manage their dependence relationships, exerting their
own influence on the external environment and on internal decision-making, processes, and
structure (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). Put more succinctly, resource dependence theory holds
organizations both to act in and to be acted upon by the environment. For seeking
explanations of the subsidy-charity relationship, this duality suggests two broad hypotheses
that, in contrast to the conventional crowding-out/-in explanations, would operate
independently of the decision-making of private charitable donors. It has been demonstrated
that NPO managers—at least some NPO managers—are attuned to the complex patterns of
benefits and liabilities associated with various revenue sources and the managerial tasks they
require (Gronberg, 1992 and 1991). Nonprofit managers and public managers are also aware
of the power, derived from their resource interdependence, that each has to influence the
other’s organization (Saidel, 1991). Coupled with resource dependence theory, these
findings suggest the first general hypothesis: Changes in levels of private giving following
changes in levels of government subsidy may reflect the strategic decision-making of NPOs.
Under this hypothesis, crowding in may result from NPO managers intentionally leveraging
government funds to attract more philanthropic giving, and crowding out may result from
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NPO managers intentionally diverting resources from generating charitable revenue to
meeting the requirements of government funding.
This first hypothesis reflects only the “organization-as-actor” half of the dual
understanding of organizations posed by resource dependence theory. The complementary
“organization-as-acted-upon” half suggests a second general hypothesis that may explain the
subsidy-charity relationship: Changes in private giving levels may follow from changes in
government funding levels indirectly due to the process and structural changes in NPOs
induced by changes in government funding. Here, resource dependence theory is consonant
with institutional theories of organization, specifically, the concept of structural isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987). The institutional
framework emphasizes the pressure exerted by elements of an organizational environment
toward organizations adopting certain internal structures and processes. Such effects have
been observed in NPOs’ responses to government contracting, including more corporate-like
approaches to board governance, more sophisticated accounting systems, and modification of
organizational goals to align with public funding opportunities (Stone, 1996; Wolch, 1990);
perhaps NPOs’ capacity for attracting charitable contributions is likewise unintentionally
affected by government funding.
Consider the findings of Oster and O’Regan (2002) in their study of the boards of
NPOs receiving funds from New York City, the only example of previous research identified
that specifically attributes changes in revenue from individual charitable donors to changes in
NPO personnel’s behavior associated with receiving government funding:
Board members are more likely to report participating in government-related
advocacy work for the nonprofit the greater the reliance on government funding, and
less likely to report undertaking fundraising.
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In addition, for board members who do undertake fund-raising, government funding
appears to decrease the breadth of fund-raising . . . . Government funding has no
impact on the likelihood of fund-raising from governments or foundations, but
significantly decreases the likelihood that a board member will fund raise from private
donors, corporations, or fees for service. (p. 370)
Whether these effects of government funding represent the intentional strategic
decisions of the board members surveyed or the unintended consequences of government
funding diverting board resources from other responsibilities cannot be determined from the
study. However, these findings do demonstrate the promise of hypotheses derived from
resource dependence theory for explaining the subsidy-charity relationship. As reflected in
Froelich’s (1999) review of nonprofit revenue research using the resource dependence theory
framework, the previous literature has treated crowding out as a potential consequence of too
much dependence on government funding. In light of donors’ limited knowledge of NPOs’
government funding and the dominance of crowding in over crowding out, the two proposed
hypotheses depart from the previous literature by reframing the subsidy-charity relationship
as a potential manifestation of NPO managers’ strategic resource management or of the
unintended consequences of government funding on NPO managers’ behaviors.
This new focus on the subsidy-charity relationship has the potential to answer
questions with practical implications for practitioners in the nonprofit and public sectors.
Future research with this focus should ask: How can nonprofit managers leverage public
funds to generate more charitable revenue? How can nonprofit managers minimize any
effects of government subsidy that may inadvertently decrease revenue from charitable
giving? How can public managers structure funding arrangements to avoid crowding out and
perhaps even promote crowding in of charitable giving? Such questions will be not only
more useful to public and nonprofit practitioners wishing to maximize the efficient use of
85
their limited resources, but also more empirically grounded than questions asked in previous
studies of the charity-subsidy relationship.
For some nonprofit scholars and practitioners, the concern about potential crowding
out of charitable giving by government subsidy is only part of larger, more pressing concerns
about the changing role of the nonprofit sector represented in the new governance movement.
As argued by the founding president of Independent Sector and Tufts University Professor
Brian O’Connell (1996), a large faction of nonprofit sector leaders decry what they see as a
distortion of the appropriate purpose and scope of the nonprofit sector by new governance
reforms. O’Connell claims that the nonprofit sector’s most important contributions to society
are advocacy, empowerment, and innovation, not service provision. Though service
provision can be an important means to these higher ends, the increased emphasis on service
provision due to government shifting these responsibilities to NPOs in the new governance
model undermines the sector’s ability to fulfill its advocacy, empowerment, and innovation
purposes. Instead of acting as a forum for criticizing government, a vehicle for collective
public-spirited voluntary action outside of government, a voice for those not represented in
government, and an incubator of innovative policies and services not implemented in
government, NPOs in the new governance model are left to help government fulfill its own
public service responsibilities—a decidedly narrower role for the nonprofit sector in society.
The partnering with government (or, critics would argue, the co-opting by
government) central to new governance may exacerbate a larger trend in the nonprofit sector
away from its charitable roots. As presented in Chapter 2, the nonprofit sector receives only
8 percent of its revenue from charitable contributions, a steep decline from the total reliance
of early voluntary associations on charitable contributions. Government funding accounts for
more—11 percent—of revenue, but government subsidy still accounts for far less revenue
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than program revenues, the fees for services that generate 54 percent of all NPOs’ revenue.
This departure from the model of NPOs relying most heavily on charitable contributions has
been welcomed by some nonprofit leaders and castigated by others. In 2002, Emmett Carson,
a leading nonprofit scholar, argued that the public’s misperception of the nonprofit sector as
consisting of small, volunteer-driven Tocquevillean associations dependent on individuals’
contributions undermines the sector’s ability to fairly compensate professional staff, leads to
public frustration with nonprofit organizations that cannot always provide low-cost or free
services, and detracts from the ability of the sector to influence public policy. He called for
research “that underscores the variety and differences among nonprofit organizations so that
we may forever debunk the one-size-fits-all romanticized view of the nonprofit sector that
now exists” (p. 435).
Carson could very well marshal evidence from Chapter 2 to correct this “image
problem.” In addition to the proportions of total revenue from charity, subsidy, and program
revenue, other the key findings are:
 The average revenue of NPOs is almost $8 million.
 Revenue is highly concentrated in relatively few NPOs, with the largest 20 percent of
NPOs receiving 89 percent of all sector revenue.
 Twelve percent of NPOs are dependent on government funding for more than three-
fourths of their revenue, and another 12 percent are dependent on charitable contributions
for more than three-fourths of their revenue.
Rather than presenting an image of NPOs as small and charity-dependent, these
findings portray the nonprofit sector as consisting of organizations that are large and mostly
self-sustaining. Carson, then, may find here evidence to indict the public for maintaining an
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inaccurate perception of the nonprofit sector, but others may instead indict the sector for
failing to meet the public’s expectations.
Whereas Carson seems to gladly accept the reality of NPOs’ increasing reliance on
program revenue, other nonprofit leaders challenge the legitimacy of the nonprofit sector’s
expansion to include organizations that are increasingly competing with for-profit
counterparts, generating program revenue, and receiving relatively little revenue from
charitable contributions. Another influential nonprofit scholar, Pablo Eisenberg, asks
critically “Why are cemeteries, trade associations, and sports associations included in the
nonprofit sector?” (2000, p. 328). Should public policy extend the benefits of legal nonprofit
status to organizations that receive little public support? Should NPOs competing directly
with for-profit businesses be afforded the competitive advantages of property tax exemptions,
eligibility to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, and the “halo effect” that comes
with nonprofit status? Both Eisenberg and Carson agree that the nonprofit sector is vastly
different from its stereotype, with NPOs becoming increasingly like their for-profit
counterparts. For Eisenberg, however, elements of what Carson disparages as a
“romanticized” ideal for the nonprofit sector—the close ties to philanthropy and the public
service spirit—are not overgeneralizations and misperceptions to be corrected in the public
mind, but ideals to be esteemed and pursued through reform of the nonprofit sector.
This tension is not resolved by this research. Indeed, the questions raised by
O’Connell, Carson, and Eisenberg are largely normative: What defines a “good” nonprofit
sector? Should public policy promote the diversity and independence of the nonprofit sector
or seek the most efficient means of delivering government-funded services via the nonprofit
sector? Which organizations should enjoy the benefits of legal nonprofit status? This
research does, however, provide an empirical foothold for government and nonprofit leaders
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grappling with such questions. This research demonstrates that the negative effects of
government funding on the amount of private philanthropy are limited and largely
outweighed by the positive effects. And where negative effects are present, this research
points to a new avenue for identifying means to mitigate these negative effects in studies that
focus on the effects of government subsidy on NPO structures and processes that, in turn,
affect charitable giving. This research documents the relative importance of different sources
of revenue in the nonprofit sector and, most strikingly, the small amount of revenue
generated from charitable giving relative to government funding and, much more, relative to
the fee-generating activities of NPOs themselves. This research illuminates the diversity of
the nonprofit sector, showing how revenue streams and subsidy-charity relationships vary
widely among the various nonprofit subsectors and NPOs of different sizes. This research
identifies where the nonprofit sector is very dependent on government funding, where the
sector is very dependent on private charity, and how such dependence is not very widespread.
Many of the current “big” questions in the nonprofit sector and in nonprofit-
government relations relate directly to NPOs’ sources of support. Where those big questions
have gone begging for empirical support, this research has made an effort to provide answers;
where those big questions cannot be answered empirically, this research can provide
empirical support to improve the quality of discourse and, perhaps, to improve the quality of
the answers.
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APPENDIX A
Auxiliary study: Do charitable donors know enough—and care enough—for
government subsidies to affect private giving to nonprofit organizations?
Testing the key assumptions of the crowding-out and crowding-in hypotheses19
19 This paper has two co-authors, David M. Van Slyke and Janet L. Johnson, and has been published in
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Volume 34, Number 1 (2005), 136-149.
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SUMMARY
A large body of research has examined the effect of government subsidies to
charitable nonprofit organizations on private philanthropy, with the preponderance of
evidence suggesting that government funding partially displaces—or “crowds out”—private
giving. Common to these studies are the assumptions that private charitable donors are
aware of the amount of government funding received by their beneficiary charitable
organizations and that they act on this information when determining how much financial and
volunteer support to donate. The purpose of this study is to assess the validity of these
heretofore untested assumptions. After comparing the “best guesses” of respondents to a
public opinion survey (N = 675) to the actual amount of government funding received by the
charitable organizations to which they have donated money, the assumption of donors’
knowledge about government funding levels is found to be met only very weakly. Further,
few respondents anticipate that they would change the level of their charitable giving in
response to an increase in government subsidy. These findings suggest the need to explore
explanations of the crowding-out phenomenon beyond those assumed under current theory.
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Auxiliary study: Do charitable donors know enough—and care enough—for
government subsidies to affect private giving to nonprofit organizations?
Testing the key assumptions of the crowding-out and crowding-in hypotheses
The nonprofit sector is heavily reliant on revenue from private contributions and
government subsidies. In 1997, 31 percent of nonprofit revenue came from government
sources and 20 percent from private donors, amounting to $207.8 billion and $132.1 billion,
respectively (Weitzman, Jalandoni, Lampkin, and Pollak, 2002). Despite the magnitude of
the nonprofit sector’s dependence on government funding and private contributions, the
relationship between these two revenue sources remains unclear.
Most research on this relationship has focused on how changes in the level of
government spending affect levels of private giving. This research has been conducted at 1)
the aggregate level, examining the effects of either total government transfers to the nonprofit
sector (or subsectors) or total government social welfare spending on total charitable giving
(e.g., Abrams and Schmitz, 1984a; Brown, 1997; Jones, 1983; Reece, 1979; Schiff, 1985;
Steinberg, 1985), and 2) the organizational level, examining the effects of government
funding on charitable giving for specific charitable organizations (e.g., Brooks, 1999;
Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler, 1995; Kingma, 1989; Payne, 1998). The latter case is the
focus of this paper. Both units of analysis merit attention, but the organizational unit of
analysis may be of more interest to public and nonprofit managers, who must take the total
amount of government social welfare spending and transfers to nonprofit organizations
(NPOs) as given, but may frequently face decisions about allocating and pursuing
government funding for specific NPOs.
The theory underlying research at the organizational level starts with the assumption
that private donors—the private citizens who make charitable contributions to NPOs—are
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aware of the amount of government funding to the NPOs that they support and changes in
these amounts over time. Given the centrality of this assumption to this body of research,
and, some may say, its dubious face validity, it is surprising that it has not been tested. The
conventional theory further assumes that private donors respond in a measurable way to
government funding levels in determining their private giving. Again, though, previous
crowding-in/-out research has not explored whether this reasoning resounds with private
donors, nor have broader theories and empirical research of motivations for charitable giving,
which focus instead on other factors that influence giving, including demographics,
personality, values, religiosity, social status, income, and personal experiences with
charitable organizations (e.g. Brown, 1999; Clary and Snyder, 1995; Mount, 1996; Schervish,
1997). This paper presents the findings of a study to address these gaps in the literature,
providing evidence that certainly not all donors have complete knowledge, and even if they
did, their private giving may be largely unaffected by changes in levels of government
funding.
Background
The relationship between government funding and private contributions to NPOs has
been widely studied due to the potential implications for nonprofit management, public
management, public policy, and private philanthropy. With a better understanding of this
relationship, these decision makers may be better equipped to leverage government funding
and private charity to maximize nonprofits’ resources and their ability to address social
problems. With the rise in “third party” or “indirect” government that relies on NPOs for
delivering publicly funded services (Salamon, 2002), legislation, such as the CARE Act, that
encourages charitable giving, and the proliferation of Charitable Choice provisions that
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encourage faith-based organizations to compete for government funding, the need to
understand the potential impact of government subsidies on charitable giving is perhaps more
pressing than ever.
Theoretical work has predicted that increased government funding to NPOs may
affect private giving in three ways: In response to increased government funding, private
giving may increase, decrease, or there may be a curvilinear effect. Most economists have
favored the “crowding-out” hypothesis, which predicts an inverse relationship between
government funding and private giving since government subsidies allow donors to
“purchase” their preferred level of NPOs’ services indirectly through government spending,
which displaces their private donations (Roberts, 1984; Warr, 1982). Many theorists temper
this hypothesis by acknowledging that the displacement may not be dollar-for-dollar since
private donors may derive some satisfaction from the act of giving itself in addition to the
satisfaction derived from having NPOs perform their services (Andreoni, 1990). Other
theorists, however, have proposed that government funding may act as a signal of NPOs’
quality to private donors (and potential private donors), stimulating an increase in private
giving—a “crowding-in” effect (Schiff, 1990). Drawing from both the crowding-out and -in
hypotheses, Brooks (2000b) hypothesizes a curvilinear effect in which crowding in is
observed with a smaller proportion of government funding that stimulates private giving but
gives way to crowding out with increased government funding. Their contradictory
predictions notwithstanding, all three hypotheses assume private donors’ awareness of the
proportion of NPOs’ revenue from government sources and that donors will act on this
information in determining the amounts of their charitable contributions.
These assumptions about donors’ knowledge and behavior have shaped previous
researchers’ interpretations of their empirical tests of the crowding-out and -in hypotheses. A
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recent review of this literature (Brooks, 2000a) identified twenty-two empirical studies of the
effect of government subsidies on NPOs’ revenue from private giving. The studies yielded
conflicting results, but the evidence favors a partial crowding-out effect, with thirteen studies
supporting the crowding-out hypothesis, four supporting crowding in, and five finding no
statistically significant relationship between government funding and private contributions.
The partial crowding-out effects ranged from 2 to 53 cents per dollar of government funding.
The recent studies by Brooks (2000b) and Payne (1998) typify the approach taken in most
prior studies conducted at the organizational unit of analysis, with individuals modeled as
rational actors maximizing their utility derived from giving to NPOs and from the NPOs’
actual service delivery taking into account NPOs’ government subsidies. Data interpretation,
driven by such a model, hinges on the assumption of individuals’ knowledge of government
funding levels, leading authors to center their conclusions on private donors’ presumed
motivations for giving to NPOs.20
While no mention of the need to assess the validity of the conventional explanation of
crowding out has been found in the literature, the need to consider an alternative explanation,
the behavior of NPOs, was posited in one of the earliest articles on the topic of crowding out:
Commenting on the 1984 empirical study by Abrams and Schmitz (1984a), Driessen (1984)
suggests that the “behavior of nonprofits” (p. 571) should be accounted for when studying the
subsidy-charity relationship and that, failing to do so, findings interpreted as displacement of
charitable giving by government funding may actually represent differences in nonprofit
20 It is also arguable that higher government funding of NPOs could follow higher taxation, which would lower
disposable income and thus consumer spending on all goods, including charitable giving, yielding a partial
crowding-out effect independent of the assumptions tested here. The hypothetical effect of increased taxes,
though, is indeterminate; since charitable donations are tax deductible, higher taxes could also lead to
increased charitable donations or have no net effect on charitable donations (Brooks, 2000a). Indeed, a
review of 23 empirical studies found that, on average, a 10 percent increase in the tax rate leads to a 12
percent increase in charitable giving (Steinberg, 1990).
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strategic decision making. In their rejoinder, Abrams and Schmitz (1984b) concur with these
comments. Despite these early observations, no studies have taken an organizational focus—
or any focus other than individual donors’ responses to government funding, for that matter
—when seeking to explain the relationship between government funding and private charity.
The remainder of this paper presents the data and methods used to test the assumption
of donors’ knowledge about government funding and the plausibility of this knowledge
motivating private giving, followed by the findings and recommendations for reconsidering
past research and conducting future research to better understand the relationship between
government funding and private giving to NPOs.
Data and methods
This study takes a simple, direct approach to assessing charitable donors’ knowledge
about the proportion of their beneficiary NPOs’ revenue from government sources and the
likelihood that such knowledge affects private giving. Data were collected using five
questions included in a larger public opinion survey, the Georgia Poll, administered quarterly
during 2002 by professional interviewers at the survey research lab of the Georgia State
University Applied Research Center. The sampling frame was constructed using random
digit dialing and a computer-assisted telephone interviewing system to develop a random
sample representative of adults in the state of Georgia (pooled N = 1,496).
Respondents were asked the following questions:
During 2001, did you or other members of your household donate money, assets,
goods, or property for charitable purposes?
If “yes”:
About how much money, including the cash value of any property, did you and
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members of your household donate to charity during the entire previous calendar
year?
Besides a church, any other house of worship, or the United Way, could you give me
the specific name of a charitable organization that you gave money to in 2001? (If
respondent offers more than one name, prompt: Which one is most important to
you?) 21
If an organization was named:
About what percentage of that organization’s 2001 income do you think was from the
government? (If respondent answers “Don’t know,” prompt: We’re just interested in
your best guess. What’s your best guess?—any percentage from zero to one
hundred.)
To all respondents who made a charitable donation in 2001:
If a charity you were contributing to were to get an increase in funding from the
government, would this make you want to give more, less, or about the same?
The actual percentages of the charitable organizations’ revenue from government
sources were calculated as follows. For each of the charitable organizations named by
respondents that could be matched to a registered 501(c)(3) organization, revenue data were
collected from the most recent Form 990 filed with the IRS to maintain tax-exempt status.
Filing an annual Form 990 is required of all tax-exempt NPOs with $25,000 or more in
annual gross receipts; for NPOs with less than $25,000 in annual gross receipts,
congregations, denominations, and primary and secondary religious schools, filing is
optional, but many such organizations file voluntarily. Data collected from Form 990s
included total revenue for the filing year (line 12) and total revenue from government sources
(sum of lines 1c, 93f, and 93g). 22
21 United Way was excluded because they generally act as a funding intermediary. Churches and other houses
of worship were excluded since they are not required to file Form 990s and rarely apply for government
funding.
22 Respondents were asked about donations during 2001 but we used most recent year available. Sixty-one
percent of the Form 990s examined were reported as being filed for Fiscal Year 2001, 37 percent for 2000,
and less than 1 percent each for 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2002. Data analysis omitting cases with data from
years other than 2001 did not yield substantively different results.
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Results
Seventy-eight percent (1,170) of those asked reported that they made a charitable
contribution in 2001. Of these, 587 were willing to provide an estimate of how much they
donated in 2001, with an average reported amount of $2,789 (s.d. = 5,620). Of those who
made a charitable contribution, 86 percent (1,012) said they could name an organization other
than the United Way or a religious congregation that they had supported financially in 2001.
Of these, 67 percent (675) gave a response that could be matched to an organization filing
Form 990.23 These 675 respondents named a total of 134 charitable organizations. The
NPOs’ average total income, weighted by number of times named by respondents, was
$249,631,592. The average income from government sources was $8,981,719; however, 60
percent (402) of these respondents named organizations that reported receiving no
government subsidies, making the median income from government zero. Most of the
remaining organizations named reported receiving from 1 to 20 percent of their income from
government sources, as reported in Figure A1.
23 Of the remaining organizations named, 5 (0.5%) used form 990EZ, which does not include the level of
detail needed for the study, 2 (0.2%) were foundations and used form 990PF, 23 (2.3%) were registered with
the IRS but not required to file a Form 990, 152 (15.0%) could not be matched to a Form 990 (perhaps
because they were not required to file, the respondents provided an inaccurate or ambiguous organization
name, or the organization name was recorded incorrectly), and 11 (1.1%) were government entities; 131
(12.9%) responses were invalid (e.g. “homelessness”), and the remaining 13 (1.3%) respondents gave no
response.
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Figure A1. Percentage of revenue from government sources among NPOs named by
respondents
Note. N = 675 (organizations are included as many times as named by respondents; a total 134
organizations were named)
The distribution of respondents’ estimates of the percentage of their named
organizations’ income from government sources is presented in Figure A2. Despite being
probed with “we’re just interested in your best guess,” 45 percent (307) of the respondents
persisted in answering “don’t know” or declined to answer at all. Of the 368 respondents
who did offer a guess, 38 percent (140) guessed zero, and 28 percent (103) guessed from 1 to
20 percent.
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Figure A2. Distribution of respondents’ guesses of percentage of NPOs’ revenue from
government sources
Note. N = 675, including 307 respondents who responded “Don’t know” even after being probed with
“we’re just interested in your best guess”
The 368 respondents’ estimates were compared to the corresponding actual
percentages of revenue from government funding calculated from the Form 990s.24 The
average estimate was 18 percent, while the average actual amount of NPOs’ revenue from
government sources (again, weighted by number of times named by respondents) was 5
percent (paired t-statistic = 9.94, p < .000); the average absolute value of the difference
between the estimates and actual percentages was 19 percentage points. The correlation of
24 Excluding the “don’t know” responses from analysis here provides a more conservative test of the
assumption that charitable donors know their beneficiary NPOs’ levels of government funding—it is unlikely
that respondents who answered “don’t know” could have provided more accurate estimates than the
respondents who did offer an estimate.
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the estimates and actual percentages is depicted in Figure A3. A correlation of one would
correspond with perfect guesses, shown as data points extending in a 45 degree line from the
origin to the upper right-hand corner of the scatterplot; the somewhat random pattern
displayed in Figure A3 and the correlation, in terms of statistical significance, of zero
indicate no simple linear relationship between the NPOs’ percentage of government funding
and respondents’ estimates (Pearson’s r = .02, p = .6).
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Figure A3. Scatterplot of NPOs’ actual percentage of revenue from government sources
and respondents’ guesses
Note. N = 368 (does not include 307 respondents who answered “don’t know”)
Pearson’s r = .02; p = .6
Size of each “bubble” indicates frequency; the (0,0) bubble represents 98 responses.
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Simple correlation, though, may be too strict a test for the knowledge assumption to
have merit. Marginal consumer theory holds that a subset of consumers acting on sufficient
knowledge may be adequate to pressure markets toward efficiency (Teske, Schneider,
Mintrom, and Best, 1993). Marginal consumer theory may be extended to philanthropic
giving to NPOs by casting charitable donors as consumers (though not beneficiaries) of
NPOs’ charitable activities. Thus, the knowledge assumption underlying the crowding-in/-
out hypotheses may need to be only weakly met by a fraction of charitable donors
—“marginal donors”—for it to drive crowding in/out. (For a similar application of marginal
consumer theory to knowledge assumptions underlying school choice arguments, see Buckley
and Schneider, 2003.) Determining the strength of a marginal consumer explanation has a
subjective component: No minimum thresholds exist for the accuracy of consumers’
knowledge or the number of informed marginal consumers that must be met to fulfill the
requirements of marginal consumer theory; we can only assess the plausibility of the
marginal consumer explanation.
To facilitate assessing the plausibility of a “marginal donor” explanation of crowding
in/out, the distribution of the differences between respondents’ estimates and the actual
percentage of revenue from government sources is presented in Figure A4. As reported
above, 45 percent persisted in answering “don’t know,” while 28 percent guessed within + 10
points of the correct percentage. Notable given the preponderance of evidence for crowding
out, when NPOs that do not receive government funds are omitted, the proportion of guesses
within + 10 points drops to 18 percent.
The plausibility of the marginal donor explanation would be strengthened if donors
with the best knowledge of NPOs’ revenue from government sources also made the largest
charitable contributions—a small number of donors could more easily account for a
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Figure A4. Distribution of differences between actual percentage of NPOs’ revenue from
government sources and respondents’ guesses
Note. N = 675, including 307 respondents who responded “Don’t know” even after being probed with
“we’re just interested in your best guess”
crowding-out relationship if they gave (and subsequent to increased government funding
could withdraw) larger gifts. Such does not appear to be the case, though. Of the 112
respondents who both provided an estimate of their 2001 contributions and estimated the
government revenue proportion for an NPO that could be matched to IRS data, those whose
estimates were within + 10 points of the actual percentage reported giving an average $2,660,
whereas those who gave less accurate estimates or answered “don’t know” reported giving an
average $3,312; the difference between the averages is not statistically significant (t-statistic
= 0.69; p = .494).
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In addition to the weaker requirements of the assumption in the marginal consumer
approach, it may be enough that charitable donors can distinguish NPOs that do not receive
government funds from those that do; crowding out could occur, for instance, if a number of
charitable donors decreased their financial support upon their beneficiary NPO getting its first
government grant. This possibility is tested in the contingency table presented in Table A1.
The data and the statistically significant Chi-squared statistic indicate that respondents
guessed correctly which organizations received no government funds (upper-left quadrant)
and those that did (lower-right) more often than would be expected by chance (χ2df=1 = 6.2, p
= .01). The difference, though, is small: 53 percent of the respondents guessed correctly, an
improvement of only 6 points over the 47 percent that would be expected to guess correctly
by chance. Notably, of the respondents whose named organizations received no government
funds, the majority (57 percent) guessed that the organizations did receive government funds.
Table A1. Respondents’ awareness of whether or not NPOs receive no revenue from
government sources
Actual percentage of NPO’s
income from government sources
0 > 0
n
Observed %
(Expected %)
n
Observed %
(Expected %)
Respondent’s estimate of
percentage of NPO’s income
from government sources
0 98
26.6%
(23.6%)
42
11.4%
(14.5%)
> 0 130
35.3%
(38.4%)
98
26.6%
(23.6%)
Note. χ2(df=1) = 6.2; p = .01
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However donors’ knowledge is assessed, the crowding-in/-out hypotheses require that
donors act on this knowledge. The 675 respondents in our sample who made charitable
donations in 2001 were asked how they would respond to their beneficiary NPO receiving an
increase in government funding. Of these, 82 percent said they would continue to give at
about the same level, 7 percent said their giving would increase, and 8 percent said their
giving would decrease (2 percent responded “don’t know”). This finding suggests that even
when donors are made aware of a change in government funding levels, they may exhibit
considerable inertia in their charitable giving. Under a marginal consumer approach,
crowding in or out would require a change in giving levels by a few marginal donors. Would
the group we identified as “informed” donors—the 28 percent of respondents whose
estimates were accurate within + 10 points—be more responsive? Surprisingly, the
distribution of responses for this group is identical to those for the entire sample: 82 percent
said their giving would stay the same, 7 percent said their giving would increase, and 8
percent said their giving would decrease (Figure A5).
Conclusion
Under the conventional crowding-in and -out hypotheses, individuals must possess
knowledge of government funding levels, and they must act on that knowledge. Our findings
offer limited support for the assumption that individuals who make charitable donations
know the proportion of their beneficiary organizations’ income that comes from government
sources. Fully 45 percent declined to even hazard a guess, even after being prodded for their
“best guess” and asked a second time. Of those who did offer an estimate, there is no
correlation between respondents’ estimates and the actual percentages, although a substantial
28 percent estimated within + 10 points. The validity of this assumption, then, especially
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If a charity you were contributing to were to get an increase in funding from the government,
would this make you want to give more, less, or about the same?
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Figure A5. Charitable donors’ anticipated response to increased government funding
* “Informed charitable donors” are defined as those whose estimates of their beneficiary NPOs’ revenue
from government sources were accurate within + 10 percentage points.
from a marginal consumer perspective that relaxes the requirements of knowledge
assumptions, is not wholly disconfirmed by this study, but neither is it strongly supported.
Whether donors respond in a significant way to changes in government funding,
though, is greatly challenged by our findings. Donors’ anticipated changes in charitable
giving to an organization in response to changes in government funding of that organization
appear to be highly inelastic. However valid the assumption of donors’ knowledge may be,
with 82 percent of respondents reporting they would make no change to their contribution in
response to increased government funding, the conventional theory may be insufficient to
explain observed levels of crowding in or out. These findings in particular should be
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interpreted cautiously; survey research of philanthropy is notoriously susceptible to social
desirability bias, so respondents may have been disinclined to reveal any anticipation of
decreased giving. Even if the number who say their giving would not change is somewhat
inflated here, though, the large margin bolsters our confidence that the attitudes of a sizable
majority of charitable donors do not resonate with the conventional explanations of crowding
in/out assumed to operate in previous research.
Previous research empirically relating levels of government funding and private
giving to NPOs, though, cannot be ignored. It may be that previous research has identified a
legitimate causal relationship between government funding and charitable giving, but
misidentified—either in part or in whole—the underlying causal mechanism; government
funding may very well have a predominant crowding-out effect on charitable giving to
nonprofits, or mixed effects for different nonprofit subsectors, but whether these effects are
explained convincingly as the aggregated reactions of individual donors to changes in levels
of government funding is debatable.
Future research, then, should focus on identifying the correct causal mechanisms that
explain the government funding-charitable giving relationship.25 Having cast doubt on the
rational behavior of individual donors as a full explanation, our search for causal mechanisms
might be expanded to include the actions of the NPOs as well. It may be learned, for
example, that NPO administrators spend less time soliciting private donations after receiving
a large government grant. Whatever the case, the explanation of government funding’s
25 Future research may also improve on this study by examining the reaction of private foundations and
corporations to NPOs’ levels of government funding; it is plausible that they obtain and act on such
information more than individual donors. Even so, foundations’ and corporations’ reactions to NPOs’
government funding levels are unlikely to explain crowding out—in 1997, individual donors’ contributions
accounted for 85 percent of all private contributions, with foundation and corporate contributions accounting
for only 9 percent and 6 percent, respectively (Boris, 1998).
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effects on private charity must build on a stronger foundation than provided by the sole
reliance on the assumption of private donors’ knowledge about and response to government
subsidy levels in order to enhance our understanding of the government-nonprofit sector
relationship and to inform government and nonprofit decision making.
108
APPENDIX B
Full regression results for analysis presented in Chapter 3
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Table B1 presents the full regression results for all of the regression analyses
summarized in Chapter 3. The table is organized first by samples (all NPOs, by subsector, by
size, and by percent of 1999 revenue from government sources), then by dependent variable
(∆charity$2000-1999, ∆direct$2000-1999, ∆indirect$2000-1999, %∆charity2000-1999, %∆direct2000-1999, %
∆indirect2000-1999), and then by type of subsidy used for independent variables (total subsidy,
then government grants). All t- and F-tests are conducted using robust standard errors. The
Adjusted R2 is Stein’s Adjusted R2, as discussed in the text.
Table B1. Full results for regression analyses of subsidy-charity relationship
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variables B Std. Error β
t
(Sig.)
F
(Sig.)
Adj.
R2
All NPOs
(N = 40,715) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 75,851.99 15,906.15 4.77
(.000)
52.26
(.000)
.003
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.05 0.01 0.04 5.32
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.72E-10 0.00 0.02 2.60
(.009)
(N = 36,982) (Constant) 79,793.52 15,921.29 5.01
(.000)
17.37
(.000)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.03 0.01 0.02 2.53
(.011)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.73E-10 0.00 0.01 1.99
(.047)
(N = 40,715) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 68,107.85 14,048.73 4.85
(.000)
85.14
(.000)
.004
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.08 0.01 0.07 10.27
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -7.75E-11 0.00 -0.01 -1.32
(.186)
(N = 36,982) (Constant) 68,829.15 14,057.00 4.90
(.000)
64.70
(.000)
.003
∆grants$1999-1998 0.12 0.01 0.08 10.65
(.000)
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(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.60E-10 0.00 -0.03 -4.68
(.000)
(N = 40,715) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 7,743.61 7,558.75 1.02
(.306)
36.95
(.000)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -7.89
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.50E-10 0.00 0.06 7.93
(.000)
(N = 36,982) (Constant) 10,963.83 7,545.08 1.45
(.146)
112.34
(.000)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.09 0.01 -0.10 -14.50
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 5.33E-10 0.00 0.09 12.91
(.000)
(N = 34,065) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 309.74 108.33 2.86
(.004)
0.19
(.830)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 347.17 585.17 0.00 0.59
(.553)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -114.22 915.53 0.00 -0.12
(.901)
(N = 31,735) (Constant) 309.39 107.90 2.87
(.004)
0.13
(.877)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 318.64 641.58 0.00 0.50
(.619)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -107.87 1,038.04 0.00 -0.10
(.917)
(N = 32,969) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 186.79 19.37 9.64
(.000)
2.90
(.055)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 281.00 104.94 0.01 2.68
(.007)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 262.94 164.80 0.01 1.60
(.111)
(N = 30,718) (Constant) 188.80 19.30 9.78
(.000)
2.89
(.056)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 255.17 115.36 0.01 2.21
(.027)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 253.51 188.12 0.01 1.35
(.178)
(N = 13,086) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 135.32 53.88 2.51
(.012)
1.34
(.262)
.000
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∆subsidy%1999-1998 520.90 323.19 0.01 1.61
(.107)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 226.18 520.88 0.00 0.43
(.664)
(N = 12,282) (Constant) 132.93 53.66 2.48
(.013)
1.67
(.189)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 637.77 360.92 0.02 1.77
(.077)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 446.78 599.39 0.01 0.75
(.456)
By
Subsector
Animal-Related
(N = 477) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) -4,574.68 47,613.28 -0.10
(.923)
4.41
(.013)
.018
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.23
(.818)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.76E-08 0.00 -0.13 -2.10
(.036)
(N = 355) (Constant) -4,627.67 47,619.66 -0.10
(.923)
4.32
(.014)
.018
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
(.997)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -4.01E-08 0.00 -0.13 -2.22
(.027)
(N = 477) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) -19,149.50 46,826.02 -0.41
(.683)
6.51
(.002)
.027
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.13 0.11 0.07 1.15
(.250)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -5.89E-08 0.00 -0.20 -3.34
(.001)
(N = 355) (Constant) -19,084.28 46,798.41 -0.41
(.684)
6.77
(.001)
.028
∆grants$1999-1998 0.16 0.12 0.08 1.41
(.160)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -6.18E-08 0.00 -0.21 -3.49
(.001)
(N = 477) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 14,574.81 8,297.28 1.76
(.080)
33.17
(.000)
.123
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.16 0.02 -0.44 -7.81
(.000)
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(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.13E-08 0.00 0.39 6.83
(.000)
(N = 355) (Constant) 14,456.61 8,283.83 1.75
(.082)
34.02
(.000)
.126
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.16 0.02 -0.45 -7.92
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.18E-08 0.00 0.39 6.94
(.000)
(N = 462) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 86.18 23.21 3.71
(.000)
0.36
(.696)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 152.46 189.95 0.04 0.80
(.423)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -251.56 510.12 -0.02 -0.49
(.622)
(N = 343) (Constant) 80.77 22.80 3.54
(.000)
0.39
(.675)
.002
∆grants%1999-1998 -198.09 223.56 -0.05 -0.89
(.376)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 181.15 547.08 0.02 0.33
(.741)
(N = 461) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 56.45 12.40 4.55
(.000)
0.16
(.853)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 54.41 101.40 0.03 0.54
(.592)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -86.17 272.21 -0.02 -0.32
(.752)
(N = 342) (Constant) 53.28 12.16 4.38
(.000)
0.63
(.531)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 -131.11 119.25 -0.06 -1.10
(.272)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 193.19 291.66 0.03 0.66
(.508)
(N = 65) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 489.27 363.92 1.34
(.184)
0.46
(.634)
.015
∆subsidy%1999-1998 3,343.99 3,505.76 0.13 0.95
(.344)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -2,314.28 9,954.43 -0.03 -0.23
(.817)
(N = 50) (Constant) 412.52 365.00 1.13
(.263)
0.06
(.943)
.002
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∆grants%1999-1998 -1,195.34 3,517.97 -0.04 -0.34
(.735)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 1,329.08 9,766.99 0.02 0.14
(.892)
Arts, Culture, and Humanities
(N = 4,711) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 100,992.74 37,891.75 2.67
(.008)
4.82
(.008)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.14 0.06 0.05 2.29
(.022)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -5.53E-09 0.00 -0.07 -3.09
(.002)
(N = 4,652) (Constant) 93,300.57 37,787.07 2.47
(.014)
18.32
(.000)
.008
∆grants$1999-1998 0.39 0.07 0.15 5.98
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -9.85E-09 0.00 -0.13 -5.36
(.000)
(N = 4,711) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 95,644.81 37,817.86 2.53
(.011)
5.38
(.005)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.15 0.06 0.06 2.50
(.012)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -5.84E-09 0.00 -0.08 -3.28
(.001)
(N = 4,652) (Constant) 87,910.87 37,706.66 2.33
(.020)
19.74
(.000)
.008
∆grants$1999-1998 0.40 0.07 0.15 6.21
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.02E-08 0.00 -0.14 -5.56
(.000)
(N = 4,711) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 5,347.93 2,917.21 1.83
(.067)
3.62
(.027)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -2.67
(.008)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 3.17E-10 0.00 0.06 2.30
(.021)
(N = 4,652) (Constant) 5,389.71 2,917.29 1.85
(.065)
3.91
(.020)
.002
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -2.78
(.005)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 3.43E-10 0.00 0.06 2.42
(.016)
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(N = 4,596) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 80.79 12.20 6.62
(.000)
11.24
(.000)
.005
∆subsidy%1999-1998 301.99 77.25 0.06 3.91
(.000)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 326.54 144.78 0.03 2.26
(.024)
(N = 4,456) (Constant) 81.77 12.19 6.71
(.000)
9.10
(.000)
.004
∆grants%1999-1998 268.86 78.07 0.05 3.44
(.001)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 279.83 144.71 0.03 1.93
(.053)
(N = 4,563) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 80.21 13.21 6.07
(.000)
13.78
(.000)
.006
∆subsidy%1999-1998 144.97 83.76 0.03 1.73
(.084)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 742.68 156.82 0.07 4.74
(.000)
(N = 4,514) (Constant) 81.37 13.20 6.17
(.000)
11.88
(.000)
.005
∆grants%1999-1998 99.39 84.68 0.02 1.17
(.241)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 701.47 156.77 0.07 4.47
(.000)
(N = 698) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 56.65 22.45 2.52
(.012)
2.69
(.069)
.008
∆subsidy%1999-1998 349.11 163.73 0.09 2.13
(.033)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 428.22 277.07 0.06 1.55
(.123)
(N = 695) (Constant) 56.17 22.45 2.50
(.013)
2.84
(.059)
.008
∆grants%1999-1998 358.85 163.33 0.09 2.20
(.028)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 430.78 277.12 0.06 1.55
(.121)
Civil Rights, Social Action, and Advocacy
(N = 221) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 115,706.13 50,824.40 2.28
(.024)
4.18
(.016)
.037
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∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.08 0.16 -0.06 -0.49
(.624)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.45E-08 0.00 -0.14 -1.08
(.281)
(N = 215) (Constant) 115,836.33 50,928.97 2.27
(.024)
4.18
(.017)
.037
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.09 0.18 -0.07 -0.49
(.624)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.26E-08 0.00 -0.13 -0.92
(.357)
(N = 221) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 114,365.32 50,024.89 2.29
(.023)
4.04
(.019)
.036
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.11
(.913)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.98E-08 0.00 -0.20 -1.59
(.114)
(N = 215) (Constant) 113,435.21 50,127.20 2.26
(.025)
4.03
(.019)
.036
∆grants$1999-1998 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.17
(.865)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -5.21E-08 0.00 -0.21 -1.50
(.136)
(N = 221) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,340.81 8,339.11 0.16
(.872)
6.70
(.001)
.058
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.10 0.03 -0.46 -3.65
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.53E-08 0.00 0.37 2.92
(.004)
(N = 215) (Constant) 2,401.12 8,301.69 0.29
(.773)
8.22
(.000)
.070
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.12 0.03 -0.55 -4.04
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.95E-08 0.00 0.46 3.38
(.001)
(N = 205) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 159.27 84.48 1.89
(.061)
0.09
(.915)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -144.37 534.87 -0.02 -0.27
(.787)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -288.98 911.47 -0.02 -0.32
(.752)
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(N = 201) (Constant) 158.85 84.36 1.88
(.061)
0.08
(.919)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 -139.69 538.56 -0.02 -0.26
(.796)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -284.94 911.65 -0.02 -0.31
(.755)
(N = 195) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 127.07 84.35 1.51
(.134)
0.07
(.935)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -157.28 535.31 -0.02 -0.29
(.769)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -184.60 891.27 -0.01 -0.21
(.836)
(N = 191) (Constant) 126.70 84.22 1.50
(.134)
0.06
(.938)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 -153.96 539.08 -0.02 -0.29
(.775)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -182.04 891.38 -0.01 -0.20
(.838)
(N = 92) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 214.81 207.50 1.04
(.303)
2.99
(.055)
.101
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -4,974.84 1,766.13 -0.29 -2.82
(.006)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 11,178.46 6,130.86 0.19 1.82
(.072)
(N = 91) (Constant) 212.09 207.77 1.02
(.310)
2.93
(.058)
.100
∆grants%1999-1998 -4,924.64 1,760.94 -0.28 -2.80
(.006)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 11,120.02 6,135.12 0.18 1.81
(.073)
Colleges and Universities
(N = 899) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,267,245.54 528,479.77 2.40
(.017)
6.43
(.002)
.014
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.35 0.12 0.17 3.01
(.003)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.15E-09 0.00 -0.07 -1.23
(.219)
(N = 879) (Constant) 1,318,635.3
6
531,872.55 2.48
(.013)
2.54
(.079)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 0.34 0.15 0.08 2.25
(.024)
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(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -6.00E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.18
(.860)
(N = 899) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,241,336.2
8
522,912.27 2.37
(.018)
6.04
(.002)
.013
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.33 0.12 0.16 2.87
(.004)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.03E-09 0.00 -0.06 -1.11
(.268)
(N = 879) (Constant) 1,291,356.1
4
526,061.77 2.45
(.014)
2.51
(.082)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 0.33 0.15 0.07 2.24
(.025)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -6.19E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.18
(.854)
(N = 899) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 25,909.27 32,622.79 0.79
(.427)
3.88
(.021)
.009
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.15 2.78
(.006)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.24E-10 0.00 -0.12 -2.15
(.032)
(N = 879) (Constant) 27,279.22 32,824.91 0.83
(.406)
0.21
(.814)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.62
(.533)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.94E-11 0.00 0.00 0.09
(.926)
(N = 866) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 207.68 110.72 1.88
(.061)
0.09
(.910)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 619.38 1,567.88 0.01 0.40
(.693)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -739.49 2,391.27 -0.01 -0.31
(.757)
(N = 846) (Constant) 206.29 110.67 1.86
(.063)
0.03
(.971)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 268.64 1,687.78 0.01 0.16
(.874)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -588.27 2,809.63 -0.01 -0.21
(.834)
(N = 862) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 263.91 122.43 2.16
(.031)
0.03
(.975)
.000
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∆subsidy%1999-1998 169.08 1,730.17 0.00 0.10
(.922)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -595.86 2,638.21 -0.01 -0.23
(.821)
(N = 842) (Constant) 262.31 122.37 2.14
(.032)
0.03
(.971)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 -253.81 1,862.42 0.00 -0.14
(.892)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -522.68 3,099.40 -0.01 -0.17
(.866)
(N = 138) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 55.86 38.14 1.46
(.145)
0.07
(.929)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 454.15 1,189.12 0.08 0.38
(.703)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -558.22 1,510.93 -0.08 -0.37
(.712)
(N = 136) (Constant) 55.93 38.19 1.46
(.145)
0.07
(.930)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 453.60 1,198.53 0.08 0.38
(.706)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -557.45 1,521.20 -0.08 -0.37
(.715)
Community Improvement and Capacity Building
(N = 2,101) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) -10,096.69 39,297.38 -0.26
(.797)
11.49
(.000)
.011
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.18 0.04 -0.12 -4.46
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.90E-09 0.00 0.04 1.33
(.183)
(N = 1,996) (Constant) -10,434.92 39,292.51 -0.27
(.791)
11.48
(.000)
.011
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.18 0.04 -0.12 -4.46
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.92E-09 0.00 0.04 1.34
(.180)
(N = 2,101) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 2,106.22 20,123.95 0.10
(.917)
0.13
(.881)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.42
(.672)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 4.45E-11 0.00 0.00 0.04
(.968)
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(N = 1,996) (Constant) 2,135.01 20,121.21 0.11
(.916)
0.14
(.869)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.45
(.651)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 6.67E-11 0.00 0.00 0.06
(.952)
(N = 2,101) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) -12,202.91 29,202.41 -0.42
(.676)
18.68
(.000)
.017
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.17 0.03 -0.16 -5.71
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.86E-09 0.00 0.05 1.77
(.078)
(N = 1,996) (Constant) -12,569.93 29,200.53 -0.43
(.667)
18.54
(.000)
.017
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.17 0.03 -0.16 -5.69
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.85E-09 0.00 0.05 1.76
(.078)
(N = 1,595) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 190.68 80.87 2.36
(.019)
1.46
(.233)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 552.53 323.83 0.04 1.71
(.088)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 139.46 516.79 0.01 0.27
(.787)
(N = 1,595) (Constant) 190.41 80.79 2.36
(.019)
1.36
(.257)
.002
∆grants%1999-1998 554.34 336.24 0.04 1.65
(.099)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 137.68 554.46 0.01 0.25
(.804)
(N = 1,752) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 235.48 88.22 2.67
(.008)
1.20
(.302)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 540.59 350.94 0.04 1.54
(.124)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 29.90 565.19 0.00 0.05
(.958)
(N = 1,534) (Constant) 234.92 88.13 2.67
(.008)
1.15
(.315)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 552.51 364.93 0.04 1.51
(.130)
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(∆grants%1999-1998)2 36.27 607.61 0.00 0.06
(.952)
(N = 417) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 73.57 46.13 1.60
(.111)
0.10
(.907)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 101.30 243.73 0.02 0.42
(.678)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 31.22 374.08 0.00 0.08
(.934)
(N = 400) (Constant) 75.20 46.31 1.62
(.105)
0.03
(.972)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 41.40 232.37 0.01 0.18
(.859)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -21.91 362.15 0.00 -0.06
(.952)
Crime and Legal-Related
(N = 1,314) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 17,596.28 7,916.97 2.22
(.026)
0.36
(.695)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.45
(.654)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.15E-09 0.00 -0.03 -0.84
(.401)
(N = 1,214) (Constant) 17,996.83 7,873.19 2.29
(.022)
0.12
(.889)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
(.982)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -4.49E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.46
(.645)
(N = 1,314) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 12,725.15 7,333.09 1.74
(.083)
1.50
(.223)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.06 1.51
(.131)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -2.09E-09 0.00 -0.06 -1.64
(.101)
(N = 1,214) (Constant) 13,848.35 7,297.36 1.90
(.058)
0.39
(.678)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.59
(.555)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -7.44E-10 0.00 -0.02 -0.82
(.411)
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(N = 1,314) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 4,869.81 3,051.75 1.60
(.111)
3.05
(.048)
.005
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -2.46
(.014)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 9.36E-10 0.00 0.07 1.77
(.077)
(N = 1,214) (Constant) 4,147.18 3,039.09 1.36
(.173)
0.98
(.377)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -1.36
(.174)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.95E-10 0.00 0.02 0.78
(.434)
(N = 1,087) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 3,409.61 3,045.21 1.12
(.263)
0.05
(.955)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 489.44 15,585.39 0.00 0.03
(.975)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -7,183.03 23,832.48 -0.01 -0.30
(.763)
(N = 1,071) (Constant) 3,383.77 3,030.40 1.12
(.264)
0.04
(.958)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 896.04 17,308.35 0.00 0.05
(.959)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -7,976.30 27,229.11 -0.01 -0.29
(.770)
(N = 1,079) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 357.54 134.95 2.65
(.008)
0.14
(.868)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 288.45 685.24 0.01 0.42
(.674)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -344.99 1,054.15 -0.01 -0.33
(.744)
(N = 1,025) (Constant) 360.35 134.28 2.68
(.007)
0.22
(.802)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 393.55 753.69 0.02 0.52
(.602)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -559.81 1,182.36 -0.01 -0.47
(.636)
(N = 559) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 26.70 8.50 3.14
(.002)
1.73
(.179)
.006
∆subsidy%1999-1998 57.38 45.11 0.05 1.27
(.204)
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(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -95.32 70.13 -0.06 -1.36
(.175)
(N = 539) (Constant) 22.59 8.49 2.66
(.008)
0.10
(.905)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 14.61 48.43 0.01 0.30
(.763)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 26.21 76.11 0.01 0.34
(.731)
Diseases and Medical
Disciplines
(N = 962) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 264,557.23 128,544.87 2.06
(.040)
2.32
(.099)
.005
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.45 0.21 0.09 2.15
(.032)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -2.35E-08 0.00 -0.05 -1.28
(.200)
(N = 879) (Constant) 259,405.29 128,330.11 2.02
(.044)
3.29
(.038)
.007
∆grants$1999-1998 0.62 0.24 0.11 2.56
(.011)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.19E-08 0.00 -0.07 -1.65
(.100)
(N = 962) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 210,925.35 124,245.31 1.70
(.090)
1.72
(.180)
.004
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.38 0.20 0.08 1.85
(.065)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.91E-08 0.00 -0.04 -1.08
(.281)
(N = 879) (Constant) 206,185.58 124,058.55 1.66
(.097)
2.52
(.081)
.005
∆grants$1999-1998 0.52 0.23 0.10 2.24
(.025)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.66E-08 0.00 -0.06 -1.42
(.155)
(N = 962) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 53,631.88 57,054.83 0.94
(.347)
0.34
(.713)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.82
(.411)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.36E-09 0.00 -0.02 -0.54
(.592)
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(N = 879) (Constant) 53,219.71 57,013.14 0.93
(.351)
0.40
(.674)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.89
(.374)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -5.25E-09 0.00 -0.03 -0.61
(.541)
(N = 906) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 850.09 768.80 1.11
(.269)
0.04
(.958)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 470.28 3,995.39 0.00 0.12
(.906)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -1,411.36 5,583.22 -0.01 -0.25
(.800)
(N = 829) (Constant) 841.07 763.79 1.10
(.271)
0.04
(.961)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 731.65 4,692.60 0.01 0.16
(.876)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -1,701.35 6,904.47 -0.01 -0.25
(.805)
(N = 892) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 85.51 16.90 5.06
(.000)
0.34
(.714)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -66.21 87.22 -0.03 -0.76
(.448)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 27.46 121.81 0.01 0.23
(.822)
(N = 817) (Constant) 89.48 16.79 5.33
(.000)
0.27
(.763)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 -6.20 102.49 0.00 -0.06
(.952)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -109.39 150.62 -0.02 -0.73
(.468)
(N = 464) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 26.10 16.85 1.55
(.122)
1.32
(.267)
.006
∆subsidy%1999-1998 180.43 110.98 0.08 1.63
(.105)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 73.56 168.63 0.02 0.44
(.663)
(N = 433) (Constant) 25.64 16.77 1.53
(.127)
1.02
(.363)
.004
∆grants%1999-1998 162.84 116.28 0.07 1.40
(.162)
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(∆grants%1999-1998)2 48.60 174.41 0.01 0.28
(.781)
Education
(N = 2,525) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 79,832.49 31,696.03 2.52
(.012)
12.72
(.000)
.010
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.04 0.02 0.10 1.94
(.053)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -5.90E-12 0.00 0.00 -0.07
(.946)
(N = 2,309) (Constant) 75,805.08 31,793.64 2.38
(.017)
13.85
(.000)
.011
∆grants$1999-1998 0.07 0.03 0.21 2.39
(.017)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.81E-10 0.00 -0.11 -1.26
(.207)
(N = 2,525) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 54,270.53 25,920.94 2.09
(.036)
16.87
(.000)
.013
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.06 1.10
(.271)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 7.89E-11 0.00 0.06 1.10
(.271)
(N = 2,309) (Constant) 54,016.56 26,013.32 2.08
(.038)
16.76
(.000)
.013
∆grants$1999-1998 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.78
(.435)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 6.40E-11 0.00 0.05 0.55
(.586)
(N = 2,525) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 25,561.96 18,310.11 1.40
(.163)
1.62
(.198)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.10 1.80
(.072)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -8.48E-11 0.00 -0.09 -1.68
(.094)
(N = 2,309) (Constant) 21,788.51 18,352.90 1.19
(.235)
4.61
(.010)
.004
∆grants$1999-1998 0.05 0.02 0.27 3.04
(.002)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.45E-10 0.00 -0.26 -2.96
(.003)
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(N = 2,101) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 179.01 49.47 3.62
(.000)
0.09
(.917)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 113.92 286.25 0.01 0.40
(.691)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -70.17 429.56 0.00 -0.16
(.870)
(N = 1,955) (Constant) 178.99 49.35 3.63
(.000)
0.03
(.969)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 74.55 335.70 0.00 0.22
(.824)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -90.28 554.48 0.00 -0.16
(.871)
(N = 2,048) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 191.27 50.69 3.77
(.000)
0.09
(.915)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 76.65 291.19 0.01 0.26
(.792)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -153.90 435.33 -0.01 -0.35
(.724)
(N = 1,904) (Constant) 191.94 50.55 3.80
(.000)
0.09
(.918)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 41.97 343.32 0.00 0.12
(.903)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -232.31 563.91 -0.01 -0.41
(.680)
(N = 588) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 26.63 9.95 2.68
(.008)
0.13
(.879)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -17.95 65.45 -0.01 -0.27
(.784)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 33.78 102.17 0.01 0.33
(.741)
(N = 562) (Constant) 27.04 9.98 2.71
(.007)
0.04
(.962)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 -18.45 81.35 -0.01 -0.23
(.821)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 38.03 159.29 0.01 0.24
(.811)
Employment
(N = 1,288) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 13,262.77 7,637.76 1.74
(.083)
0.22
(.802)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.60
(.549)
126
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.56E-10 0.00 -0.02 -0.53
(.598)
(N = 1,122) (Constant) 13,336.73 7,616.07 1.75
(.080)
0.51
(.600)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.85
(.393)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -9.52E-10 0.00 -0.04 -0.97
(.330)
(N = 1,288) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 11,606.26 7,465.88 1.55
(.120)
0.04
(.961)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.22
(.828)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.70E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.26
(.797)
(N = 1,122) (Constant) 11,725.33 7,445.79 1.57
(.116)
0.14
(.871)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.32
(.747)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -5.00E-10 0.00 -0.02 -0.52
(.600)
(N = 1,288) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,656.53 1,474.77 1.12
(.262)
2.18
(.114)
.003
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.06 2.00
(.045)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.86E-10 0.00 -0.04 -1.43
(.154)
(N = 1,122) (Constant) 1,611.41 1,468.68 1.10
(.273)
4.14
(.016)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.10 2.79
(.005)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -4.51E-10 0.00 -0.09 -2.40
(.017)
(N = 965) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 410.40 164.36 2.50
(.013)
0.14
(.873)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 171.80 981.62 0.01 0.18
(.861)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -538.58 1,389.44 -0.01 -0.39
(.698)
(N = 847) (Constant) 410.68 164.33 2.50
(.013)
0.13
(.877)
.000
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∆grants%1999-1998 170.38 917.94 0.01 0.19
(.853)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -546.63 1,289.18 -0.01 -0.42
(.672)
(N = 919) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 409.97 169.61 2.42
(.016)
0.11
(.897)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 178.72 1,003.54 0.01 0.18
(.859)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -488.06 1,431.85 -0.01 -0.34
(.733)
(N = 804) (Constant) 404.93 169.53 2.39
(.017)
0.05
(.949)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 139.32 959.27 0.00 0.15
(.885)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -342.96 1,362.82 -0.01 -0.25
(.801)
(N = 404) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 82.44 39.00 2.11
(.035)
0.03
(.969)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 30.01 222.23 0.01 0.14
(.893)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -50.47 314.90 -0.01 -0.16
(.873)
(N = 344) (Constant) 82.41 39.01 2.11
(.035)
0.02
(.976)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 -4.15 220.31 0.00 -0.02
(.985)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -68.66 314.57 -0.01 -0.22
(.827)
Environment
(N = 802) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 104,423.84 60,896.67 1.71
(.087)
301.46
(.000)
.430
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.58 0.13 0.26 4.54
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 5.11E-08 0.00 0.41 7.19
(.000)
(N = 773) (Constant) 167,375.54 73,595.79 2.27
(.023)
78.85
(.000)
.165
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.04 0.17 -0.01 -0.23
(.822)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 5.72E-08 0.00 0.42 6.54
(.000)
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(N = 802) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 102,649.49 60,850.81 1.69
(.092)
301.46
(.000)
.430
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.58 0.13 0.26 4.55
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 5.09E-08 0.00 0.41 7.18
(.000)
(N = 773) (Constant) 165,618.52 73,552.57 2.25
(.025)
78.69
(.000)
.165
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.04 0.16 -0.01 -0.22
(.828)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 5.70E-08 0.00 0.42 6.52
(.000)
(N = 802) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,774.36 1,899.04 0.93
(.350)
0.32
(.727)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.42
(.677)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.52E-10 0.00 0.05 0.69
(.493)
(N = 773) (Constant) 1,757.03 1,895.85 0.93
(.354)
0.35
(.708)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.32
(.752)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.49E-10 0.00 0.05 0.66
(.509)
(N = 726) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 174.88 51.74 3.38
(.001)
0.09
(.910)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 103.87 240.02 0.02 0.43
(.665)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -20.32 431.87 0.00 -0.05
(.962)
(N = 706) (Constant) 177.30 51.67 3.43
(.001)
0.11
(.893)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 114.72 244.45 0.02 0.47
(.639)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -74.81 443.91 -0.01 -0.17
(.866)
(N = 721) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 142.23 39.10 3.64
(.000)
0.51
(.599)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 169.43 182.95 0.04 0.93
(.355)
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(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 82.38 333.45 0.01 0.25
(.805)
(N = 701) (Constant) 144.96 39.05 3.71
(.000)
0.51
(.601)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 182.71 186.45 0.04 0.98
(.327)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 27.64 343.37 0.00 0.08
(.936)
(N = 116) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 17.84 14.15 1.26
(.210)
1.68
(.190)
.029
∆subsidy%1999-1998 79.00 75.97 0.10 1.04
(.301)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -254.47 142.78 -0.18 -1.78
(.077)
(N = 115) (Constant) 16.42 14.17 1.16
(.249)
1.09
(.340)
.019
∆grants%1999-1998 23.56 78.43 0.03 0.30
(.764)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -214.77 146.07 -0.14 -1.47
(.144)
Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition
(N = 630) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 284,354.25 75,969.52 3.74
(.000)
0.08
(.923)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.16
(.870)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.65E-09 0.00 -0.01 -0.16
(.874)
(N = 608) (Constant) 282,591.74 75,930.90 3.72
(.000)
0.01
(.986)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.11
(.913)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -5.81E-10 0.00 0.00 -0.05
(.958)
(N = 630) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 259,714.63 77,431.05 3.35
(.001)
0.15
(.858)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.05 0.12 -0.02 -0.43
(.670)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 3.04E-10 0.00 0.00 0.03
(.977)
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(N = 608) (Constant) 258,039.68 77,392.70 3.33
(.001)
0.08
(.924)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.38
(.706)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.05E-09 0.00 0.00 0.09
(.926)
(N = 630) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 24,639.62 30,633.42 0.80
(.422)
0.23
(.797)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.67
(.501)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.95E-09 0.00 -0.03 -0.47
(.641)
(N = 608) (Constant) 24,552.06 30,614.37 0.80
(.423)
0.23
(.793)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.68
(.495)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.63E-09 0.00 -0.02 -0.36
(.716)
(N = 547) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 76.84 17.43 4.41
(.000)
0.29
(.750)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 113.67 172.09 0.03 0.66
(.509)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -151.94 479.31 -0.01 -0.32
(.751)
(N = 537) (Constant) 76.93 17.40 4.42
(.000)
0.26
(.767)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 99.08 167.00 0.03 0.59
(.553)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -129.36 428.37 -0.01 -0.30
(.763)
(N = 541) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 76.25 18.13 4.21
(.000)
0.27
(.763)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -62.05 178.69 -0.02 -0.35
(.729)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -334.28 496.03 -0.03 -0.67
(.501)
(N = 445) (Constant) 76.46 18.09 4.23
(.000)
0.32
(.726)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 -74.97 173.29 -0.02 -0.43
(.665)
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(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -328.80 443.08 -0.03 -0.74
(.458)
(N = 248) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 135.74 54.96 2.47
(.014)
0.00
(.997)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 19.86 593.22 0.00 0.03
(.973)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -154.99 2,249.09 0.00 -0.07
(.945)
(N = 245) (Constant) 136.63 55.00 2.48
(.014)
0.01
(.989)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 -45.06 567.80 -0.01 -0.08
(.937)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -224.25 2,025.38 -0.01 -0.11
(.912)
Health Care
(N = 2,543) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) -70,868.58 105,212.68 -0.67
(.501)
0.21
(.815)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.64
(.523)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 3.46E-10 0.00 0.02 0.48
(.631)
(N = 2,310) (Constant) -71,200.91 105,244.22 -0.68
(.499)
0.38
(.682)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.10 0.11 -0.02 -0.87
(.384)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.15E-09 0.00 0.01 0.33
(.741)
(N = 2,543) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 24,061.95 8,882.61 2.71
(.007)
4.82
(.008)
.004
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 -3.02
(.003)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.16E-10 0.00 0.06 1.90
(.057)
(N = 2,310) (Constant) 21,872.73 8,901.97 2.46
(.014)
0.22
(.800)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.26
(.797)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.82E-10 0.00 0.01 0.51
(.609)
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(N = 2,543) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) -94,930.03 104,665.52 -0.91
(.365)
0.08
(.928)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.39
(.699)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.30E-10 0.00 0.01 0.32
(.748)
(N = 2,310) (Constant) -93,073.15 104,690.69 -0.89
(.374)
0.40
(.668)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.10 0.11 -0.02 -0.90
(.370)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.87E-09 0.00 0.01 0.29
(.773)
(N = 2,108) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 245.32 79.84 3.07
(.002)
1.69
(.184)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 784.47 430.22 0.04 1.82
(.068)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 366.74 735.69 0.01 0.50
(.618)
(N = 1,934) (Constant) 235.92 78.79 2.99
(.003)
3.63
(.027)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 1,452.80 554.71 0.06 2.62
(.009)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 1,417.09 987.59 0.03 1.43
(.151)
(N = 2,003) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 258.25 84.17 3.07
(.002)
0.66
(.519)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 397.49 457.63 0.02 0.87
(.385)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 688.49 784.46 0.02 0.88
(.380)
(N = 1,836) (Constant) 269.69 83.10 3.25
(.001)
2.46
(.086)
.002
∆grants%1999-1998 1,327.14 600.28 0.05 2.21
(.027)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 1,006.23 1,086.45 0.02 0.93
(.354)
(N = 840) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 141.13 72.62 1.94
(.052)
0.16
(.855)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 134.97 410.76 0.01 0.33
(.743)
133
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -256.25 679.00 -0.01 -0.38
(.706)
(N = 778) (Constant) 131.00 71.52 1.83
(.067)
0.05
(.953)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 172.84 572.50 0.01 0.30
(.763)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 182.30 960.31 0.01 0.19
(.849)
Hospitals
(N = 970) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,189,407.5
8
578,707.61 2.06
(.045)
0.71
(.494)
.025
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.03 0.02 0.20 1.19
(.238)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.46E-10 0.00 -0.13 -0.76
(.448)
(N = 925) (Constant) 1,226,594.3
5
589,379.24 2.08
(.042)
0.42
(.661)
.015
∆grants$1999-1998 0.87 1.40 0.25 0.62
(.538)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.38E-07 0.00 -0.33 -0.80
(.425)
(N = 970) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 845,607.20 469,253.76 1.80
(.077)
0.05
(.955)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
(.986)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.88E-11 0.00 -0.04 -0.25
(.803)
(N = 925) (Constant) 895,267.53 474,099.81 1.89
(.064)
0.20
(.816)
.007
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.07 1.13 -0.02 -0.06
(.953)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.57E-08 0.00 -0.06 -0.15
(.882)
(N = 970) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 343,800.39 360,040.65 0.95
(.344)
1.84
(.168)
.062
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.03 0.01 0.31 1.90
(.063)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.07E-10 0.00 -0.15 -0.90
(.372)
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(N = 925) (Constant) 331,326.81 372,714.50 0.89
(.378)
0.59
(.559)
.021
∆grants$1999-1998 0.93 0.89 0.43 1.05
(.296)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.02E-07 0.00 -0.44 -1.08
(.285)
(N = 831) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 172.32 83.70 2.06
(.045)
0.85
(.434)
.033
∆subsidy%1999-1998 718.21 561.02 0.21 1.28
(.206)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -1,272.62 1,424.65 -0.15 -0.89
(.376)
(N = 797) (Constant) 145.43 79.16 1.84
(.072)
0.06
(.943)
.002
∆grants%1999-1998 1,878.57 6,204.22 0.43 0.30
(.763)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -2,151.02 6,780.22 -0.45 -0.32
(.752)
(N = 748) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 291.47 288.10 1.01
(.317)
2.91
(.064)
.110
∆subsidy%1999-1998 2,744.47 1,877.37 0.24 1.46
(.150)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 3,880.95 4,771.68 0.13 0.81
(.420)
(N = 718) (Constant) 452.67 281.17 1.61
(.114)
0.18
(.835)
.008
∆grants%1999-1998 -12,194.68 21,395.60 -0.83 -0.57
(.571)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 12,815.33 23,377.97 0.80 0.55
(.586)
(N = 359) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 493.53 394.88 1.25
(.225)
0.29
(.751)
.027
∆subsidy%1999-1998 1,769.15 2,446.37 0.18 0.72
(.478)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -3,221.59 5,547.37 -0.15 -0.58
(.568)
(N = 347) (Constant) 455.91 390.51 1.17
(.256)
0.10
(.906)
.009
∆grants%1999-1998 26,904.69 79,847.10 0.10 0.34
(.739)
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(∆grants%1999-1998)2 131,096.92 3,484,931.8 0.01 0.04
(.970)
Housing and Shelter
(N = 3,504) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 14,310.34 7,752.14 1.85
(.065)
20.03
(.000)
.011
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.04 0.01 0.18 5.93
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.63E-10 0.00 -0.19 -6.18
(.000)
(N = 2,846) (Constant) 14,085.82 7,752.53 1.82
(.069)
19.51
(.000)
.011
∆grants$1999-1998 0.04 0.01 0.18 5.85
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -4.61E-10 0.00 -0.19 -6.11
(.000)
(N = 3,504) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 11,914.06 7,703.02 1.55
(.122)
23.20
(.000)
.013
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.05 0.01 0.20 6.45
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.92E-10 0.00 -0.20 -6.60
(.000)
(N = 2,846) (Constant) 11,684.44 7,702.32 1.52
(.129)
23.19
(.000)
.013
∆grants$1999-1998 0.05 0.01 0.20 6.45
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -4.96E-10 0.00 -0.21 -6.61
(.000)
(N = 3,504) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 2,396.29 2,231.21 1.07
(.283)
1.37
(.255)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -1.65
(.099)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.89E-11 0.00 0.04 1.34
(.181)
(N = 2,846) (Constant) 2,401.39 2,230.67 1.08
(.282)
1.89
(.151)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -1.94
(.052)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 3.45E-11 0.00 0.05 1.59
(.112)
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(N = 1,619) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 151.85 35.39 4.29
(.000)
0.20
(.820)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -64.23 146.06 -0.01 -0.44
(.660)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 94.21 247.76 0.01 0.38
(.704)
(N = 1,512) (Constant) 150.72 35.25 4.28
(.000)
0.25
(.779)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 -63.81 151.36 -0.01 -0.42
(.673)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 119.12 254.94 0.01 0.47
(.640)
(N = 1,530) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 220.79 75.12 2.94
(.003)
0.02
(.980)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -64.64 317.85 -0.01 -0.20
(.839)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -21.46 542.02 0.00 -0.04
(.968)
(N = 1,433) (Constant) 219.02 74.88 2.92
(.003)
0.02
(.979)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 -63.26 330.46 -0.01 -0.19
(.848)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 12.81 563.93 0.00 0.02
(.982)
(N = 486) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 159.52 79.42 2.01
(.045)
0.24
(.790)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -20.06 387.56 0.00 -0.05
(.959)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -486.71 727.21 -0.03 -0.67
(.504)
(N = 452) (Constant) 158.36 78.67 2.01
(.045)
0.25
(.777)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 -83.79 388.81 -0.01 -0.22
(.829)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -483.63 695.05 -0.03 -0.70
(.487)
Human Services
(N = 11,333) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 36,747.46 7,471.08 4.92
(.000)
7.10
(.001)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.04 3.75
(.000)
137
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.52E-10 0.00 -0.01 -1.35
(.177)
(N = 10,031) (Constant) 35,508.06 7,447.38 4.77
(.000)
17.40
(.000)
.003
∆grants$1999-1998 0.05 0.01 0.07 5.89
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.16E-09 0.00 -0.05 -4.11
(.000)
(N = 11,333) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 22,571.30 7,901.10 2.86
(.004)
1.08
(.341)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.84
(.401)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.46E-10 0.00 0.01 0.69
(.487)
(N = 10,031) (Constant) 22,256.99 7,882.53 2.82
(.005)
2.03
(.132)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.98
(.048)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.97E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.99
(.320)
(N = 11,333) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 14,174.28 6,311.19 2.25
(.025)
6.28
(.002)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.04 3.39
(.001)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -6.98E-10 0.00 -0.03 -2.47
(.014)
(N = 10,031) (Constant) 13,249.19 6,294.54 2.10
(.035)
10.50
(.000)
.002
∆grants$1999-1998 0.03 0.01 0.06 4.49
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -8.61E-10 0.00 -0.04 -3.61
(.000)
(N = 9,683) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 215.97 76.40 2.83
(.005)
1.43
(.239)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 614.23 421.88 0.01 1.46
(.145)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 572.79 618.05 0.01 0.93
(.354)
(N = 8,774) (Constant) 223.36 75.97 2.94
(.003)
1.02
(.362)
.000
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∆grants%1999-1998 645.34 491.88 0.01 1.31
(.190)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 532.43 755.65 0.01 0.70
(.481)
(N = 9,346) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 204.31 52.56 3.89
(.000)
2.89
(.056)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 582.36 290.34 0.02 2.01
(.045)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 658.40 427.37 0.02 1.54
(.123)
(N = 8,464) (Constant) 212.67 52.27 4.07
(.000)
1.98
(.138)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 586.71 339.51 0.02 1.73
(.084)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 599.69 527.77 0.01 1.14
(.256)
(N = 5,196) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 149.45 87.71 1.70
(.088)
0.03
(.971)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 60.04 537.23 0.00 0.11
(.911)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -177.05 850.74 0.00 -0.21
(.835)
(N = 4,817) (Constant) 149.42 87.33 1.71
(.087)
0.03
(.970)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 58.07 626.62 0.00 0.09
(.926)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -215.24 1,044.97 0.00 -0.21
(.837)
International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security
(N = 179) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 75,471.41 649,665.81 0.12
(.908)
34.49
(.000)
.282
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.87
(.385)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.04E-08 0.00 0.53 8.26
(.000)
(N = 173) (Constant) 74,362.02 649,455.03 0.11
(.909)
34.49
(.000)
.282
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.87
(.383)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.04E-08 0.00 0.53 8.26
(.000)
139
(N = 179) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 14,491.67 642,563.77 0.02
(.982)
11.17
(.000)
.113
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.26 0.08 0.24 3.36
(.001)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 4.16E-09 0.00 0.24 3.33
(.001)
(N = 173) (Constant) 30,966.19 642,343.08 0.05
(.962)
11.17
(.000)
.113
∆grants$1999-1998 0.26 0.08 0.24 3.37
(.001)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 4.16E-09 0.00 0.24 3.33
(.001)
(N = 179) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 60,979.74 155,606.05 0.39
(.696)
369.36
(.000)
.808
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.33 0.02 -0.58 -17.52
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 6.27E-09 0.00 0.69 20.72
(.000)
(N = 173) (Constant) 43,395.83 155,147.00 0.28
(.780)
371.78
(.000)
.809
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.33 0.02 -0.58 -17.60
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 6.27E-09 0.00 0.69 20.79
(.000)
(N = 157) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 122.65 63.92 1.92
(.057)
0.48
(.622)
.006
∆subsidy%1999-1998 238.85 250.54 0.08 0.95
(.342)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -129.00 376.48 -0.03 -0.34
(.732)
(N = 154) (Constant) 123.80 63.94 1.94
(.055)
0.45
(.640)
.006
∆grants%1999-1998 231.61 253.45 0.07 0.91
(.362)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -123.86 388.37 -0.03 -0.32
(.750)
(N = 155) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 129.90 64.84 2.00
(.047)
0.41
(.665)
.005
∆subsidy%1999-1998 220.73 254.73 0.07 0.87
(.388)
140
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -143.36 379.90 -0.03 -0.38
(.706)
(N = 152) (Constant) 131.06 64.85 2.02
(.045)
0.38
(.682)
.005
∆grants%1999-1998 212.91 257.62 0.07 0.83
(.410)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -140.54 391.84 -0.03 -0.36
(.720)
(N = 41) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 9.86 17.99 0.55
(.587)
0.06
(.944)
.003
∆subsidy%1999-1998 18.97 55.63 0.06 0.34
(.735)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -2.38 77.80 0.00 -0.03
(.976)
(N = 40) (Constant) 9.93 17.98 0.55
(.584)
0.06
(.943)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 19.18 55.82 0.06 0.34
(.733)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -2.47 77.75 -0.01 -0.03
(.975)
Medical Research
(N = 117) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 204,445.36 202,527.25 1.01
(.315)
11.11
(.000)
.163
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.64 0.24 0.57 2.61
(.010)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.53E-08 0.00 -0.18 -0.85
(.397)
(N = 113) (Constant) 200,367.08 203,127.09 0.99
(.326)
11.07
(.000)
.163
∆grants$1999-1998 0.64 0.25 0.57 2.60
(.011)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.53E-08 0.00 -0.19 -0.85
(.398)
(N = 117) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 140,424.35 200,121.48 0.70
(.484)
9.73
(.000)
.146
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.46 0.24 0.42 1.91
(.058)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.41E-09 0.00 -0.04 -0.19
(.848)
141
(N = 113) (Constant) 137,629.65 200,698.94 0.69
(.494)
9.71
(.000)
.145
∆grants$1999-1998 0.46 0.24 0.42 1.90
(.060)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.39E-09 0.00 -0.04 -0.19
(.850)
(N = 117) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 64,021.00 56,145.45 1.14
(.257)
3.36
(.038)
.056
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.18 0.07 0.60 2.59
(.011)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.19E-08 0.00 -0.55 -2.39
(.019)
(N = 113) (Constant) 62,737.43 56,301.90 1.11
(.267)
3.35
(.038)
.056
∆grants$1999-1998 0.18 0.07 0.60 2.59
(.011)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.20E-08 0.00 -0.55 -2.38
(.019)
(N = 104) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 322.19 239.88 1.34
(.182)
0.30
(.739)
.006
∆subsidy%1999-1998 1,231.34 1,644.98 0.08 0.75
(.456)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -1,783.02 3,519.25 -0.06 -0.51
(.614)
(N = 101) (Constant) 322.98 239.63 1.35
(.181)
0.34
(.714)
.007
∆grants%1999-1998 1,305.22 1,650.29 0.09 0.79
(.431)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -1,871.17 3,519.57 -0.06 -0.53
(.596)
(N = 100) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 70.13 25.99 2.70
(.008)
0.31
(.738)
.006
∆subsidy%1999-1998 127.28 177.85 0.07 0.72
(.476)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -176.98 618.97 -0.03 -0.29
(.776)
(N = 97) (Constant) 71.62 25.84 2.77
(.007)
0.74
(.482)
.015
∆grants%1999-1998 198.26 177.70 0.11 1.12
(.267)
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(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -267.62 615.69 -0.04 -0.43
(.665)
(N = 25) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 1,080.24 1,001.23 1.08
(.292)
0.31
(.736)
.027
∆subsidy%1999-1998 6,901.86 9,048.22 0.27 0.76
(.454)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -9,765.65 13,273.21 -0.26 -0.74
(.470)
(N = 25) (Constant) 1,080.24 1,001.23 1.08
(.292)
0.31
(.736)
.027
∆grants%1999-1998 6,901.86 9,048.22 0.27 0.76
(.454)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -9,765.65 13,273.21 -0.26 -0.74
(.470)
Mental Health and Crisis Intervention
(N = 2,597) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) -512.20 8,311.70 -0.06
(.951)
0.70
(.497)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.02 1.01
(.314)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.51E-10 0.00 0.01 0.37
(.709)
(N = 2,262) (Constant) 305.81 8,286.84 0.04
(.971)
0.88
(.415)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.03 1.33
(.185)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.11E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.45
(.651)
(N = 2,597) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 953.12 7,728.59 0.12
(.902)
0.24
(.788)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.22
(.827)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.21E-10 0.00 0.01 0.59
(.557)
(N = 2,262) (Constant) 1,375.59 7,706.58 0.18
(.858)
0.05
(.952)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.28
(.779)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.30E-11 0.00 0.00 0.03
(.976)
143
(N = 2,597) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) -1,465.32 2,959.20 -0.50
(.621)
2.55
(.078)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.05 2.26
(.024)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -7.00E-11 0.00 -0.01 -0.49
(.627)
(N = 2,262) (Constant) -1,069.78 2,948.31 -0.36
(.717)
4.53
(.011)
.003
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.06 3.00
(.003)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.24E-10 0.00 -0.03 -1.35
(.176)
(N = 2,193) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 273.56 67.79 4.04
(.000)
0.05
(.955)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -17.64 326.50 0.00 -0.05
(.957)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -132.90 458.42 -0.01 -0.29
(.772)
(N = 1,950) (Constant) 251.32 67.26 3.74
(.000)
1.15
(.316)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 -392.22 369.95 -0.02 -1.06
(.289)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 522.47 528.36 0.02 0.99
(.323)
(N = 2,055) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 239.01 49.67 4.81
(.000)
0.01
(.988)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 33.52 237.39 0.00 0.14
(.888)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -24.49 331.83 0.00 -0.07
(.941)
(N = 1,828) (Constant) 216.21 49.22 4.39
(.000)
2.95
(.053)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 -400.61 269.80 -0.03 -1.48
(.138)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 695.86 384.48 0.04 1.81
(.070)
(N = 1,100) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 422.40 460.63 0.92
(.359)
1.45
(.234)
.003
∆subsidy%1999-1998 4,140.92 2,588.52 0.05 1.60
(.110)
144
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 1,470.16 4,019.72 0.01 0.37
(.715)
(N = 1,011) (Constant) 395.72 457.26 0.87
(.387)
2.28
(.102)
.004
∆grants%1999-1998 5,854.98 2,953.56 0.06 1.98
(.048)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 3,912.84 4,744.37 0.02 0.82
(.410)
Public and Societal Benefit
(N = 182) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) -21,951.86 53,221.28 -0.41
(.680)
2.64
(.074)
.029
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.22 0.10 -0.46 -2.30
(.023)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.25E-08 0.00 0.43 2.12
(.035)
(N = 167) (Constant) -23,627.37 53,028.75 -0.45
(.656)
2.71
(.069)
.029
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.22 0.10 -0.47 -2.33
(.021)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.26E-08 0.00 0.43 2.15
(.033)
(N = 182) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) -29,717.08 52,264.20 -0.57
(.570)
2.92
(.057)
.032
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.23 0.09 -0.49 -2.42
(.017)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.29E-08 0.00 0.45 2.24
(.027)
(N = 167) (Constant) -31,449.23 52,073.52 -0.60
(.547)
2.99
(.053)
.032
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.23 0.09 -0.49 -2.44
(.015)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.31E-08 0.00 0.45 2.26
(.025)
(N = 182) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 7,765.22 8,277.49 0.94
(.349)
0.12
(.891)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.47
(.638)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.33E-10 0.00 -0.10 -0.47
(.637)
145
(N = 167) (Constant) 7,821.86 8,250.32 0.95
(.344)
0.12
(.890)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.47
(.636)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -4.35E-10 0.00 -0.10 -0.48
(.635)
(N = 145) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 128.04 54.93 2.33
(.021)
0.35
(.705)
.005
∆subsidy%1999-1998 100.21 338.02 0.03 0.30
(.767)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -449.54 703.95 -0.06 -0.64
(.524)
(N = 135) (Constant) 126.23 54.44 2.32
(.022)
0.29
(.746)
.004
∆grants%1999-1998 74.76 367.70 0.02 0.20
(.839)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -561.27 798.45 -0.06 -0.70
(.483)
(N = 140) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 131.81 56.99 2.31
(.022)
0.22
(.803)
.003
∆subsidy%1999-1998 62.40 347.54 0.02 0.18
(.858)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -388.48 719.71 -0.05 -0.54
(.590)
(N = 130) (Constant) 130.82 56.45 2.32
(.022)
0.21
(.814)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 34.13 377.72 0.01 0.09
(.928)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -501.63 815.20 -0.05 -0.62
(.539)
(N = 32) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) -18.23 9.68 -1.88
(.070)
0.28
(.758)
.019
∆subsidy%1999-1998 19.64 49.93 0.08 0.39
(.697)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 69.24 94.24 0.14 0.73
(.468)
(N = 29) (Constant) -16.68 9.77 -1.71
(.099)
0.05
(.947)
.004
∆grants%1999-1998 14.37 70.50 0.04 0.20
(.840)
146
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 25.81 175.44 0.03 0.15
(.884)
Public Safety, Disaster Preparedness, and Relief
(N = 931) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) -882.51 8,836.42 -0.10
(.920)
73.29
(.000)
.136
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.77 0.07 0.35 10.75
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 4.16E-07 0.00 0.29 8.86
(.000)
(N = 875) (Constant) -893.11 8,716.19 -0.10
(.918)
86.97
(.000)
.158
∆grants$1999-1998 0.92 0.08 0.38 11.87
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 4.49E-07 0.00 0.30 9.49
(.000)
(N = 931) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) -1,631.93 8,815.26 -0.19
(.853)
73.58
(.000)
.137
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.77 0.07 0.35 10.79
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 4.15E-07 0.00 0.29 8.85
(.000)
(N = 875) (Constant) -1,661.42 8,692.01 -0.19
(.848)
87.69
(.000)
.159
∆grants$1999-1998 0.92 0.08 0.38 11.94
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 4.48E-07 0.00 0.30 9.49
(.000)
(N = 931) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 749.42 679.83 1.10
(.271)
0.15
(.862)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.19
(.853)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.52E-09 0.00 0.01 0.42
(.675)
(N = 875) (Constant) 768.31 678.93 1.13
(.258)
0.33
(.719)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.54
(.590)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.42E-09 0.00 0.01 0.38
(.701)
147
(N = 858) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 146.98 60.73 2.42
(.016)
0.09
(.910)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 75.81 311.60 0.01 0.24
(.808)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -176.55 510.06 -0.01 -0.35
(.729)
(N = 807) (Constant) 145.49 60.34 2.41
(.016)
0.05
(.951)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 43.76 358.65 0.00 0.12
(.903)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -174.77 621.61 -0.01 -0.28
(.779)
(N = 846) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 143.15 61.49 2.33
(.020)
0.09
(.911)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 82.61 313.71 0.01 0.26
(.792)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -167.45 512.97 -0.01 -0.33
(.744)
(N = 796) (Constant) 142.09 61.10 2.33
(.020)
0.05
(.947)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 47.54 361.23 0.00 0.13
(.895)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -179.89 625.16 -0.01 -0.29
(.774)
(N = 145) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 56.85 29.85 1.90
(.059)
0.09
(.916)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 38.59 147.56 0.02 0.26
(.794)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 108.10 296.58 0.03 0.36
(.716)
(N = 142) (Constant) 55.45 29.24 1.90
(.060)
0.65
(.526)
.009
∆grants%1999-1998 209.40 203.00 0.11 1.03
(.304)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 377.24 367.89 0.11 1.03
(.307)
Recreation and Sports
(N = 762) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 29,639.35 59,048.94 0.50
(.616)
10.68
(.000)
.027
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.81 0.19 -0.20 -4.15
(.000)
148
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 4.03E-08 0.00 0.05 1.16
(.247)
(N = 718) (Constant) 36,796.71 59,197.03 0.62
(.534)
9.19
(.000)
.024
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.55 0.13 -0.27 -4.27
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.66E-08 0.00 -0.23 -3.70
(.000)
(N = 762) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 29,583.44 58,989.49 0.50
(.616)
10.72
(.000)
.027
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.81 0.19 -0.20 -4.16
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 4.04E-08 0.00 0.05 1.17
(.244)
(N = 718) (Constant) 36,755.29 59,138.10 0.62
(.534)
9.22
(.000)
.024
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.55 0.13 -0.27 -4.28
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.66E-08 0.00 -0.23 -3.70
(.000)
(N = 762) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 55.90 2,477.53 0.02
(.982)
0.01
(.992)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12
(.903)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.46E-10 0.00 0.00 -0.10
(.920)
(N = 718) (Constant) 41.42 2,479.01 0.02
(.987)
0.00
(.997)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07
(.941)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.79E-11 0.00 0.00 0.06
(.953)
(N = 662) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 117.53 40.11 2.93
(.004)
0.43
(.653)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 190.45 238.52 0.03 0.80
(.425)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -257.18 431.53 -0.02 -0.60
(.551)
(N = 629) (Constant) 117.12 39.88 2.94
(.003)
0.34
(.715)
.001
149
∆grants%1999-1998 161.92 240.13 0.03 0.67
(.500)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -213.68 409.28 -0.02 -0.52
(.602)
(N = 654) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 122.74 41.64 2.95
(.003)
0.36
(.696)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 172.56 246.66 0.03 0.70
(.484)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -266.26 445.41 -0.02 -0.60
(.550)
(N = 621) (Constant) 121.86 41.41 2.94
(.003)
0.34
(.711)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 168.97 248.18 0.03 0.68
(.496)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -221.87 422.38 -0.02 -0.53
(.600)
(N = 176) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 41.61 33.16 1.25
(.211)
11.12
(.000)
.114
∆subsidy%1999-1998 1,170.97 279.16 0.33 4.19
(.000)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 1,994.68 527.56 0.30 3.78
(.000)
(N = 164) (Constant) 42.05 32.81 1.28
(.202)
12.62
(.000)
.127
∆grants%1999-1998 1,298.78 287.85 0.36 4.51
(.000)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 2,152.59 531.60 0.32 4.05
(.000)
Religion-Related
(N = 240) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 97,169.03 37,971.31 2.56
(.011)
1.25
(.288)
.010
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.11 0.12 -0.06 -0.87
(.385)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 7.74E-08 0.00 0.09 1.45
(.149)
(N = 211) (Constant) 96,540.32 38,095.00 2.53
(.012)
0.86
(.423)
.007
∆grants$1999-1998 0.31 0.24 0.14 1.30
(.196)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.23E-07 0.00 -0.13 -1.17
(.243)
150
(N = 240) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 97,077.36 37,230.03 2.61
(.010)
1.42
(.245)
.012
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.13 0.12 -0.07 -1.05
(.295)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 7.71E-08 0.00 0.10 1.47
(.142)
(N = 211) (Constant) 96,966.01 37,414.70 2.59
(.010)
0.62
(.537)
.005
∆grants$1999-1998 0.26 0.24 0.12 1.09
(.277)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.06E-07 0.00 -0.11 -1.02
(.308)
(N = 240) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 91.67 5,130.04 0.02
(.986)
0.71
(.492)
.006
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.02 0.08 1.17
(.243)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.57E-10 0.00 0.00 0.04
(.972)
(N = 211) (Constant) -425.69 5,122.60 -0.08
(.934)
1.45
(.237)
.012
∆grants$1999-1998 0.06 0.03 0.19 1.69
(.092)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.78E-08 0.00 -0.14 -1.26
(.210)
(N = 205) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 34.24 15.21 2.25
(.025)
0.39
(.677)
.004
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -72.49 86.44 -0.06 -0.84
(.403)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -6.74 138.36 0.00 -0.05
(.961)
(N = 189) (Constant) 35.72 15.28 2.34
(.020)
0.31
(.734)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 -48.31 83.96 -0.04 -0.58
(.566)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -40.48 133.36 -0.02 -0.30
(.762)
(N = 199) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 50.28 17.87 2.81
(.005)
0.19
(.827)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -25.53 119.92 -0.02 -0.21
(.832)
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(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -78.19 198.70 -0.03 -0.39
(.694)
(N = 184) (Constant) 52.07 17.92 2.91
(.004)
0.35
(.706)
.004
∆grants%1999-1998 14.89 118.07 0.01 0.13
(.900)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -144.60 192.53 -0.07 -0.75
(.454)
(N = 79) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 4.88 8.91 0.55
(.585)
2.99
(.056)
.080
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -291.63 113.13 -0.50 -2.58
(.012)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -388.52 182.78 -0.42 -2.13
(.037)
(N = 76) (Constant) 4.91 8.86 0.55
(.581)
2.94
(.059)
.092
∆grants%1999-1998 -306.11 110.62 -0.54 -2.77
(.007)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -409.70 180.61 -0.44 -2.27
(.026)
Science and Technology
(N = 148) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) -8,235.09 59,573.30 -0.14
(.890)
0.98
(.378)
.013
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.12 1.25
(.213)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.04E-11 0.00 -0.01 -0.09
(.929)
(N = 127) (Constant) -6,504.99 61,086.07 -0.11
(.915)
0.49
(.614)
.007
∆grants$1999-1998 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.94
(.349)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.43E-09 0.00 -0.06 -0.47
(.637)
(N = 148) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) -28,149.25 58,338.52 -0.48
(.630)
0.96
(.386)
.013
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.01 0.11 1.20
(.234)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.60E-13 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.999)
152
(N = 127) (Constant) -26,255.74 59,851.17 -0.44
(.662)
0.39
(.677)
.005
∆grants$1999-1998 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.81
(.420)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.74E-09 0.00 -0.04 -0.35
(.730)
(N = 148) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 19,914.17 10,612.50 1.88
(.063)
0.15
(.861)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.45
(.651)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.99E-11 0.00 -0.05 -0.49
(.621)
(N = 127) (Constant) 19,750.75 10,829.43 1.82
(.070)
0.37
(.693)
.005
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.83
(.409)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -6.90E-10 0.00 -0.09 -0.76
(.451)
(N = 106) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 89.41 35.54 2.52
(.013)
0.05
(.948)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 11.88 134.90 0.01 0.09
(.930)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 61.77 192.36 0.03 0.32
(.749)
(N = 97) (Constant) 91.58 35.31 2.59
(.011)
0.28
(.760)
.005
∆grants%1999-1998 -99.60 154.42 -0.06 -0.64
(.520)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 84.53 235.20 0.04 0.36
(.720)
(N = 100) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 94.52 37.89 2.49
(.014)
0.01
(.987)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -10.78 139.23 -0.01 -0.08
(.938)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 26.36 199.22 0.01 0.13
(.895)
(N = 91) (Constant) 95.64 37.59 2.54
(.013)
0.27
(.765)
.005
∆grants%1999-1998 -110.10 159.42 -0.07 -0.69
(.491)
153
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 57.55 243.31 0.02 0.24
(.814)
(N = 20) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) -21.01 21.66 -0.97
(.345)
2.58
(.105)
.233
∆subsidy%1999-1998 74.76 153.03 0.21 0.49
(.631)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 157.23 232.54 0.29 0.68
(.508)
(N = 20) (Constant) -26.72 16.78 -1.59
(.130)
10.70
(.001)
.557
∆grants%1999-1998 -170.72 130.51 -0.36 -1.31
(.208)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 898.44 245.30 1.01 3.66
(.002)
Social Science
(N = 87) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 519,824.41 304,116.25 1.71
(.091)
0.12
(.890)
.003
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.06 0.14 -0.20 -0.45
(.657)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 6.91E-10 0.00 0.18 0.39
(.698)
(N = 76) (Constant) 519,743.37 304,128.49 1.71
(.091)
0.11
(.892)
.003
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.06 0.14 -0.20 -0.44
(.660)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 6.85E-10 0.00 0.18 0.39
(.701)
(N = 87) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 520,647.75 304,048.49 1.71
(.091)
0.12
(.891)
.003
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.06 0.14 -0.20 -0.44
(.658)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 6.89E-10 0.00 0.18 0.39
(.699)
(N = 76) (Constant) 520,566.86 304,060.68 1.71
(.091)
0.11
(.892)
.003
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.06 0.14 -0.20 -0.44
(.660)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 6.83E-10 0.00 0.18 0.38
(.702)
154
(N = 87) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) -823.34 1,824.65 -0.45
(.653)
0.02
(.982)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.18
(.856)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.02E-12 0.00 0.09 0.19
(.850)
(N = 76) (Constant) -823.49 1,824.70 -0.45
(.653)
0.02
(.983)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.18
(.858)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.00E-12 0.00 0.09 0.19
(.852)
(N = 75) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 32.86 16.99 1.93
(.057)
7.54
(.001)
.173
∆subsidy%1999-1998 40.24 160.42 0.05 0.25
(.803)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 383.83 200.73 0.37 1.91
(.060)
(N = 68) (Constant) 37.34 17.48 2.14
(.036)
4.58
(.013)
.113
∆grants%1999-1998 28.24 179.10 0.03 0.16
(.875)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 481.17 261.23 0.32 1.84
(.070)
(N = 73) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 76.79 44.26 1.74
(.087)
0.83
(.440)
.023
∆subsidy%1999-1998 64.14 418.15 0.03 0.15
(.879)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 295.10 521.23 0.12 0.57
(.573)
(N = 66) (Constant) 80.82 44.15 1.83
(.071)
0.53
(.590)
.015
∆grants%1999-1998 63.99 453.56 0.03 0.14
(.888)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 361.27 656.56 0.10 0.55
(.584)
(N = 9) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 95.62 76.03 1.26
(.255)
1.18
(.369)
.283
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -522.92 424.48 -0.45 -1.23
(.264)
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(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -3,540.03 2,755.79 -0.47 -1.28
(.246)
(N = 9) (Constant) 95.62 76.03 1.26
(.255)
1.18
(.369)
.283
∆grants%1999-1998 -522.92 424.48 -0.45 -1.23
(.264)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -3,540.03 2,755.79 -0.47 -1.28
(.246)
Youth Development
(N = 1,192) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 54,187.04 29,716.60 1.82
(.068)
207.17
(.000)
.258
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.40 0.10 0.13 3.91
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.52E-07 0.00 0.41 12.33
(.000)
(N = 1,146) (Constant) 56,896.90 29,655.22 1.92
(.055)
212.67
(.000)
.263
∆grants$1999-1998 0.28 0.14 0.09 2.07
(.039)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.66E-07 0.00 0.44 10.41
(.000)
(N = 1,192) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 45,376.01 29,521.59 1.54
(.125)
211.17
(.000)
.262
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.42 0.10 0.14 4.19
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.50E-07 0.00 0.41 12.26
(.000)
(N = 1,146) (Constant) 47,807.54 29,470.15 1.62
(.105)
216.17
(.000)
.267
∆grants$1999-1998 0.32 0.14 0.10 2.37
(.018)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.63E-07 0.00 0.43 10.25
(.000)
(N = 1,192) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 8,811.03 3,113.32 2.83
(.005)
2.80
(.061)
.005
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -2.36
(.018)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.92E-09 0.00 0.06 1.49
(.137)
156
(N = 1,146) (Constant) 9,089.36 3,115.30 2.92
(.004)
3.65
(.026)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.04 0.01 -0.13 -2.70
(.007)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 3.57E-09 0.00 0.10 2.13
(.033)
(N = 1,152) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 50.50 10.18 4.96
(.000)
0.94
(.392)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 90.20 66.21 0.04 1.36
(.173)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -9.61 131.05 0.00 -0.07
(.942)
(N = 1,112) (Constant) 50.36 10.13 4.97
(.000)
0.70
(.497)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 79.78 67.47 0.03 1.18
(.237)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -1.17 128.38 0.00 -0.01
(.993)
(N = 1,136) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 77.13 12.89 5.98
(.000)
0.15
(.862)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 44.74 84.84 0.02 0.53
(.598)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 21.46 177.08 0.00 0.12
(.904)
(N = 1,097) (Constant) 76.45 12.82 5.96
(.000)
0.61
(.541)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 90.67 87.13 0.03 1.04
(.298)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 43.99 174.08 0.01 0.25
(.801)
(N = 789) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 24.06 7.49 3.21
(.001)
0.85
(.426)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 72.26 59.58 0.04 1.21
(.226)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -63.18 126.04 -0.02 -0.50
(.616)
(N = 762) (Constant) 24.28 7.47 3.25
(.001)
0.89
(.411)
.002
∆grants%1999-1998 72.18 61.09 0.04 1.18
(.238)
157
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -74.37 126.31 -0.02 -0.59
(.556)
By Size
Smallest NPOs
(N = 5,036) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 5,583.39 1,859.20 3.00
(.003)
2.10
(.123)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -1.70
(.090)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -5.97E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.78
(.435)
(N = 4,716) (Constant) 5,596.67 1,858.90 3.01
(.003)
2.15
(.117)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -1.73
(.085)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -5.38E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.69
(.490)
(N = 5,036) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 4,108.83 1,782.78 2.30
(.021)
2.91
(.055)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -2.10
(.036)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -5.43E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.74
(.459)
(N = 4,716) (Constant) 4,125.05 1,782.46 2.31
(.021)
3.04
(.048)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -2.16
(.031)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -4.66E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.62
(.532)
(N = 5,036) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,474.86 715.22 2.06
(.039)
0.34
(.715)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82
(.413)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -5.37E-11 0.00 0.00 -0.18
(.855)
(N = 4,716) (Constant) 1,471.92 715.10 2.06
(.040)
0.40
(.670)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.90
(.371)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -7.14E-11 0.00 0.00 -0.24
(.812)
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(N = 4,044) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 189.61 52.55 3.61
(.000)
2.77
(.063)
.003
∆subsidy%1999-1998 775.30 241.04 0.05 3.22
(.001)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 615.45 423.00 0.02 1.45
(.146)
(N = 3,897) (Constant) 191.10 52.37 3.65
(.000)
2.70
(.067)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 771.37 246.01 0.05 3.14
(.002)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 601.04 427.30 0.02 1.41
(.160)
(N = 3,956) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 200.56 53.87 3.72
(.000)
2.82
(.060)
.003
∆subsidy%1999-1998 724.73 249.00 0.05 2.91
(.004)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 632.50 439.46 0.02 1.44
(.150)
(N = 3,813) (Constant) 202.19 53.69 3.77
(.000)
2.79
(.062)
.003
∆grants%1999-1998 717.87 254.91 0.04 2.82
(.005)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 612.20 447.31 0.02 1.37
(.171)
(N = 961) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 77.30 28.22 2.74
(.006)
0.40
(.672)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 74.34 142.26 0.02 0.52
(.601)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -158.65 254.38 -0.02 -0.62
(.533)
(N = 306) (Constant) 76.12 28.14 2.70
(.007)
0.35
(.705)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 78.02 147.30 0.02 0.53
(.596)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -127.88 257.96 -0.02 -0.50
(.620)
2nd Quintile
(N = 7,213) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 12,119.50 1,829.92 6.62
(.000)
0.01
(.988)
.000
159
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.15
(.883)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.56E-10 0.00 0.00 -0.10
(.919)
(N = 6,630) (Constant) 12,116.86 1,829.68 6.62
(.000)
0.01
(.995)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(.990)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.41E-10 0.00 0.00 -0.10
(.923)
(N = 7,213) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 10,637.63 1,783.62 5.96
(.000)
0.01
(.993)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.10
(.919)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 4.47E-11 0.00 0.00 0.01
(.990)
(N = 6,630) (Constant) 10,639.17 1,783.39 5.97
(.000)
0.00
(.999)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.04
(.970)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.23E-11 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.997)
(N = 7,213) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 1,481.14 347.70 4.26
(.000)
0.18
(.834)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25
(.803)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -4.01E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.60
(.547)
(N = 6,630) (Constant) 1,476.96 347.66 4.25
(.000)
0.19
(.824)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
(.895)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.28E-10 0.00 -0.01 -0.49
(.623)
(N = 5,975) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 132.25 24.90 5.31
(.000)
0.64
(.530)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 131.98 123.63 0.01 1.07
(.286)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 71.35 205.82 0.00 0.35
(.729)
160
(N = 5,690) (Constant) 132.00 24.81 5.32
(.000)
0.53
(.589)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 121.97 129.60 0.01 0.94
(.347)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 90.16 216.66 0.01 0.42
(.677)
(N = 5,810) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 160.65 30.73 5.23
(.000)
0.15
(.860)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 84.86 154.62 0.01 0.55
(.583)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 1.47 261.18 0.00 0.01
(.996)
(N = 5,535) (Constant) 160.45 30.61 5.24
(.000)
0.14
(.873)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 83.78 161.83 0.01 0.52
(.605)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 10.36 274.51 0.00 0.04
(.970)
(N = 1,956) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 107.55 34.77 3.09
(.002)
0.19
(.823)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 122.36 197.95 0.01 0.62
(.537)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 7.31 348.80 0.00 0.02
(.983)
(N = 1,881) (Constant) 107.63 34.59 3.11
(.002)
0.09
(.915)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 85.28 207.48 0.01 0.41
(.681)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -2.85 355.60 0.00 -0.01
(.994)
3rd Quintile
(N = 8,568) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 25,132.03 9,258.42 2.71
(.007)
0.20
(.822)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.26
(.793)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -7.80E-09 0.00 -0.01 -0.56
(.577)
(N = 7,728) (Constant) 25,147.95 9,256.05 2.72
(.007)
0.22
(.804)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.34
(.737)
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(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -7.75E-09 0.00 -0.01 -0.55
(.580)
(N = 8,568) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 22,641.43 9,244.70 2.45
(.014)
0.25
(.781)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.43
(.669)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -7.57E-09 0.00 -0.01 -0.54
(.587)
(N = 7,728) (Constant) 22,645.04 9,242.34 2.45
(.014)
0.27
(.765)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.48
(.633)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -7.48E-09 0.00 -0.01 -0.53
(.593)
(N = 8,568) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 2,488.53 603.42 4.12
(.000)
3.20
(.041)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.03 2.52
(.012)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -2.25E-10 0.00 0.00 -0.25
(.805)
(N = 7,728) (Constant) 2,500.85 603.33 4.15
(.000)
2.37
(.094)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.02 2.17
(.030)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.77E-10 0.00 0.00 -0.30
(.762)
(N = 7,106) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 348.27 130.90 2.66
(.008)
0.17
(.842)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 247.67 689.47 0.00 0.36
(.719)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -493.83 1,115.32 -0.01 -0.44
(.658)
(N = 6,640) (Constant) 345.78 130.49 2.65
(.008)
0.14
(.866)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 245.20 744.42 0.00 0.33
(.742)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -477.00 1,239.95 0.00 -0.38
(.700)
(N = 6,917) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 176.88 28.90 6.12
(.000)
0.70
(.496)
.000
162
∆subsidy%1999-1998 167.06 152.38 0.01 1.10
(.273)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -96.93 246.84 0.00 -0.39
(.695)
(N = 6,463) (Constant) 176.28 28.81 6.12
(.000)
0.48
(.618)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 146.25 164.25 0.01 0.89
(.373)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -88.86 274.24 0.00 -0.32
(.746)
(N = 2,678) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 41.50 17.55 2.36
(.018)
0.76
(.467)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 78.46 106.35 0.01 0.74
(.461)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 166.81 180.28 0.02 0.93
(.355)
(N = 2,532) (Constant) 40.48 17.50 2.31
(.021)
1.05
(.348)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 93.52 113.97 0.02 0.82
(.412)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 245.71 197.62 0.02 1.24
(.214)
4th Quintile
(N = 9,298) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 35,305.16 5,688.38 6.21
(.000)
24.07
(.000)
.005
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.05 0.01 0.04 3.64
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.18E-08 0.00 0.07 6.30
(.000)
(N = 8,339) (Constant) 35,566.53 5,673.82 6.27
(.000)
26.73
(.000)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 0.06 0.02 0.04 4.01
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.30E-08 0.00 0.07 6.55
(.000)
(N = 9,298) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 30,333.64 5,474.41 5.54
(.000)
26.50
(.000)
.006
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.05 0.01 0.04 3.93
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.18E-08 0.00 0.07 6.56
(.000)
163
(N = 8,339) (Constant) 30,596.12 5,460.24 5.60
(.000)
29.45
(.000)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 0.06 0.01 0.05 4.33
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.30E-08 0.00 0.07 6.81
(.000)
(N = 9,298) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 4,971.43 1,616.24 3.08
(.002)
0.12
(.887)
.000
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.49
(.625)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -3.85E-11 0.00 0.00 -0.04
(.969)
(N = 8,339) (Constant) 4,970.34 1,612.55 3.08
(.002)
0.15
(.858)
.000
∆grants$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.55
(.581)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.14E-11 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(.991)
(N = 7,739) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 656.92 445.78 1.47
(.141)
0.04
(.964)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 625.17 2,526.45 0.00 0.25
(.805)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -393.22 3,724.37 0.00 -0.11
(.916)
(N = 7,132) (Constant) 658.03 444.63 1.48
(.139)
0.01
(.989)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 290.11 2,827.01 0.00 0.10
(.918)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -496.08 4,455.31 0.00 -0.11
(.911)
(N = 7,485) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 219.94 64.55 3.41
(.001)
1.79
(.167)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 513.80 363.82 0.02 1.41
(.158)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 683.72 535.95 0.01 1.28
(.202)
(N = 6,903) (Constant) 222.58 64.38 3.46
(.001)
0.82
(.439)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 136.66 410.74 0.00 0.33
(.739)
164
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 806.24 650.56 0.01 1.24
(.215)
(N = 3,483) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 73.24 24.25 3.02
(.003)
0.19
(.825)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 1.32 159.03 0.00 0.01
(.993)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -158.76 257.82 -0.01 -0.62
(.538)
(N = 3,373) (Constant) 72.46 24.20 2.99
(.003)
0.13
(.879)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 6.75 171.87 0.00 0.04
(.969)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -147.00 291.64 -0.01 -0.50
(.614)
Largest
NPOs
(N = 9,689) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 242,563.80 64,810.09 3.74
(.000)
11.93
(.000)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.04 0.02 0.03 2.41
(.016)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.82E-10 0.00 0.02 1.36
(.172)
(N = 8,740) (Constant) 257,974.79 64,855.17 3.98
(.000)
3.83
(.022)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.99
(.322)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.96E-10 0.00 0.02 1.11
(.267)
(N = 9,689) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 220,849.58 57,069.87 3.87
(.000)
19.66
(.000)
.004
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.08 0.02 0.07 4.90
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -7.21E-11 0.00 -0.01 -0.61
(.540)
(N = 8,740) (Constant) 224,767.45 57,089.66 3.94
(.000)
14.93
(.000)
.003
∆grants$1999-1998 0.11 0.02 0.07 5.12
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -3.56E-10 0.00 -0.03 -2.29
(.022)
165
(N = 9,689) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 21,714.22 31,128.43 0.70
(.485)
9.27
(.000)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 -3.97
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.54E-10 0.00 0.06 3.97
(.000)
(N = 8,740) (Constant) 33,207.34 31,062.07 1.07
(.285)
28.67
(.000)
.006
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.09 0.01 -0.11 -7.34
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 5.52E-10 0.00 0.09 6.54
(.000)
(N = 8,423) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 137.30 17.75 7.74
(.000)
0.02
(.980)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 15.13 111.10 0.00 0.14
(.892)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -21.29 157.56 0.00 -0.14
(.893)
(N = 7,669) (Constant) 138.04 17.61 7.84
(.000)
0.44
(.646)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 115.93 139.45 0.01 0.83
(.406)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -60.79 203.35 0.00 -0.30
(.765)
(N = 8,103) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 177.24 24.43 7.26
(.000)
0.20
(.818)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -13.74 153.15 0.00 -0.09
(.929)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 135.30 217.58 0.01 0.62
(.534)
(N = 7,371) (Constant) 181.77 24.24 7.50
(.000)
0.64
(.528)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 208.72 192.92 0.01 1.08
(.279)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -52.39 283.30 0.00 -0.18
(.853)
(N = 3,673) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 295.34 183.01 1.61
(.107)
1.16
(.312)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 1,654.14 1,105.71 0.02 1.50
(.135)
166
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 757.17 1,601.03 0.01 0.47
(.636)
(N = 3,373) (Constant) 290.04 181.44 1.60
(.110)
2.26
(.105)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 2,932.66 1,432.44 0.04 2.05
(.041)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 2,435.58 2,153.35 0.02 1.13
(.258)
By % 1999 revenue from government sources
0 to 25
(N = 17,555) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 132,660.17 37,112.94 3.57
(.000)
60.84
(.000)
.007
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.08 0.02 0.04 3.77
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.22E-09 0.00 0.06 5.92
(.000)
(N = 16,391) (Constant) 125,977.76 37,074.47 3.40
(.001)
69.97
(.000)
.008
∆grants$1999-1998 0.07 0.03 0.02 2.46
(.014)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 6.22E-09 0.00 0.09 11.27
(.000)
(N = 17,555) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 141,753.24 32,772.66 4.33
(.000)
86.31
(.000)
.010
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.18 0.02 0.09 9.67
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 2.13E-10 0.00 0.01 1.17
(.244)
(N = 16,391) (Constant) 136,880.46 32,802.52 4.17
(.000)
62.48
(.000)
.007
∆grants$1999-1998 0.24 0.02 0.08 9.82
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.12E-09 0.00 0.03 4.33
(.000)
(N = 17,555) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) -9,092.97 17,587.90 -0.52
(.605)
64.53
(.000)
.008
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.10 0.01 -0.10 -10.05
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.01E-09 0.00 0.10 10.32
(.000)
167
(N = 16,391) (Constant) -10,902.61 17,446.45 -0.62
(.532)
193.68
(.000)
.023
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.18 0.01 -0.10 -13.25
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 4.11E-09 0.00 0.12 15.80
(.000)
(N = 15,756) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 177.75 49.12 3.62
(.000)
1.08
(.340)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 901.32 626.42 0.03 1.44
(.150)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 986.67 861.83 0.02 1.14
(.252)
(N = 14,943) (Constant) 175.07 48.75 3.59
(.000)
0.97
(.380)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 911.27 662.59 0.02 1.38
(.169)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 1,040.04 969.64 0.02 1.07
(.283)
(N = 15,386) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 147.20 17.60 8.36
(.000)
2.90
(.055)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 650.64 225.04 0.05 2.89
(.004)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 869.27 311.42 0.05 2.79
(.005)
(N = 14,596) (Constant) 145.86 17.47 8.35
(.000)
2.89
(.056)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 661.22 238.07 0.04 2.78
(.005)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 953.73 352.91 0.04 2.70
(.007)
(N = 5,535) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 60.74 11.74 5.17
(.000)
1.06
(.347)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -145.19 157.80 -0.03 -0.92
(.358)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -291.41 219.93 -0.04 -1.32
(.185)
(N = 5,263) (Constant) 59.26 11.63 5.10
(.000)
1.63
(.196)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 -263.46 168.10 -0.04 -1.57
(.117)
168
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -442.55 245.14 -0.05 -1.81
(.071)
25.1 to 50
(N = 6,438) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 57,488.95 10,904.04 5.27
(.000)
95.54
(.000)
.029
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.10 0.01 0.21 13.55
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.23E-09 0.00 0.16 10.38
(.000)
(N = 5,982) (Constant) 50,120.68 10,355.76 4.84
(.000)
463.71
(.000)
.126
∆grants$1999-1998 0.05 0.02 0.04 2.71
(.007)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.25E-08 0.00 0.32 19.53
(.000)
(N = 6,438) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 52,593.82 10,646.82 4.94
(.000)
93.08
(.000)
.028
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.09 0.01 0.20 13.17
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.25E-09 0.00 0.17 10.80
(.000)
(N = 5,982) (Constant) 44,790.90 10,114.06 4.43
(.000)
459.10
(.000)
.125
∆grants$1999-1998 0.07 0.02 0.06 3.78
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 2.09E-08 0.00 0.31 18.59
(.000)
(N = 6,438) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 4,895.14 2,793.78 1.75
(.080)
7.73
(.000)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.04 2.69
(.007)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -2.02E-11 0.00 -0.01 -0.66
(.508)
(N = 5,982) (Constant) 5,329.78 2,794.88 1.91
(.057)
13.03
(.000)
.004
∆grants$1999-1998 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -3.63
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.59E-09 0.00 0.09 5.10
(.000)
169
(N = 5,665) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 76.61 10.14 7.55
(.000)
1.37
(.254)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 55.43 54.13 0.01 1.02
(.306)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 218.86 167.29 0.02 1.31
(.191)
(N = 5,322) (Constant) 87.36 9.95 8.78
(.000)
2.26
(.105)
.001
∆grants%1999-1998 96.30 56.72 0.02 1.70
(.090)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -201.61 166.20 -0.02 -1.21
(.225)
(N = 5,515) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 108.12 27.00 4.00
(.000)
1.30
(.273)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -65.88 143.52 -0.01 -0.46
(.646)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 682.98 442.78 0.02 1.54
(.123)
(N = 5,183) (Constant) 136.21 26.50 5.14
(.000)
0.47
(.626)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 38.02 150.33 0.00 0.25
(.800)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -406.93 439.50 -0.01 -0.93
(.355)
(N = 2,429) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 87.70 34.68 2.53
(.012)
0.11
(.893)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 101.44 221.27 0.01 0.46
(.647)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 103.79 736.26 0.00 0.14
(.888)
(N = 2,294) (Constant) 85.84 33.62 2.55
(.011)
0.27
(.762)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 162.67 230.37 0.01 0.71
(.480)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 212.50 633.22 0.01 0.34
(.737)
50.1 to 75
(N = 6,854) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 32,876.65 5,777.45 5.69
(.000)
94.66
(.000)
.027
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.10
(.272)
170
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 9.15E-11 0.00 0.13 3.84
(.000)
(N = 6,106) (Constant) 25,950.39 5,706.94 4.55
(.000)
189.82
(.000)
.053
∆grants$1999-1998 0.08 0.01 0.47 10.83
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.09E-10 0.00 -0.26 -5.97
(.000)
(N = 6,854) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 29,374.18 5,481.59 5.36
(.000)
112.24
(.000)
.032
∆subsidy$1999-1998 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -2.46
(.014)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 1.71E-10 0.00 0.25 7.54
(.000)
(N = 6,106) (Constant) 25,024.67 5,458.45 4.58
(.000)
150.19
(.000)
.042
∆grants$1999-1998 0.03 0.01 0.19 4.42
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 1.19E-11 0.00 0.02 0.36
(.722)
(N = 6,854) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 3,499.73 2,026.04 1.73
(.084)
48.27
(.000)
.014
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.00 0.33 9.79
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -7.91E-11 0.00 -0.32 -9.46
(.000)
(N = 6,106) (Constant) 922.95 1,990.85 0.46
(.643)
179.54
(.000)
.050
∆grants$1999-1998 0.05 0.00 0.82 18.94
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.21E-10 0.00 -0.78 -18.08
(.000)
(N = 5,513) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 82.54 11.23 7.35
(.000)
2.66
(.070)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 202.57 85.90 0.05 2.36
(.018)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -115.08 179.11 -0.01 -0.64
(.521)
(N = 5,111) (Constant) 82.61 11.10 7.44
(.000)
2.62
(.073)
.001
171
∆grants%1999-1998 169.75 69.99 0.04 2.43
(.015)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -32.40 142.00 0.00 -0.23
(.820)
(N = 5,320) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 143.07 26.37 5.43
(.000)
0.51
(.598)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 192.61 202.61 0.02 0.95
(.342)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -398.04 422.27 -0.02 -0.94
(.346)
(N = 4,934) (Constant) 143.22 26.07 5.49
(.000)
0.64
(.526)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 160.26 163.71 0.02 0.98
(.328)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -335.07 331.54 -0.02 -1.01
(.312)
(N = 2,529) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 203.64 205.89 0.99
(.323)
1.90
(.150)
.002
∆subsidy%1999-1998 3,096.02 1,844.48 0.05 1.68
(.093)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -2,214.25 3,885.65 -0.02 -0.57
(.569)
(N = 2,368) (Constant) 177.15 204.20 0.87
(.386)
2.05
(.128)
.002
∆grants%1999-1998 2,456.46 1,479.92 0.04 1.66
(.097)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 833.35 3,130.92 0.01 0.27
(.790)
75.1 to 100
(N = 9,823) ∆charity$2000-1999 (Constant) 30,463.67 6,397.35 4.76
(.000)
12.53
(.000)
.003
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.02 0.00 0.08 4.92
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -2.28E-10 0.00 -0.07 -4.32
(.000)
(N = 8,503) (Constant) 32,567.52 6,322.76 5.15
(.000)
12.68
(.000)
.003
∆grants$1999-1998 0.02 0.00 0.07 4.89
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -2.86E-10 0.00 -0.06 -4.37
(.000)
172
(N = 9,823) ∆direct$2000-1999 (Constant) 20,030.76 4,107.51 4.88
(.000)
10.30
(.000)
.002
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.07 4.27
(.000)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -1.44E-10 0.00 -0.07 -4.23
(.000)
(N = 8,503) (Constant) 21,285.46 4,059.56 5.24
(.000)
10.59
(.000)
.002
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.06 4.13
(.000)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.84E-10 0.00 -0.06 -4.39
(.000)
(N = 9,823) ∆indirect$2000-1999 (Constant) 10,432.41 4,923.64 2.12
(.034)
4.01
(.018)
.001
∆subsidy$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.04 2.83
(.005)
(∆subsidy$1999-1998)2 -8.46E-11 0.00 -0.03 -2.08
(.037)
(N = 8,503) (Constant) 11,281.59 4,866.20 2.32
(.020)
4.22
(.015)
.001
∆grants$1999-1998 0.01 0.00 0.04 2.90
(.004)
(∆grants$1999-1998)2 -1.02E-10 0.00 -0.03 -2.02
(.043)
(N = 7,131) %∆charity2000-1999 (Constant) 958.16 503.37 1.90
(.057)
0.02
(.984)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 653.34 6,985.39 0.00 0.09
(.925)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -1,261.85 8,784.08 0.00 -0.14
(.886)
(N = 6,359) (Constant) 966.33 494.09 1.96
(.051)
0.02
(.985)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 167.16 3,096.65 0.00 0.05
(.957)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -682.47 4,069.30 0.00 -0.17
(.867)
(N =6,748) %∆direct2000-1999 (Constant) 363.32 80.73 4.50
(.000)
2.05
(.129)
.001
∆subsidy%1999-1998 2,005.87 1,110.41 0.06 1.81
(.071)
173
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 -1,874.44 1,394.59 -0.04 -1.34
(.179)
(N = 6,005) (Constant) 391.08 79.16 4.94
(.000)
0.58
(.559)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 354.60 499.79 0.01 0.71
(.478)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 186.27 657.02 0.00 0.28
(.777)
(N = 2,593) %∆indirect2000-1999 (Constant) 272.79 178.82 1.53
(.127)
0.12
(.887)
.000
∆subsidy%1999-1998 -1,235.09 2,703.26 -0.02 -0.46
(.648)
(∆subsidy%1999-1998)2 1,253.43 3,545.39 0.02 0.35
(.724)
(N = 2,357) (Constant) 258.91 174.84 1.48
(.139)
0.04
(.961)
.000
∆grants%1999-1998 -179.14 1,119.96 0.00 -0.16
(.873)
(∆grants%1999-1998)2 -237.97 1,554.44 0.00 -0.15
(.878)
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